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Strange events and ironic conjunctions pervade the narrative of the 
renewal of provisions of the Voting Rights Act 2005–2006.  Never has the 
radical, still-controversial Act been treated in such hushed, reverential tones, 
and never has its discussion been so blatantly manipulated for immediate parti-
san advantage.  Never have there been so many proposals for comprehensive 
changes when the temporary parts of the Act have come up for renewal, and 
never has there been less serious debate about the Act in committees and on the 
floor of Congress.  Never has support for the Act in Congress and the country 
seemed so universal, and never has its constitutional future before the Supreme 
Court seemed so tenuous. 
This Article shows that the strange, ironic nature of the recent 
consideration of the Voting Rights Act is not unusual, but rather that it is typical 
of the history of the most controversial provision of the Act, Section 5, which 
requires that all changes in election laws in “covered jurisdictions,” chiefly in 
the Deep South, be submitted to the Justice Department or the District of 
Columbia District Court for “preclearance” before they are allowed to go into 
effect.  In its early years, Section 5 was largely ignored by state and local 
governments, and the Justice Department was too disorganized to police it, 
anyway.  After receiving a judicial blessing from the Supreme Court, Section 5 
was for the first time vigorously enforced by the Nixon Administration, which 
had opposed its effective continuation, and the Carter Administration, the first 
administration headed by a president from the Deep South since before the Civil 
War.  Two Supreme Court decisions in 1976 and 1980 that threatened to sap the 
Act’s vigor instead stimulated civil rights activists to mount a campaign for 
amendments that overwhelmed the Reagan Administration and led to the largest 
increase in minority elected officials since the first years of the post-Civil War 
Reconstruction.  But no sooner had the promise of the Act finally been fulfilled 
than the Supreme Court—through strained interpretations of the Act’s intentions 
and, even more ironically, through the use of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to hamper, instead of to protect, minority political rights—stripped 
the Act of much of its power.  By 2006, the Act’s iconic status insured its 
persistence, but the fears of its staunchest proponents and the barely hidden 
antipathy of many members of the dominant political party prevented amend-
ments that might have increased its chances to pass muster with the Roberts 
Court.  Eight days after President George W. Bush signed the law, Gregory 
Coleman, a Texas lawyer with strong ties to the Republican Party, filed a serious 
challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5.  The strange career continues. 
Analyzing the complete history of Section 5 and emphasizing the story’s 
ironic elements and shifting course yield lessons that may be useful in the con-
tinuing struggle to protect the political rights of minorities. 
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I. The Tangled History of the Voting Rights Act 
A. Latest Twists 
On July 20, 2006, only one day after the Senate Judiciary Committee 
reported a bill reauthorizing key provisions of what conservative columnist 
George Will called “the 20th century’s noblest and most transformative 
law,”1 the U.S. Senate briefly debated and unanimously passed the Voting 
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act (VRARA).2  The apparent 
impetus for the unusual haste3 by “the world’s greatest deliberative body,”4 
was the fact that President George W. Bush wished to cite the imminent pas-
sage of the Act as evidence of racial progress under his Administration in a 
speech, arranged at the last minute,5 marking his first appearance as president 
before a convention of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP).6 
But the curtailment of even the appearance of deliberation7 in order to 
serve the most immediate of political purposes was not the only odd aspect of 
the 2005–2006 renewal saga.  Despite overwhelming support for the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) in Congress and civil society—support that made it inevi-
table that even the Republican-controlled government would extend the life 
of the provisions at issue,8 chiefly Sections 5 and 2039—proponents of 
 
1. George F. Will, VRA, All of It, Forever?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 2005, at 70, 70.  Topping 
Will, Representative Steve Chabot of Ohio, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, which oversaw the House hearings on the Voting Rights Act in 
2005, termed the Act “perhaps the most significant piece of legislation ever passed.”  Christy 
Arnold, Voting Rights Act to Get Review, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 17, 2005, available at 
http://news.enquirer.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051017/NEWS01/510170354/1077. 
2. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1973); S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 54 (2006); Charles Babington, Voting Rights Act Extension 
Passes in Senate, 98 to 0, WASH. POST, July 21, 2006, at A1. 
3. In 1965, the Senate passed the VRA forty-six days after the Judiciary Committee reported it.  
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 21 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 533, 544–45 (1965).  In 1982, the time between 
reporting and passage in the Senate was forty-five days.  Voting Rights Act Extended, Strengthened, 
38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 373, 376 (1982). 
4. The phrase is ubiquitous; its origins, murky.  See, e.g., DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U.S. 
SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 5 (1960) (referring to the U.S. Senate as “the greatest deliberative 
body in the world”); Burdett A. Loomis, Civility and Deliberation: A Linked Pair?, in ESTEEMED 
COLLEAGUES 1, 1 (Burdett A. Loomis ed., 2000) (referring to the U.S. Senate as the “world’s 
greatest deliberative body”). 
5. Darryl Fears, President to Address NAACP Tomorrow, WASH. POST, July 19, 2006, at A5. 
6. Dana Milbank, For Bush and the NAACP, Uneasy Does It, WASH. POST, July 21, 2006, at 
A2; Patty Reinert, Chilly Reception for Bush in First Speech to NAACP, HOUS. CHRON., July 21, 
2006, at A1. 
7. In Rick Pildes’s fine phrase, congressional consideration of the VRARA was “a tale of 
political avoidance.”  Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 
117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 148, 151 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/614.pdf. 
8. See generally Jonathan Allen, In Senate, It’s D’j’ Vu All Over Again on Voting Rights Act 
Extension, HILL, June 28, 2006, available at http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/in-senate-its-dj-vu-
all-over-again-on-voting-rights-act-extension-2006-06-28.html (explaining that Republicans feared 




minority voting rights settled for only slight revisions in the law.10  Deferring 
entirely to Republican leaders, the overwhelmingly Democratic civil rights 
forces agreed to sponsor no amendments to the basic legislation encompass-
ing these revisions, and they gave Republicans full credit for passing the 
Act.11  Republicans, who controlled both houses of Congress for the first 
time ever during serious consideration of the VRA and who had displayed 
nearly unprecedented unity during the first six years of President George W. 
Bush’s term, split almost in half over the bill in the House and secured only 
one ambiguously written amendment to the VRA that clearly helped their 
party.12  Conversely, the often-factionalized Democrats, who claimed the 
allegiance of the overwhelming number of African-American and Latino 
voters and who had generally been shut out of influence over legislation 
during the George W. Bush Administration, managed, through almost com-
plete unity, to avoid changes that would have gutted or repealed Sections 5 
and 203, but their only positive accomplishment merely restored Section 5 to 
its damaged pre-2000 state.13  While the idealists were too cautious to seek 
 
opposition would label the party racist); Laurie Kellman, Parties Unite to Renew Voting Rights Act, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles 
/2006/05/02/dems_gop_stand_together_on_voting_rights (“Opponents [of the Act are] fighting a 
losing battle . . . .”); Rick Lyman, Extension of Voting Act Is Likely Despite Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 29, 2006, at A14 (describing the law as in “little danger of expiring”); Abigail Thernstrom & 
Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at A10 (suggesting that 
congressional Republicans “grovel” on race issues); Edward Blum, An Insulting Provision, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, May 2, 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NjRmNzIzZmRlZDM2ZWQ5Mm 
EzYmFjNWQ1NTVjNjk0NDU= (“[Republicans are] hell-bent on keeping this system in place.”). 
9. Section 203, added to the VRA in 1975, requires that jurisdictions with appreciable numbers 
of citizens who are not literate in English translate all election and ballot materials into the 
languages of the appropriate groups.  Voting Rights Act of 1965—Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 
sec. 203, § 4(f), 89 Stat. 400, 401–02 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b (West 
2003 & Supp. 2007)). 
10. See Posting of David Mikhail to The Hill’s Congress Blog, http://blog.thehill.com (June 26, 
2006) (on file with the Texas Law Review) [hereinafter Mikhail Posting] (noting compromises 
made by Democrats and civil rights leaders on measures regarding voter protection). 
11. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds as President Bush Signs Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/votingrights/gen/26259prs2006 
0727.html (lauding President Bush for signing the VRARA and specifically noting with approval 
that Congress had “rejected attempts to dilute the original intent of the bill”); NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, Minority Vote Protected for 25 More Years (July 27, 2006), http://www.naacpldf.org 
/content.aspx?article=956 (praising President Bush for signing the VRARA into law). 
12. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 5, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 
580–81 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c) (adding to Section 5 of the VRA the requirement that 
any voting qualification, practice, or other means that “has the purpose of or will have the effect of 
diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or color . . . to elect 
their preferred candidates . . . denies or abridges the right to vote within the meaning of subsection 
(a) of this section”); see also James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the 
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205, 222–23, 244–45, 250–51 (2007) 
(detailing the terms of the bill and describing Republican division). 
13. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 221–22, 237, 245 (describing Democrats withdrawing 
divisive amendments and refraining from partisan attacks). 
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changes in the VRA in an effort to dissuade the Supreme Court from apply-
ing its “New Federalism” doctrines14 to the Act, some Republicans, 
especially those on the Senate Judiciary Committee, adopted tactics and is-
sued statements and reports that virtually invited the Supreme Court to 
declare the VRA unconstitutional.15 
As a result of these and other strange occurrences, a manifestly effective 
law that rested upon a degree of support for minority political rights un-
precedented in the country’s history16 was simultaneously extended for 
another twenty-five years and threatened with judicial termination in the near 
future.17 
B. The Perils of Oversimplified, Partial Histories of Section 5 
This Article argues that the strange and ironic elements of the story of 
the 2006 VRARA are typical of the history of its most controversial 
provision, Section 5, and that recounting that history will help us both to 
understand a crucial civil rights policy and to devise workable solutions to 
the problems in voting rights that are sure to arise in the future, especially if 
the Supreme Court declares one or more sections of the VRA 
unconstitutional.  Telling the history of Section 5 in parts, as all past 
scholarship has, distorts its nature by smoothing out informative kinks, 
telescoping complex and often paradoxical developments, and misleadingly 
characterizing motives.18  It is too easy, as some scholars have, to see the 
Act’s development as linear and deterministic, without fits and starts, 
constant struggle, disappointments, as well as triumphs.  Thus, one treatment 
of the 1970–1982 renewals of the VRA, which painted them as rather easy 
 
14. See infra subpart VI(A). 
15. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 261–67 (describing attempts by Republican senators who 
voted for the VRARA to undermine the Act); Georgia Leaders Urge Lawsuits on Voting Rights Act, 
AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.), Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/091206/ 
met_96277.shtml (describing efforts by two Republican members of Congress to find a test case 
with which to challenge the constitutionality of the VRA). 
16. No legislative act or major amendments on minority political rights had ever passed a house 
of Congress unanimously before, and from 1872 until 1957, no such act had passed at all.  J. 
MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF 
THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 39–40 (1999) (detailing the Legislature’s roll-call votes on major 
issues of civil rights from 1866 to 1982). 
17. See Victor Andres Rodríguez, Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After 
Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 769, 794 (2003) (suggesting 
the judicial threat). 
18. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6–11 (2006) (telescoping events); BERNARD 
GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST 
FOR VOTING EQUALITY 30–31 (1992) (same); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 33–34, 38, 77, 82–84 (1987) (distorting the 
purpose of the Act); Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 167, 167–70 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (smoothing 
history); Dale Krane, Implementation of the Voting Rights Act: Enforcement by the Department of 
Justice, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 123, 124 (Lorn S. Foster 
ed., 1985) (presenting a static view of enforcement). 




and uneventful, declared that increasing support for the Act “demonstrates 
the happy logic of democracy.”19  Another, much more nuanced study still 
leaned toward inevitability, judging that as early as 1970, “the Voting Rights 
Act had become a valuable component of the American Creed.”20  Those 
civil rights supporters, who fail to realize how precarious the passage and 
early renewals of the Act were or who, paradoxically, underestimate the ex-
tent of the consensus that later supported it, may be too quick to compromise 
on necessary amendments, as I believe they were in 2006.  The dangers and 
problems currently facing the Act may seem irredeemably complex, even 
insurmountable,21 yet the law, which had a long and difficult gestation but a 
very quick birth induced by the Selma March, has been subject to crises and 
threats throughout its existence. 
Other commentators oversimplify in the service of a political agenda by 
dividing the Act’s history into a sole initial concern with the individual right 
to vote and a later bureaucratic or special-interest focus on electoral 
structures,22 but that view distorts reality.  Still others accept misleading 
shorthand characterizations of crucial cases interpreting the purposes of the 
Act.23  Such characterizations discourage the consideration of amendments to 
the Act designed to reverse the cases and short renewal periods for the Act 
that might embolden Congress to clarify misreadings of its goals by the 
 
19. Colin D. Moore, Extensions of the Voting Rights Act, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: 
SECURING THE BALLOT 95, 108 (Richard M. Valelly ed., 2006). 
20. STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL 
POLITICS, 1965–1982, at 156 (1985). 
21. See An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues 
Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9–10 
(2006) (statement of Richard L. Hasen, Professor, Loyola Law School) [hereinafter Hasen 
Statement] (fearing the Supreme Court would overturn Section 5 if coverage were not updated and 
more recent southern examples were not cited); Bob Bauer, The Constitutional Politics of the 
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization (May 4, 2006), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/ 
updates/voting_rights_act_redistricting_issues.html?AID=703 (suggesting that a Supreme Court 
ruling that the VRA is unconstitutional may force Congress to confront questions it now avoids). 
22. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 18, at 11 (“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 had a simple 
aim: providing ballots for southern blacks.  Within five years, . . . complex questions of electoral 
equality would arise, but certainly at the outset no one envisioned that turn of events.”).  By 1968, 
the attention of voting rights advocates was focused squarely on dilution, not on the right to vote per 
se.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 21–39 (1968) [hereinafter U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION] (discussing dilution as the main 
impediment to the impact of the black vote).  From 1975 to 1980, over 80% of the Justice 
Department’s objections were to such dilutive laws as at-large elections, majority-vote laws, 
redistricting, numbered posts, and annexations.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 65–70 (1981) [hereinafter U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
UNFULFILLED GOALS]. 
23. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own 
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1717–18 (2004) (discussing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 
130 (1976)). 
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courts more frequently.  Still others concentrate entirely on judicial cases24 
or, conversely, on administrative actions,25 both of which tend to overlook 
the complicated minuets involving courts, Congress, and bureaucracy.  
Awareness of these elaborate dances would make activists more anxious to 
push Congress for explicit amendments in the text of the law, more focused 
on oversight of bureaucratic procedures, and more skeptical about “bright-
line” rules.  The forms of voting discrimination may have changed over time, 
but until recently, at least, the VRA has been flexible enough to counter 
them.  That necessary flexibility is endangered by abstract rules,26 as well as 
by judicial and political restrictions on the Act’s scope.27  In a larger sense, 
the history of Section 5, reviewed entirely and in detail for the first time here, 
is only a chapter in America’s strange and ironic history of race relations, 
one that will be illuminated by applying insights drawn from the work of the 
dean of the twentieth-century study of the history of race relations, C. Vann 
Woodward.  Incomplete, oversimplified, superficial history provides an in-
adequate background for making or assessing policy.  To control the future, 
we must begin by understanding the past. 
II. Strange and Ironic: C. Vann Woodward’s View of Race Relations and 
Southern History 
The most widely read book ever written on the history of American race 
relations, C. Vann Woodward’s The Strange Career of Jim Crow, began in 
research that Woodward, a white southerner, conducted for the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund’s brief in Brown v. Board of Education.28  Composed on 
the cusp of change from the legally segregated to the legally desegregated 
 
24. See, e.g., KEITH J. BYBEE, MISTAKEN IDENTITY: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICS 
OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION 7 (1998) (analyzing the theoretical foundations of Supreme Court 
redistricting decisions and the ideological debates those decisions have produced). 
25. See, e.g., HOWARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 8 (1982) (examining the implementation of “radical voting rights policy” 
by “concentrating on administrative management . . . and focusing on the intergovernmental 
environment”). 
26. In 2006, Congress attempted to overrule Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) by 
stating that unless single minorities comprised half or more of a potential legislative or other 
district, they did not deserve protection under Section 5.  See infra notes 554–65 and accompanying 
text.  For a demonstration of the usefulness of the standards of Georgia v. Ashcroft in efforts to 
protect minority voting rights, see Tim Mellett et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Section 5 
Recommendation Memorandum 29–73 (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Section 5 Recommendation 
Memorandum], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/texasDOJ 
memo.pdf. 
27. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915–16 (1995) (holding that a redistricting 
scheme would be subject to strict scrutiny if it assigned any significant number of voters to a district 
on the basis of race); Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal: Voting Rights 
Finding on Map Pushed by DeLay Was Overruled, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at A1 (explaining 
that the professional staff of the Justice Department found Texas’s 2003 redistricting plan in 
violation of the VRA because the state did not prove that the plan had no discriminatory effect). 
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM 
CROW (1955). 




South, the short, but influential Strange Career was guardedly optimistic 
about the future of race relations after Brown.  Woodward’s analysis rested 
on four propositions: first, that institutions, not culture, had shaped southern 
race relations; second, that slavery and segregation were not equivalent and, 
more particularly, that segregation had not immediately replaced slavery as a 
“natural” form of racial control or interaction; third, that the extreme domi-
nation of one race over the other was not inevitable—there were forgotten 
alternatives to segregation and disfranchisement in the post-1877 South; and 
finally—a proposition so fundamental as to remain unnoticed, perhaps even 
to Woodward, but which has emerged against the background of recent static 
cultural treatments of the subject29—that race relations, like any other aspect 
of human relationships, could change and vary.  Strict, virtually uniform seg-
regation was, Woodward asserted, the result of state and local laws that 
regularized and policed previously untidy, frequently mixed, and sometimes 
nearly egalitarian, if furtive, relations between people of different races.  As 
party competition, especially, Woodward thought, between Populists and 
Democrats, tended to preserve black rights and status, white Democratic de-
sires to end both partisan opposition and any shreds of racial equality 
prevailed only through law.30 
As the Civil Rights Movement intensified and then collapsed in the 
twenty years after Brown, and as national administrations moved from tepid 
support of black civil rights under Eisenhower, to enthusiastic cooptation 
under Johnson, to politicized backlash under Nixon, Strange Career went 
through three editions that mirrored the times.31  Even more than in the first 
edition, the later versions emphasized that changes might lurch forward or 
backward and the profound difficulty of sustaining policies that benefitted 
minorities.  At the time of the earlier classic, Gunnar Myrdal’s American 
Dilemma, it had seemed to many people of good will that all America needed 
to do to solve its race problem was for whites to recognize the inconsistency 
 
29. See generally, e.g., MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: 
EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998) (discounting white-ethnic-group 
conflict); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991) (setting forth a static view of working-class racism); JOEL 
WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984) (offering a cultural–psychological interpretation); Eric Arneson, 
Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination, 60 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 3 (2001) 
(assessing “whiteness studies” negatively). 
30. See C. VANN WOODWARD, AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT: SLAVERY AND RACISM IN THE 
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE 252–60 (1964) (positing a link between party competition and black 
rights); WOODWARD, supra note 28, at 63, 81–82 (contending that laws regularized inconsistent 
practices). 
31. Woodward’s next paragraph after discussing the passage of the VRA in the third revised 
edition of Strange Career begins: “For a very brief interval the optimists had things their way.”  C. 
VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 186 (3d rev. ed. 1974). 
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between racial discrimination and the egalitarian “American Creed.”32  By 
1974, it was clear to Woodward and nearly everyone else that ideological 
consistency was at best only a first step.  There is an Olympian despair about 
the third and last revised edition of Strange Career, as the decade after the 
passage of the two major national civil rights laws brought a seeming aban-
donment on the part of both blacks and whites of the nonviolent methods that 
inspired the movement for the laws and the integrationist ideals that both the 
movement and the laws embodied.  Victory over segregation was no sooner 
declared than it was reversed.  The federal courts and the Executive 
Branch—which had forged and wielded the chief tools to attack racial 
inequality—had, by the time of Milliken v. Bradley,33 apparently become the 
engines of its reinforcement.34 
Woodward’s understanding, particularly in later editions of Strange 
Career, that racial discrimination takes many forms, his realistic view of the 
difficulty of eliminating prejudice and discriminatory behavior, and his per-
ception that racial progress is neither inevitable nor hopeless can help us 
unravel the complicated history of the VRA.  Section 5 of the VRA may be 
seen as representing the child of light to the segregation laws’ children of 
darkness35—the law that systematized a previously uneven and frustratingly 
slow assault on racial discrimination in voting and election structures36 and 
insured some uniformity in the guarantee to underrepresented ethnic-
minority groups of an equal opportunity to participate in elections and to 
 
32. See 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 23 (1944) (noting the conflict between the ideals of the “American Creed” and the 
“status actually awarded” to blacks). 
33. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
34. WOODWARD, supra note 30, at 211–12. 
35. The reference is to one of Woodward’s favorite authors, Reinhold Niebuhr.  See REINHOLD 
NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A VINDICATION OF 
DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENSE 9 (1960) (dubbing moral cynics 
“children of darkness” and “[t]hose who believe that self-interest should be brought under the 
discipline of a higher law . . . the children of light”); see also, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE 
BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 171, 171–72 (Vintage Books 1961) (1960) (applying Niebuhr’s 
analysis of the “American pretensions” of “illusions of innocence and virtue” to Woodward’s 
discussion of the “American legend of success and victory”). 
36. Chief Justice Warren wrote in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) 
(citation omitted): 
Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread 
and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and 
energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these 
lawsuits.  After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth 
Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia 
from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims. 
See also Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., pt. 
1, at 14 (1965) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“[E]xisting law 
is inadequate.  Litigation on a case-by-case basis simply cannot do the job.”).  The Justice 
Department’s frustrating experiences in Alabama before the passage of the VRA are detailed in 
BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT (2007). 




elect candidates of their choice.  In this sense, Section 5 represents a sort of 
inverse instance of Woodward’s “Jim Crow thesis,”37 with the implications 
that if the law is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court or strangled 
by narrow administrative construction, minority voting rights will again vary, 
perhaps widely, from place to place and from time to time, and that the 
dwindling party competition in many places in the South will provide, at 
best, only weak support for minority rights.  Woodward’s story of segrega-
tion and discrimination in the late nineteenth century was one of slow 
regression and then despair.  There are more parallels between race relations 
in the 1890s and the VRA in the 1990s than many scholars may realize.38 
There is another facet of Woodward’s scholarship, his insatiable taste 
for irony,39 that illuminates the history of Section 5.  In his still-timely essay 
The Irony of Southern History, Woodward contrasted “the American legend 
of success and victory,”40 a legend that has “fostered the tacit conviction that 
American ideals, values, and principles inevitably prevail in the end,” with 
the white southern experience of defeat and discontinuity, the product of the 
Civil War and the abolition of a slaveholder-dominated society.41  Historians 
bathed in the experience of the South, Woodward hoped, would produce, 
instead, an American history that would “constitute a warning that an over-
whelming conviction in the righteousness of a cause is no guarantee of its 
ultimate triumph, and that the policy which takes into account the possibility 
of defeat is more realistic than one that assumes the inevitability of 
victory.”42  An ironic history of Section 5 may avoid the triumphalist, 
foreshortened story of irrepressible, almost-unresisted success that pundits 
and other casual observers often repeat.  Treating the story as less than an 
effortless success is not only more realistic, but it may contribute something 
to staving off future defeats.  In any event, the more complicated history can-
not avoid being suffused with a pervasive sense of irony, for the course of 
Section 5 has been characterized by deep ironies from 1965 on.43 
 
37. See generally WOODWARD, supra note 31. 
38. On the recent gradual resegregation of schools and predictions of much more to come, see 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2801–02, 
2831–34 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
39. See J. Morgan Kousser & James M. McPherson, Introduction to REGION, RACE, AND 
RECONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD, at xiii, xx–xxv (J. Morgan 
Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982) (noting Woodward’s use of irony). 
40. WOODWARD, supra note 35, at 168. 
41. Id. at 168–69, 168–71. 
42. Id. at 190. 
43. I am not the first to note ironies in the history of the VRA.  See, e.g., Days & Guinier, supra 
note 18, at 172 (“Somewhat ironically, however, [the Reagan Administration proposals] provided 
the ninety-seventh Congress with an opportunity to reconsider the reasons for the act’s original 
passage and to reaffirm the basic goals and objectives.”); Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 18, at 145, 145 
(“The two-year-long debate [over the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1982] also produced an 
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III. The Institutionalization of a Flexible Provision: From Selma to Mobile, 
1965–1980 
A. Proxy Disfranchisement and the Evolution of Reform 
Section 5, the most constitutionally radical innovation of the VRA, until 
2006 barred certain states and counties from enacting or administering any 
post-1964 “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” 
without a declaratory judgment by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia or a similar declaration by the U.S. Attorney General that the law 
“does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”44  It was the product 
of experience, not logic or theory.45  Adopted in 1870, the Fifteenth 
Amendment provides, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”46  The Reconstruction 
Congresses interpreted the Amendment very broadly, within a year passing 
laws to enforce it by protecting voters against violence, intimidation, and 
bribery from private, as well as official persons; by supervising congressional 
elections from registration through the counting of ballots; and by giving the 
president the power to suppress the Ku Klux Klan, and similarly violent 
organizations, on the factually valid view that Klansmen meant to interfere 
with blacks’ right to vote.47  In 1875, Republicans proposed to widen the 
scope of violent activities against voters punishable by law and to outlaw 
“excessive poll taxes,” but Democrats filibustered the proposal, as they did a 
sweeping bill against corruption in elections in 1890, the first time after 1875 
that the Republicans held the presidency and majorities in both houses of 
Congress.48 
Although Democrats had charged during ratification debates that the 
Fifteenth Amendment would massively expand the powers of the national 
government, allowing it to regulate all aspects of local, state, and federal 
elections,49 after the Amendment went into effect, Democrats gave it the nar-
rowest possible reading and launched a strategy of imposing discriminatory 
electoral structures, as well as adopting suffrage qualifications that disfran-
chised those with personal traits thought to be particularly prevalent among 
 
ironic by-product—a Supreme Court decision, Rogers v. Lodge, which goes far toward undoing the 
damage done by the earlier Supreme Court case of Mobile v. Bolden.” (citations omitted)). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000) (amended 2006).  Congress in 2006 very slightly rewrote Section 
5 to make it unmistakably clear that objections could be made on either purpose or effect grounds.  
H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 65 n.168 (2006). 
45. See LANDSBERG, supra note 36, at ix (“[T]he record of Department of Justice litigation . . . 
provided the foundation on which the act was built.”). 
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
47. KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 18. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 




African-Americans.50  Southern Democrats gerrymandered election districts, 
instituted at-large elections, annexed or deannexed land as it fit their racial 
and partisan interests, and required huge bonds of officeholders.51  Seizing 
temporary legislative majorities through violence and ballot-box stuffing, 
they passed literacy tests or their equivalents, the “eight-box” or secret-ballot 
laws, which disproportionately disadvantaged ex-slaves, who had been pro-
hibited by law from learning how to read.52  Democrats also instituted 
property tests or poll taxes, which especially penalized blacks for their dis-
proportionate poverty.53  Compounding the inequity of a discriminatory 
system of criminal justice, they expanded the list of disfranchising crimes to 
emphasize those for which blacks were particularly likely to be convicted, 
such as miscegenation and wife beating.54  Finally, there was the white 
primary, which did not completely deny African-Americans the right to vote; 
they just could not vote in the only important elections.55  Southern strict 
constructionists contended that none of these laws violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment because none on their face relied on race as a bar to voting.56  
More practically, the methods testified to the genius of Jim Crow southern 
politics, which was always to be able to create a new technique to replace 
one that was not suppressing enough black votes. 
After Smith v. Allwright 57 outlawed the white primary,58 when southern 
blacks threatened to vote in large numbers for the first time since the turn of 
the twentieth century, white Democrats reverted to such reliable means as 
racial gerrymandering, at-large elections, and felon disfranchisement, as well 
as employing variations of other subterfuges, such as the privatized white 
primary, greatly strengthened literacy tests, and the expansion of the admin-
istrative discretion of registration and election officials to enable them to 
increase informal discrimination that was difficult to document in court.  
Lawsuits against such tactics by private parties being slow and localized, 
supporters of equal rights enlisted the help of Republicans and Democrats, 
who were, at that time, competing for black votes, to pass the 1957 and 1960 
Civil Rights Acts.  These Acts authorized the Department of Justice to file 
suits against discriminatory voting practices and established the Civil Rights 
Commission to study patterns of discrimination in voting and other areas.59 
 
50. Id. at 25. 
51. Id. at 25–34. 
52. Id. at 34–35. 
53. Id. at 35. 
54. Id. at 36–37. 
55. Id. at 37–38. 
56. Id. at 38. 
57. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
58. Id. at 664–65. 
59. See generally STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 
1944–1969, at 140–249 (1976). 
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Those who framed and debated the original VRA in 1965 were acutely 
aware of the history of election discrimination.60  Not only did they entirely 
outlaw the central techniques of disfranchisement, literacy tests, and poll 
taxes, but they also attacked administrative discrimination by authorizing 
federal officials to examine state registration and election records and 
procedures. 
To guard against the century-old southern trick of finding traits that 
proxied race or electoral structures that especially disadvantaged blacks, the 
framers introduced one of the most innovative governmental mechanisms 
since the New Deal—Section 5.61  Detailing “the variety of means used to 
bar Negro voting,”62 including the infamous Tuskegee Gerrymander,63 the 
House Judiciary Committee declared that because neither private lawsuits 
nor those brought by the government under the 1957, 1960, and 1964 laws 
produced sufficiently rapid results, a new method was needed: “Progress has 
been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of State and local 
officials and repeated delays in the judicial process.”64  The Committee went 
on to emphasize that “even after apparent defeat[,] resisters seek new ways 
and means of discriminating.  Barring one contrivance too often has caused 
no change in result, only in methods.”65 
Properly skeptical of Deep South jurisdictions because of their history 
of discrimination, Congress combined two important innovations into 
Section 5.  First, legal scrutiny of all election laws in covered jurisdictions 
was automatic.  Civil rights organizations or other private parties did not 
have to bring expensive, time-consuming lawsuits to challenge laws and ad-
ministrative procedures in areas whose history made their actions suspect.  
Second, the burden of proof was shifted to the local and state jurisdictions, 
which had to prove to the District Court or the Department of Justice that the 
law had neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating. 
The tactics of those who wished to preserve or restore equal political 
rights were in a way mirror images of the moves of those who wished to re-
store or buttress white supremacy.  One proliferated discriminatory devices; 
the other worked and reworked laws in attempts to counter changing south-
ern strategies.  Both sides were practical and flexible; neither acted as though 
 
60. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 11–12 (1965) (discussing literacy tests beginning with 
Mississippi’s, adopted in 1890). 
61. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)). 
62. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 8. 
63. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (recounting the fact that the boundary 
of the City of Tuskegee was changed from a square shape into a “strangely irregular twenty-eight-
sided figure” in order to “remove from the city all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters 
while not removing a single white voter or resident”). 
64. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 9. 
65. Id. at 10.  See generally LANDSBERG, supra note 36, at 34–147 (documenting this process 
exhaustively in three Alabama counties). 




it believed that political equality could be guaranteed by granting blacks 
merely the right to register and cast ballots.  The history of black suffrage 
before 1965, a history of which policy makers on all sides were unusually 
aware, was anything but simple. 
B. Centralized Efficiency? 
When the final version of the VRA was being hastily drafted after the 
horses of the Alabama State Troopers in Selma stampeded the Johnson 
Administration into action, the safely nonsouthern District Court of the 
District of Columbia was slated to be the principal venue for vetting new 
southern election laws that might seek to evade the movement toward elec-
toral equality.  The Justice Department, which quickly replaced the district 
court as the site of preclearance because of the apparent administrative effi-
ciency of an executive agency compared to a rule-bound court, was not 
tasked with preclearance duties in the Administration’s original bill and was 
added to Section 5 as an afterthought.66  And in some ways, it was a curious 
afterthought, for although the tiny Civil Rights Division had filed seventy-
one voting rights cases from 1957 to 1965,67 it had less experience investigat-
ing voting discrimination than the Civil Rights Commission, an independent 
agency that had been holding hearings and intensively studying the subject 
since the Commission’s inception in 1957.68  In the Johnson Administration’s 
first draft of the bill, dated March 1, 1965 (six days before “Bloody Sunday” 
in Selma), there was no preclearance section, but the Civil Rights 
Commission had a central role in a quite-analogous process—ruling on 
whether local jurisdictions could be trusted to administer literacy tests in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion.  This provision and the Civil Rights 
Commission’s participation were dropped from the bill, for unstated reasons, 
in the draft of the afternoon of March 12, which also added what became 
Section 5, at first scheduled to be administered largely by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia.  The bill was introduced on March 15, 
and in subsequent committee and floor consideration in Congress, the Civil 
Rights Commission was not given any oversight role.69  The last-minute shift 
in the federal-oversight task and in the governmental body overseeing it re-
veals that the strange birth of Section 5 was far from the simple, logical 
 
66. John J. Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary 
Federal Remedy, 22 AM. U. L. REV. 111, 124 (1972); Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 3, at 
540. 
67. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 9. 
68. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IN MISSISSIPPI (1965); U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ’63: 1963 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1963); 5 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE: 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS REPORT (1961); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1959 (1959). 
69. See generally LANDSBERG, supra note 36, at 157–61 (describing the sequence of drafts of 
the bill). 
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outgrowth of dissatisfaction with the experience of litigation under the 1957 
and 1960 Civil Rights Acts, as it is so often made to appear.70 
If the purpose of providing an alternative to full-blown trials for 
preclearance was administrative efficiency, why was the duty not given to an 
administrative agency dedicated to that purpose?71  After all, independent 
agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and later, 
the Federal Election Commission carried out similar quasi-judicial regulatory 
tasks.  But instead of handing the preclearance function to an independent, 
experienced, bipartisan agency like the Civil Rights Commission, the 
Administration and Congress, apparently without deep contemplation, tossed 
the responsibility to a Justice Department that was by no means organized to 
 
70. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 18, at 15–17 (characterizing the framing of the VRA as 
the logical and obvious response to the obstacles federal civil rights litigators had faced over the 
previous decades).  Thernstrom’s version of the VRA, repeated endlessly, often in very nearly the 
same words, is of a law that burst, full grown and already perfect, from a collective Jovian head in 
1965, only to be disfigured later by mere-mortal interest groups.  See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: By Now, a Murky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 42 (2007) 
(“It is important to understand the perfect design of every component of the 1965 Act.”); id. at 46 
(describing the current version of the VRA as “jerrybuilt, ramshackle, illogical, almost 
unworkable—and arguably unconstitutional”).  In fact, as this Article tries to show, the 1965 VRA 
was an intermediate step in a long, imperfect, incremental process.  No one in 1965 could possibly 
have predicted just how it would work; how its proponents, opponents, and multifarious 
bureaucratic, congressional, and, most of all, judicial interpreters would refashion it; and how it 
would fare after reverses.  The VRA in general and Section 5 in particular have from the beginning 
been perhaps the prime example in modern American government of the art of muddling through. 
71. To be sure, the Civil Rights Commission in 1965 was a tiny, eight-year-old agency without 
the political and institutional power of the Justice Department, and it was perhaps more easily 
subject to political pressure than the Department was.  Yet, as often noted, the Justice Department 
did not send federal examiners to recalcitrant Sunflower County, Mississippi, the home of Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman James Eastland, and it minimized the number sent to the State of 
Georgia, home of the Senate’s most powerful southern Democrat, Richard Russell.  LAWSON, supra 
note 20, at 101, 184.  Later, particularly during the 1990s, the Department’s by-that-time-
experienced, very professional staff was less subject to political pressures.  See Mark A. Posner, The 
Real Story Behind the Justice Department’s Implementation of Section 5 of the VRA: Vigorous 
Enforcement, as Intended by Congress, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 120, 178 (2006) (“In 
the middle to late 1980s and in the 1990s, the legal bases on which the Department could invalidate 
a non-retrogressive change became, at least temporarily, well set, and the Department then 
stringently applied the established legal standards in reviewing the facts of individual 
submissions.”).  Nonetheless, during the Bush Administration, political appointees repeatedly 
reversed decisions of the staff of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and drove out 
many of the most experienced attorneys.  Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil 
Rights Enforcement Within the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 117–
18 (2007) (statement of Joseph D. Rich, former Chief, Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division, 
Department of Justice); see MARK A. POSNER, THE POLITICIZATION OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
DECISIONMAKING UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: IS IT A PROBLEM AND WHAT 
SHOULD CONGRESS DO? 13–15 (2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Section%205%20 
decisionmaking%201-30-06.pdf (describing the history of politicization of the Justice Department 
under the Bush Administration).  In the early years of the Act’s history, the Civil Rights 
Commission might have withstood pressure about as well as the Justice Department did at that time. 




pursue it.72  The Civil Rights Division was organized regionally, and before 
1969 no attorneys were permanently assigned to oversee voting.73  Moreover, 
Congress did not give the Justice Department regulatory powers similar to 
those of established independent agencies or even the weak Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.  The Department issued 
“guidelines,” not “regulations” or “rules” on Section 5, and its objection let-
ters did not have precedential force, as the rulings of many other quasi-
executive agencies did.74 
Although the Civil Rights Commission did not carry out the task itself, 
it quickly produced a critical examination of the Justice Department’s stew-
ardship in 1965 and, in 1968, 1975, and 1981, the most far-reaching and 
profound studies of southern electoral practices ever published by a federal 
agency—studies that were cited as authoritative again and again in judicial 
opinions and Justice Department documents.75  One of the forgotten, perhaps 
unconsidered, alternatives of the VRA was to give the job of preclearance to 
the agency that was most dedicated to the purposes of the Act, most closely 
connected to the Civil Rights Movement that forced passage of the Act, and 
most attuned to the larger patterns of discrimination in American society.  
And in view of the difficulty of equalizing political opportunity that had been 
unequal for more than half a century, the tools provided to the Justice 
Department seemed shockingly weak.  The radical provision was not so 
radical, after all. 
In its first major Supreme Court test, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,76 
Section 5 was depicted by the southern states that challenged the law as a 
wholesale bureaucratic intrusion by an all-powerful federal government on 
its federalist subordinates, the state and local governments.77  According to 
the one dissenter in the case, Justice Hugo Black, Section 5 forced the states 
to come on bended knee to “plead,”78 “beg,” and “entreat” with the Attorney 
General or the district court in Washington, “hundreds of miles away” from 
 
72. The most egregious administrative anomaly in the 1965 VRA was turning to the Civil 
Service Commission to supply examiners.  In his version of the VRA, liberal Republican 
Congressman John V. Lindsay proposed setting up an independent administrative agency to write 
rules and oversee the examiners.  See H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 62–63 (detailing Lindsay’s 
objections to what he saw as the shortcomings of the Act).  Such an agency might eventually have 
acquired other functions, such as handling preclearance. 
73. BALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 68–69. 
74. See infra notes 105–13 and accompanying text. 
75. See LAWSON, supra note 20, at 30–31 (describing the 1965 study and the Justice 
Department response).  The studies are published in book format.  See generally U.S. COMM’N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, UNFULFILLED GOALS, supra note 22; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER (1975) [hereinafter U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN YEARS 
AFTER]; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 22; U.S. COMM’N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: THE FIRST MONTHS (1965). 
76. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
77. BALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 52–53. 
78. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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their homes, before they could put any change in their own election laws into 
effect.79  In an unmistakable reference to the warped reflection of the First 
Reconstruction that Black must have been exposed to as a boy in Alabama, 
the Justice declared that Section 5 treated the covered jurisdictions as 
“conquered provinces.”80 
The reality was completely different.  From 1965 through 1970, the 
Justice Department did not draft a single guideline on Section 5, it generally 
assigned only one lawyer to monitoring compliance with the provision, and 
states and localities, either purposefully or out of ignorance, rarely informed 
Washington of any election law alterations at all.81  The covered states made 
only 325 submissions to the Department of Justice from 1965 through June 
30, 1969, 90% of which came from a single state, South Carolina.82  Through 
the end of 1969, the Department objected to only 20 of 417 submissions83—a 
small number, hardly a federal takeover of election authority.  There were no 
criminal or civil sanctions for noncompliance with Section 5 nor were there 
any grants or other incentives for jurisdictions that did submit changes.  
Compared to most regulatory schemes, Section 5 was toothless.84  The bur-
den of proof did not shift; compliance was not attained; the law during its 
first temporary period was an empty stage set waiting for the script to be 
written. 
Far from moving forcefully to insure that states and localities 
demonstrate that they were not trying to undercut federal supervision of voter 
registration and the suspension of literacy tests by enacting new laws, the 
Johnson Administration largely left voter registration, as well as lawsuits, to 
civil rights organizations.  Federal examiners, only 3% of whom were black, 
registered only about a third of the new black voters in the first three months 
of the VRA’s existence; over the first two years, they registered only about 
one in ten.85  That the Administration that deserves, and has been granted, 
 
79. Id. at 359, 359–60. 
80. Id. at 360.  In his dissent in Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 595 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting), Justice Black expanded on his reference to the First Reconstruction. 
81. BALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 65. 
82. WASH. RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT: THE SURVIVAL OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN THE SOUTH 139 (1972) [hereinafter WASH. RESEARCH PROJECT, 
SHAMEFUL BLIGHT]. 
83. Roman, supra note 66, at 126 n.54. 
84. Richard Scher & James Button, Voting Rights Act: Implementation and Impact, in 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 20, 36 (Charles S. Bullock III & Charles M. Lamb eds., 
1984). 
85. BALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 56 (citing 1965–1967 statistics for counties that were visited 
by federal examiners); DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 183–84 (1978) (citing 1965 statistics measuring the number 
and pace of black-voter registration); see also L. Thorne McCarty & Russell B. Stevenson, Note, 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965: An Evaluation, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 372–78 (1968) 
(noting that after an initial burst of registration of black voters in 1965, the rate of registration 
dropped sharply and that the Justice Department was deliberately dilatory in sending registrars to 
the Deep South, especially to rural areas).  No doubt federal examiners deterred continued 




abundant praise for passing the most far-reaching advance in minority voting 
rights since the Fifteenth Amendment did so little to implement the law that 
civil rights leaders in November 1965 charged it with “administrative repeal” 
of the VRA is deeply puzzling.86  That private parties, which were not explic-
itly part of the scheme of federal judicial and administrative protection under 
the VRA at all, should have been the first to sue to determine the scope of 
Section 5’s coverage was simply the active complement of the Johnson 
Administration’s passivity. 
C. Extension in Scope and Time 
To counteract the effect of the surge in black voter registration in 1965 
and 1966, Mississippi had passed a phalanx of laws changing elective to ap-
pointive offices—moving from single-member districts to at-large elections, 
combining predominantly black with predominantly white counties to sub-
merge the blacks in majority-white districts, and so on.87  In Allen v. Board of 
Elections,88 the U.S. Supreme Court first granted plaintiffs represented by the 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and the Lawyers’ Constitutional 
Defense Committee standing to sue to require that Mississippi submit laws 
changing election structures to the Department of Justice or the District of 
Columbia District Court under Section 5 and then ruled that the legislative 
history as a whole indicated that Congress intended such laws to come within 
Section 5’s purview.89  Yet paradoxically, Chief Justice Earl Warren refused 
to overturn the elections that had already been held under the nonprecleared 
Mississippi laws,90 effectively allowing the deepest of Deep South states to 
enact and put into force new election laws without Washington’s approval, 
against the manifest purpose of Section 5.  As Justice John Marshall Harlan 
pointed out, if Section 5 expired in 1970, as originally scheduled, no official 
in any covered jurisdiction would have been removed from office even if the 
law under which he was elected or appointed had been enacted after 1964 
and had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect but had never been 
 
discrimination by registrars in counties to which they were sent, but civil rights leaders, including 
the Civil Rights Commission, were harshly critical of the Justice Department’s unwillingness to 
authorize examiners for many more counties in which private registration drives continued to 
encounter resistance.  LAWSON, supra note 20, at 24–29. 
86. See JAMES C. HARVEY, BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION 159 
(1973) (noting the criticisms of civil rights leaders). 
87. FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI 
AFTER 1965, at 34–77 (1990). 
88. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
89. See id. at 554–57, 563–71; see also John P. MacCoon, The Enforcement of the 
Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 
110–11 (1979) (discussing Allen and its consequences).  Presumably because it came first 
alphabetically, the case is known by the name of a Virginia lawsuit concerning a bulletin about 
aiding illiterate voters, an easier issue for the Court to decide, rather than by the names of the three 
much more significant Mississippi cases. 
90. Allen, 393 U.S. at 571–72. 
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submitted for preclearance.91  Thus, the same decision that in its substantive 
phase recognized the broadest scope for the VRA treated Section 5 as non-
existent during its penalty phase.92  No branch of government had a 
monopoly on contradictions. 
In the same month that Allen was handed down, South Carolina 
Republican Chairman Harry Dent, the key operative in Nixon’s “southern 
strategy,” told a meeting of southern GOP state chairmen that “the Voting 
Rights Act looks like it’s coming along pretty good so that the monkey will 
be off the backs of the South.”93  Indeed, after rejecting internal administra-
tion pressures for a straight renewal of those provisions of the VRA that 
expired in 1970, Attorney General John Mitchell proposed deleting Section 5 
altogether, returning to the case-by-case quagmire in southern federal courts, 
on the curious grounds that the Department that he headed had never en-
forced it, anyway.94  After Rules Committee Chairman William Colmer of 
Mississippi delayed the bill for four months, the House startled liberals by 
substituting the Administration’s bill for the House Judiciary Committee’s 
simple five-year extension of the VRA by a vote of 208–203.95  Responding 
to Administration appeals and pressures, Republicans voted 129–49 against 
preclearance, joining 69 of 83 southern Democrats, but only 10 of 151 north-
ern Democrats.96  This Republican shift from the party’s Lincolnian heritage, 
according to African-American Democratic Congressman John Conyers, 
represented “an approach toward Republicanizing the South.”97 
This was just the stimulus that what was left of the civil rights 
movement needed.  Opposition to key provisions of the VRA by the Nixon 
Administration, as in 1982 by the Reagan Administration, served to focus 
and enliven proponents and to resurrect seemingly moribund Republican 
Party civil rights fervor.  In the Senate, there was a backlash against the 
backlash, and liberals sidestepped the hostile Judiciary Committee, 
marshaled lobbyists, avoided a long filibuster, and renewed Section 5 for 
 
91. Id. at 593–94, 593 & n.12 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
92. See Roman, supra note 66, at 119 (noting that Allen robbed the successful plaintiffs of a 
remedy that would have ended the discriminatory practices at issue). 
93. LEON E. PANETTA & PETER GALL, BRING US TOGETHER: THE NIXON TEAM AND THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT 106 (1971). 
94. GARROW, supra note 85, at 194–96; LAWSON, supra note 20, at 141.  Under the provisions 
of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, the Justice Department had brought only four cases from 1957 to 
1960, and these cases did not result in the registration of a single black voter who was not 
previously registered to vote.  GARROW, supra note 85, at 12–14. 
95. Congress Delays Extension of Voting Rights Act, 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 421, 426 (1969); 
see LAWSON, supra note 20, at 141 (recounting Colmer’s stalling tactics); see also PANETTA & 
GALL, supra note 93, at 201–02 (recounting Nixon Administration strategy during the VRA-
extension debate). 
96. House Passes Administration Voting Rights Bill, 234–179; Votes Extension for Office of 
Economic Opportunity, 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 74-H, 74-H to 75-H (1969). 
97. Congress Delays Extension of Voting Rights Act, supra note 95, at 422; see also LAWSON, 
supra note 20, at 144–45 (recounting Nixon Administration pressure on Congress to accept the 
Administration’s VRA amendment). 




another five years by a 64–12 vote.98  Along the way, the Senate rejected, by 
a vote of 27–48, an amendment gutting Section 5 by requiring the Attorney 
General, if he disapproved of an election law submitted to him, to seek an 
injunction against the law, effectively shifting the burden of proof from the 
local jurisdiction to the national government, which would have to prove in 
court that the law had a discriminatory purpose and effect.99  Despite 
Administration efforts, which corralled as many as 183 votes on procedural 
issues, the House then agreed to the rejuvenated VRA by a 272–132 biparti-
san margin,100 and President Nixon disappointed his Dixie minions by 
signing the bill, decrying only an amendment to it that attempted to enfran-
chise eighteen-year-olds by statute, instead of by a constitutional 
amendment.101  Key moves in the legislative chess game were the sponsor-
ship of the renewed bill by Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, a 
Pennsylvania Republican, and the insistence of Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield that action on the VRA had to precede the vote on conservative 
southern Supreme Court nominee Harold Carswell, a nomination that the 
Nixon Administration vainly tried to rush through the Senate.  Mansfield’s 
agenda manipulation prevented a filibuster, and the entangling of two promi-
nent elements of the Nixonian southern strategy helped to insure the defeat of 
both.102 
Perhaps it was a combination of Administration hubris and southern 
Democratic devotion to principle that inhibited any member of the House or 
Senate from offering an amendment in 1969–1970 to overturn the Allen 
decision, thereby removing annexation, at-large elections, and redistricting 
from the class of laws that required preclearance.  After the House’s initial 
vote, and with the Senate Judiciary Committee securely in the control of 
Mississippi Senator James Eastland and other conservatives, a clean and 
complete repeal of the almost unused, but still possibly potent, restriction on 
the southern freedom to discriminate may have seemed within reach.  It is 
often remarked that in legislative activity, the best is the enemy of the 
good—that is, that seeking a perfect policy inhibits the adoption of an 
 
98. Congress Lowers Voting Age, Extends Voting Rights Act, 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 192, 
194–98 (1970). 
99. Id. at 198; Senate Rejects Move to Table Compromise Amendment; Turns Down Other 
Changes, 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 15-S, 15-S (1970). 
100. Congress Lowers Voting Age, Extends Voting Rights Act, supra note 98, at 198. 
101. The Supreme Court accepted Nixon’s argument about the eighteen-year-old vote in state 
and local, but not federal, elections in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1970) (Black, J., 
announcing the judgments of the Court and expressing his own view of the cases).  Significantly, 
Justice Black, in the lead opinion in a fractured case decided by five votes to four, rested his 
decision upholding congressional power to enfranchise eighteen-year-olds in federal elections 
through an amendment of the VRA on Article I, Section Four of the Constitution, suggesting that 
the Fifteenth Amendment was not the only constitutional basis for the VRA.  See id. at 119–24. 
102. See generally GARROW, supra note 85, at 196–97 (outlining procedural tactics employed 
by congressional leadership); Congress Lowers Voting Age, Extends Voting Rights Act, supra note 
98, at 192–95 (summarizing the procedural history of the measure). 
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improvement.  In this instance, it might be said that the worst was the enemy 
of the merely bad.  Hoping to repeal Section 5 altogether, opponents passed 
up an opportunity to hobble it.  As for principle, the white southern argu-
ments against Section 5 from the beginning had been that it was an 
antisouthern infringement on states’ rights.103  How could one consistently 
argue that it was constitutional, or even proper, to constrain a state’s power to 
define its electors but not its electoral structure?  Whatever the reason, the 
failure of opponents of Section 5 to constrain it severely when they had their 
best chance to do so and before its real power had begun to be wielded dem-
onstrates again that the course of the VRA was contingent, not 
predetermined. 
It is also possible that the Nixon Administration gave way because it 
knew that even if civil rights forces had the power to write the laws, only it 
had the authority to administer them.104  Only pressure from civil rights 
forces in Congress forced the Justice Department to draw up guidelines in 
early 1971, and the manner in which it administered Section 5 differed from 
congressional and judicial interpretations of the Act in three major ways.  
First, its initial draft of the guidelines reversed the burden of proof by pro-
viding that the Attorney General would object to a submitted law or 
regulation only if he affirmatively determined that the law would have a dis-
criminatory effect and that it had a discriminatory purpose.105  Pressure from 
the Civil Rights Commission and members of Congress—especially Senators 
Phil Hart, Jacob Javits, and Hugh Scott, the latter two prominent 
Republicans, and California Democrat Don Edwards’s Civil Rights 
Oversight Committee of the House Judiciary Committee—forced a reversal, 
so that the final guidelines, in Section 51.19, required the Attorney General 
to object even if the evidence of discrimination was indeterminate.106  That 
is, the state or local jurisdiction had to prove a negative—that there was no 
racially discriminatory purpose or effect.  Changes in the guidelines 
notwithstanding, the Justice Department continued to preclear laws, such as 
one in Canton, Mississippi, unless it was convinced by positive evidence that 
they were racially oriented.107 
Although Congress provided no explicit directive, a second facet of the 
guidelines was also disappointing to proponents of minority rights.  As 
Representative Edwards’s subcommittee noted, the guidelines made no 
attempt to insure that states and localities submit all changes, leaving “the 
burden on the people Congress sought to protect rather than on the covered 
 
103. LAWSON, supra note 59, at 319–20. 
104. Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee in 1965 had stressed the partisan danger of 
assigning preclearance to the Department of Justice.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 46 (1965).  The 
Mitchell Justice Department realized those fears. 
105. WASH. RESEARCH PROJECT, SHAMEFUL BLIGHT, supra note 82, at 164. 
106. LAWSON, supra note 20, at 168–73. 
107. Id. at 171–73. 




jurisdictions.”108  Not only was initial compliance voluntary but so was 
compliance with Justice Department decisions.  Because the Voting Section 
never had more than thirty employees to deal with thousands of Section 5 
submissions, it rarely checked to make sure that jurisdictions did not put into 
effect laws and regulations that the Department had rejected.109 
Third, the Administration left vague exactly what constituted a 
discriminatory purpose or effect, and its criteria varied in practice.  To the 
exasperation of Representative Edwards’s oversight subcommittee, for 
instance, the Department of Justice precleared Mississippi laws requiring 
every voter to reregister to vote in twenty-four of twenty-six counties be-
cause it chose not to anticipate discrimination in the administration of the 
laws.110  This effectively shifted the burden of proof from the counties to the 
federal government.111  In South Carolina in March and April, 1972, the 
Department precleared a state house plan with multimember districts and 
full-slate and majority-vote requirements on the grounds that those otherwise 
objectionable provisions predated the most recent reapportionment, but it 
objected to multimember districts, a majority-vote requirement, and num-
bered posts for the state senate because the numbered-posts provision was 
new.112  In other states, the Department, deferring to contradictory federal 
district court decisions, shifted its standards as often as a new decision was 
issued.113  Covered jurisdictions were probably as confused as the 
Department seemed to be.  Having won in the courts and in Congress, civil 
rights forces suffered unadvertised reversals at the hands of a faceless 
bureaucracy. 
D. From Indianapolis to New Orleans, via Dallas and San Antonio, with a 
Retrogression to Cincinnati 
The year 1971 brought not only the Section 5 guidelines but also the 
first full redistricting cycle held since the VRA passed, and Section 5 played 
an important role, being invoked most prominently to overturn a racial ger-
rymander in Atlanta that was aimed at preventing the election of the first 
 
108. GARROW, supra note 85, at 199. 
109. See BALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 140–43 (noting that through the mid-1980s, the 
litigation unit of the Voting Section consisted of thirteen attorneys and that the Section was often 
unaware of what jurisdictions actually put into practice after a rejection). 
110. See WASH. RESEARCH PROJECT, SHAMEFUL BLIGHT, supra note 82, at 30–45 
(summarizing the Subcommittee’s report on the Justice Department’s approach to reregistration and 
cataloguing Mississippi counties that sought reregistration approval). 
111. H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 60 (1975); WASH. RESEARCH PROJECT, SHAMEFUL BLIGHT, 
supra note 82, at 24–27, 30–47; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 75, 
at 94–95. 
112. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 75, at 214–19. 
113. Stanley A. Halpin, Jr. & Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern State 
Legislative Redistricting: Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act, 22 J. PUB. 
L. 37, 49–58, 62–63 (1973). 
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black member of Congress from the South in the twentieth century.114  Quite 
rapidly, the VRA became more associated in congressional and academic 
discussions with redistricting than with any other type of electoral law.115  
James Blacksher and Larry Menefee have noted the perverse timing in the 
fact that the “reapportionment revolution” began just before the VRA created 
large numbers of black voters in the Deep South for the first time since the 
First Reconstruction.116  Had legislative districts in Alabama remained 
skewed heavily in favor of the Black Belt counties, as they had been between 
1901 and the 1964 Supreme Court decision in Reynolds v. Sims,117 Blacksher 
and Menefee pointed out, African-Americans elected to the legislature would 
have enjoyed substantially more power after 1965 than they did in an equally 
apportioned legislature.118  Yet the conjunction of the reapportionment 
revolution with Section 5 was more fortunate than Blacksher and Menefee 
contend.  For Baker v. Carr 119 and subsequent decisions forced the southern 
states to redistrict at least once every ten years.120  Had there been no Baker, 
southern states could have avoided dislodging incumbents or recognizing the 
increasingly urbanized black population, and the marked jump in southern 
black state and national legislators that took place after the redistrictings of 
1971, 1981, and 1991121 would not have occurred.  Thus, litigation by white 
suburbanites in Memphis, Nashville, Birmingham, and Mobile ended up 
benefitting not only themselves but also African-American city dwellers. 
The first important redistricting case the Supreme Court decided that 
involved Section 5 seemed to undercut the removal of political 
discrimination cases from down-home judges.  A three-judge district court 
ruled Mississippi’s state legislative apportionment unconstitutional due to 
population inequality, not racial inequality, and rejected plans for single-
member districts throughout the state in favor of a plan that used multimem-
ber districts in four counties.122  The Supreme Court, in an anomalous per 
curiam decision with three dissenters—Why was it not simply a 6–3 
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397 U.S. 50, 52–54 (1970), and similar cases applied population-equality requirements to local, 
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decision?—ordered the lower court to draw or choose a single-member-
district plan for the state’s largest county.123  But it also declared, without 
citations to the text of the law or hearings or reports of Congress on the 
VRA, and without any reasoning whatsoever, that a redistricting plan 
adopted by a district court was exempt from Section 5.124  This suggested that 
the state or locality could simply propose a plan to a local federal district 
court, have the court adopt it as its own in some litigation, and expect ex-
emption from Section 5.  But in a series of cases, the Court drew a slightly 
different, though faint, line: What distinguished a court-drawn from a legis-
lative plan was not who proposed it but whose authority put it into force.  If a 
court ruled a legislative plan illegal on any grounds, such as population 
inequality, then it could adopt parts of that plan without submitting the whole 
plan to the Justice Department, even if it contained provisions to which the 
Department usually objected.125  In any event, as the Republican domination 
of the presidency after 1968 led to more conservative Republican judges 
everywhere, often replacing segregation-era southern Democrats, the 
ideological distance between the District of Columbia District Court and the 
southern circuits diminished, and it made less and less difference where a 
voting rights case was litigated.126  The South rose again to the Mason–Dixon 
Line. 
The Supreme Court also decided two major constitutional redistricting 
cases, both with opinions by Justice Byron White, that would shadow the 
interpretation of the VRA for the rest of the century.  In Whitcomb v. 
Chavis,127 Justice White held that an at-large legislative district in Marion 
County, Indiana (Indianapolis), was constitutional, even though many fewer 
African-Americans were elected under it than would have been under single-
member districts, because the reason the blacks lost was partisan, not 
racial.128  Except in landslide years, all Democrats lost, not just black 
Democrats.129  But in White v. Regester,130 Justice White ruled that a host of 
factors—such as a long history of discrimination in Texas and the lingering 
effects of that legacy, the importance of slating groups on election outcomes, 
and the prevalence of racial bloc voting—enhanced the effect of at-large 
 
123. Connor, 402 U.S. at 692. 
124. Id. at 691; Halpin & Engstrom, supra note 113, at 52. 
125. See MacCoon, supra note 89, at 116–17. 
126. See, e.g., C.K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, A Longitudinal Study of Party Effects on 
Federal District Court Policy Propensities, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 291, 298, 298–301 (1980) (noting 
that “President Nixon diligently pursued his campaign promise to appoint conservatives to the 
federal courts whenever possible” and that these appointments were part of the reason that 
conservative judicial decisions were issued after 1968). 
127. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
128. Id. at 149–53. 
129. Id. at 150–55. 
130. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
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districts in Dallas and San Antonio, rendering them unconstitutional.131  In 
both Whitcomb and Regester, Justice White rejected the view that a mere 
failure to elect black or Latino candidates in proportion to their percentage of 
the population was sufficient evidence of a discriminatory effect to violate 
the Constitution.  Although less-than-proportional representation was 
suggestive, it was merely one among a variety of circumstances to be 
considered together, systematically, by judges assessing liability.132  Thus, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, passed in 1868 to promote equality for African-
Americans, was held to guarantee strict mathematical equality of representa-
tion to suburbanites and city dwellers in the reapportionment cases, but only 
a much less mechanical, more complicated formula for equality in the 
minority-voting-rights cases. 
Yet even this diluted test quickly became too pro-minority for the 
majority of the Supreme Court.  When Circuit Court Judge Spottswood W. 
Robinson, III, a former attorney for the NAACP, sought to apply the 
Regester test to a Section 5 case from New Orleans, the Supreme Court 
overturned him, 5–3, with Justice White joining Justices Thurgood Marshall 
and William J. Brennan, Jr. in dissent.133  Although 45% of the city’s popula-
tion and 34.5% of its registered voters in 1970 were African-American, no 
black had been elected to the New Orleans City Council in the twentieth 
century.134  The reasons for recent black failure were largely structural.  In 
addition to two at-large seats, where the overall white majority always 
prevailed, there were five single-member districts drawn north–south, joining 
the affluent white areas in the northern and southern parts of the city but 
splintering the more heavily black neighborhoods in the center, which ran 
east–west.135  Expressly to protect the white incumbents, the city first drafted 
a plan with no black-registration-majority city-council district and then re-
drew it to contain one bare black-registration-majority district.  The council 
did not revise its plan out of a desire to enhance minority influence but in 
order to allay dissatisfaction over the division of the locally chauvinistic 
Algiers community, which was separated from the rest of the city by the 
Mississippi River, into three councilmanic districts.136  The city fathers did 
try to make way for black representation without displacing whites by 
 
131. Id. at 765–69.  Slating groups endorse and publicize a group of candidates, asking voters 
to cast ballots for all of them.  Racial bloc voting occurs when majorities, often very large 
majorities, of different ethnic groups support different candidates.  In at-large elections, a whole 
community votes for all candidates, rather than splitting the community into two or more districts.  
It disadvantages minorities, who might be able to win in smaller districts but who could not defeat a 
united majority in the larger community. 
132. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 157–60; Regester, 412 U.S. at 765–66. 
133. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 131, 138–43 (1976).  Newly appointed Justice John 
Paul Stevens, who replaced Justice William O. Douglas after the oral argument had taken place in 
the Supreme Court, took no part in Beer.  Id. at 131. 
134. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 75, at 288. 
135. Id. at 287–92. 
136. Id. at 288, 289 n.146. 




authorizing referenda to expand the council to nine or eleven members, but 
white voters overcame a black majority for expansion.137  The Justice 
Department objected to both seven-member plans, which differed in their 
treatment of predominantly black neighborhoods only very slightly.138  All of 
the city councilmen save the one from the majority-black district appealed to 
the District Court for the District of Columbia.139 
Judge Robinson’s comprehensive opinion, joined by the other two 
judges on the panel, employed the totality-of-circumstances analysis of 
Regester, but it emphasized more than Justice White had the gap between the 
African-American percentage of voters (35%) and the proportion of seats 
that blacks might win (14%).140  More in the style of constitutional than of 
statutory construction, Judge Robinson termed the right to vote fundamental, 
requiring New Orleans to demonstrate not just a rational basis but a compel-
ling state interest to justify diluting black votes.141  Majority-vote and “anti-
single-shot” laws, a history and legacy of past discrimination, all-powerful 
slating groups, and racial bloc voting combined with the way district bounda-
ries had been drawn, Robinson declared, to perpetuate black 
underrepresentation in political office.142  Because the effect of the lines was 
so clear, Robinson felt it unnecessary to rule on the city council’s intent.143 
When New Orleans appealed, the Supreme Court could have affirmed 
on the basis of Regester, ruling that the language and purpose of Section 5 so 
closely tracked the Fifteenth Amendment that it was surely meant to ban le-
gal changes that violated the Constitution and that the sort of evidence that 
convinced a unanimous court in Regester should be sufficient for the Court 
three years later.  Instead, Justice Potter Stewart and the four Justices ap-
pointed by President Nixon ignored Robinson’s elaborate totality-of-
circumstances analysis and all of the evidence except the percentages of the 
black population and registered voters in the city-council districts.144  Why?  
For their part, the Nixon appointees seem to have been particularly antipa-
thetic to anything that smacked of “quotas,” although interestingly enough, 
their patron had instituted the first programs for minority group quotas in the 
 
137. Id. at 289 n.146. 
138. Id. at 289–90. 
139. Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
140. Id. at 384, 388–90. 
141. Id. at 391–92. 
142. Id. at 401–02.  Majority-vote requirements deny victory to candidates who obtain 
pluralities, requiring runoff elections if no candidate gains a majority in the first round.  Minorities 
have no chance to elect any candidates against solid majorities.  In multicandidate races, it may be 
possible for the minority to win by casting ballots for one or two co-ethnics.  Anti-single-shot laws 
prevent such tactics. 
143. Id. at 367. 
144. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 134–36 (spotlighting percentages of the black population and black 
registered voters). 
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federal government.145  But what explains the position of the “moderate” 
Justice Stewart?  Potter Stewart had served on the city council of Cincinnati 
from 1949 to 1953, elected under a “single transferable vote” (STV) 
proportional-representation system, and his father had been the city’s mayor 
from 1938 to 1947.  For thirty years, stalwart Republicans like the Stewarts 
bitterly fought against the STV system, launching four initiatives against it 
that barely lost before finally overturning the system in 1957 when it ap-
peared that the city might elect as the most senior city councilman, and 
therefore mayor, its first African-American chief officer, Theodore Berry.146  
Stewart’s strong aversion to proportional representation, almost certainly the 
product of his personal experience, largely shaped the second wave of voting 
rights law that followed the initial Katzenbach and Allen decisions.147  Thus, 
the shining example of proportional representation in American history most 
likely led to the personal backlash of a man with the power to make 
“proportional representation” an unanswerable reproach, a byword that 
would force proponents of such systems to invent new terms, such as “instant 
runoff voting,” for what they advocate.148 
Stewart and the other four Justices rejected using proportionality as a 
benchmark in Section 5 cases, a benchmark that had pervaded Judge 
Robinson’s opinion.  Accepting the position of New Orleans in its brief and 
citing as his sole evidence of congressional intent a lonely sentence fragment 
from the 1975 House Report on the VRA, Stewart asserted in Beer v. United 
States 149 that the proper standard against which to measure discriminatory 
effect under Section 5 was that the change in the covered jurisdiction’s elec-
tion law “would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities 
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”150  Because 
there had been no city-council district in New Orleans in 1961 with a major-
ity of black voters—Stewart did not offer statistics on the proportion of black 
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registered voters later in the decade, after the VRA, registration drives, and 
white flight had no doubt increased it—the Justice ruled that the council’s 
1973 plan “enhance[d] the position of racial minorities,” rather than “diluting 
or abridging the right to vote.”151  But Stewart went on in the next sentence to 
provide another basis for denying preclearance, a basis that, announced by 
itself, would have been consistent with language from such previous cases as 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and that would have satisfied the three dis-
senters in Beer: “[T]he new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis 
of race or color as to violate the Constitution.”152  This could logically only 
have referred to the purpose inquiry that Judge Robinson had abjured, not to 
a constitutional effect standard.153  It is careless of scholars to represent Beer 
as embodying the retrogression interpretation of Section 5, yet ignore the rest 
of the opinion, because the purpose standard of Beer strengthened the pur-
pose prong of Section 5, the prong that underlay such a large proportion of 
Justice Department objections in the 1980s and 1990s.154 
Stewart arrived at his nonretrogression standard by disregarding the text 
of the law, sidestepping Supreme Court precedents, and quoting very selec-
tively from congressional reports.  Section 5 merely stated (as of 1976) that a 
“qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” in a covered 
jurisdiction should not be allowed to go into effect unless it can be deter-
mined that it “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,”155 not that 
it by itself will further disadvantage people of color.  A law that replaced a 
poll tax with an equivalent registration fee, for instance, would not make 
blacks worse off, but it might have the purpose, effect, or both of abridging 
the right to vote because of race.  Following the text of the VRA, Chief 
Justice Warren twice used the word perpetuate about Section 5 in his opinion 
for the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.  The Section required the 
D.C. District Court or the Justice Department, Warren remarked, “to deter-
mine whether [new voting regulations’] use would perpetuate voting 




153. Had Stewart meant to refer to a constitutional effect standard, instead of a purpose 
standard, as Justice Scalia later contended in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II ), 528 
U.S. 320, 337–38 (2000), superseded by statute, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott 
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 
5, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c), Stewart’s argument would have 
been blatantly self-contradictory.  The retrogressive-effect standard is more difficult to meet than a 
simple discriminatory-effect standard, which New Orleans had quite obviously violated, as Judge 
Robinson showed in such detail.  If Stewart had meant what Scalia later said he meant, then the 
United States would have won in Beer. 
154. Peyton McCrary et al., The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court 
Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 297–99 (2006). 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976) (amended 2006). 
156. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 316 (1966) (emphasis added). 
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by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving 
new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting dis-
crimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees.”157  The purpose of 
the VRA, Warren declared, was to “rid the country of racial 
discrimination”158—not to preserve the current discriminatory levels that had 
convinced an outraged country to pass the law in the first place, as Stewart’s 
standard presumed. 
The effect standard in House Report 196, from which Stewart quoted in 
Beer, was “whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the politi-
cal process and to elect their choices to office is augmented, diminished, or 
not affected by the change affecting voting in view of the political, sociologi-
cal, economic, and psychological circumstances within the community 
proposing the change.”159  Stewart cut off the quotation after the word 
voting,160 thus eliminating the factors in the Regester totality-of-
circumstances test.  While it is possible that the House Committee meant 
political circumstances to cover only behavior and not such previously 
existing electoral provisions as at-large elections or majority-vote 
requirements, it is equally arguable that it meant to include rules among the 
behavioral patterns.  Stewart shaved the quotation to make it seem that Judge 
Robinson had violated congressional intent, when in fact, Robinson had an-
ticipated a very plausible interpretation of the House Report’s somewhat-
ambiguous pronouncement. 
Justice Stewart also ignored a statement in the 1975 Senate Judiciary 
Committee Report on the VRA that specifically praised Judge Robinson’s 
Beer decision and set forth a standard that unmistakably rejected any nonret-
rogression criterion: 
In some Section 5 cases, a change in the voting practice or procedure 
may also retain some features of the previous system, and all aspects 
of such a change are within the reach of Section 5. . . .  For example, 
as in Beer . . . , Section 5 requires submission of the entire seven 
member council plan when New Orleans sought approval for a 
reapportionment of only the five single-member seats.161 
The Beer nonretrogression test itself only partially cleared up the 
confusion about what constituted a discriminatory effect.  In assessing the 
redistricting of the 1970s, the Justice Department had been inconsistent in 
defining a legal change: Sometimes, the Department had anticipated Judge 
Robinson and the 1975 Senate Report by considering the effect of a change 
in the context of the entire electoral structure; sometimes, it had, like Justice 
 
157. Id. at 335 (emphasis added). 
158. Id. at 315 (emphasis added). 
159. H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 60 (1975) (emphasis added). 
160. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
161. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 19 (1975) (emphasis added). 




Stewart, isolated the effect of the very specific change.162  After 1976, the 
Department followed Stewart.163  But there was a larger question: Did 
nonretrogression mean a general change in the political status of a minority 
group, so that, for instance, annexation of a white suburban area by a central 
city could be balanced by shifting from an at-large system to single-member 
districts, keeping black political status roughly unchanged, or was each legal 
provision to be considered in itself, with the Department required to disallow 
any retrogressive section without any balancing?164  The Supreme Court in 
City of Richmond 165 and City of Lockhart 166 tended toward the first position, 
while federal district courts, in cases like Wilkes County,167 tended toward the 
second.  The Justice Department in effect circumvented the question by in-
creasingly considering such situations under the rubric of purpose, the 
provision of Section 5 that Stewart had left in its original condition, which 
encompassed both definitions of a change.168 
E. Retreat to Mobile, in Confusion 
Beer was a turning point, the first retrogression in voting rights since 
1965.  It began a series of judicial attacks on minority voting rights through 
restraints on the VRA.  The attacks may be divided into two varieties—
direct, through interpretations of the VRA, and indirect, through 
interpretations of the Constitution, constraining the VRA.  Direct attacks like 
Beer reinterpreted benchmarks of discrimination or definitions of the status 
quo.  Indirect attacks, such as City of Mobile v. Bolden,169 involved 
reweighting and redefining intent and effect, narrowing the discretion 
 
162. As noted supra text accompanying note 138, the Justice Department had objected to the 
same New Orleans plan that Judge Robinson overturned.  For other examples of Justice Department 
objections that considered the whole electoral structure, see Halpin & Engstrom, supra note 113, at 
63–65.  For examples of inconsistent Justice Department treatments of change before Beer, see 
Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 
228–32 (1983). 
163. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.54 (1987) (noting the Department’s reliance on the test from Beer); 
Motomura, supra note 162, at 191 n.15 (quoting a Justice Department objection letter declaring that 
in making a preclearance requirement, the Department seeks to make the “decision . . . the court 
would make if the matter were before it” and noting that this standard was codified in 28 C.F.R. 
§ 51.39(a) (1981)). 
164. See generally Motomura, supra note 162, at 228–32 (distinguishing between different 
meanings of retrogression). 
165. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (considering offsetting 
changes and allowing the balancing of considerations). 
166. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983) (comparing the new election 
plan, in its entirety, with the old election system and finding no retrogression). 
167. See Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 439 U.S. 999 
(1978) (considering the change from the use of single-member districts to the use of an at-large 
voting system as the sole criterion for determining whether the changes were discriminatory in 
purpose and effect). 
168. McCrary et al., supra note 154, at 298 tbl.3. 
169. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
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granted to Congress in implementing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. 
But because the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the VRA 
were stated broadly, as principles, rather than narrowly, like a commercial 
code, the courts themselves enjoyed wide discretion in framing 
interpretations.  And with this freedom from textual constraint came the 
ability to issue contradictory decision after decision without having to over-
rule previous decisions, allowing seemingly absolute statements to be evaded 
effortlessly—but for the legal analyst, maddeningly—in subsequent opinions.  
Rather than battering down precedential barriers, the Justices outflanked or 
merely ignored them.  The courts’ interpretative freedom, the resistance of a 
Voting Section of the Department of Justice that was institutionally invested 
in minority voting rights, and the greater commitment of post-Nixon 
Administration legislators than of post-Warren Court Justices to protecting 
such rights combined to produce a judicial retreat from the Second 
Reconstruction that was halting and frequently reversed. 
Justice Stewart’s Gulf Coast journey took him east from New Orleans to 
Mobile, Alabama, where he arrived in 1980 with missing baggage—one 
fewer Justice endorsing his opinion than in Beer.  Mobile had adopted a 
three-person commission form of government in 1911, elected at-large with 
numbered places and a majority-vote requirement, and although 35% of the 
city was black in 1970, no African-American had ever sat on the 
commission.170  Efforts to establish single-member districts had been 
rebuffed in the legislature.171  Claiming that the electoral scheme was main-
tained with a racially discriminatory purpose but, much more forcefully, that 
the factors outlined in Regester showed that it had a discriminatory effect, 
attorneys of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (NAACP-LDF) convinced 
“Wiregrass Populist” Judge Virgil Pittman to declare the commission 
illegal.172  Despite the fact that the plaintiffs had challenged the commission 
under the VRA, as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
Pittman’s opinion devoted little attention to the statute.173  The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed,174 and the city appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which issued a 
splintered decision, with a plurality opinion by Justice Stewart, joined by 
 
170. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 386–88 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d, 571 F.2d 238 
(5th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 446 U.S. 55. 
171. See id. at 397 (noting that a “courtesy rule” in the state legislature allowed local 
delegations to veto “any effective redistricting which would result in any benefit to black voters”). 
172. Id. at 402. 
173. See id.  Pittman’s avoidance of Section 2 was not unusual.  Before 1980, only one case had 
been decided under Section 2, and that case, Toney v. White, 348 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1972), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 476 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973) (en 
banc), was not the subject of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. 
174. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 446 U.S. 55. 




Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Lewis Powell and William 
Rehnquist.175 
The first part of Stewart’s opinion formed a syllogism that, if left 
undisturbed, would have severely constrained the VRA.  First, Section 2 of 
the VRA, he asserted, “no more than elaborates upon . . . the Fifteenth 
Amendment.”176  Second, the Fifteenth Amendment was violated only by 
laws that are “motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”177  Third, the 
Fifteenth Amendment protected only the right to vote, not any right to a fair 
electoral system.  It followed that so long as blacks could “register and vote 
without hindrance,” they could claim no remedy under the Fifteenth 
Amendment and, therefore, none under Section 2 of the VRA.178  The over-
whelming proof of racial discrimination and vote dilution in Mobile and, 
indeed anywhere, was consequently irrelevant to a Section 2 claim.  
Moreover, because the legislative purposes of Sections 2 and 5 were so 
similar, Stewart’s opinion implied, although it did not specifically assert, that 
any prohibition of laws on the grounds of their discriminatory effects went 
beyond Congress’s constitutional powers in both sections of the VRA.  The 
Justice did not note the inconsistency of this analysis with the application of 
the VRA to electoral structures in Allen and even with the retrogressive-
effect standard of Beer. 
In his district court opinion in Bolden, Judge Pittman had relied less on 
the Fifteenth than on the Fourteenth Amendment, conducting an extensive 
factual examination to determine the totality of the circumstances under 
Regester.179  Justice Stewart first recast Regester, which had previously been 
thought to be concerned with effects, as an intent case,180 thus squaring it 
with Washington v. Davis 181 and discarding the Fifth Circuit’s “codification” 
of Regester in Zimmer v. McKeithen.182  But then, instead of aggregating the 
factors—considering them in their “totality”—Stewart divided them, 
concluding with a minimum of reasoning that no factor considered alone 
proved Mobile’s discriminatory intent.183  Stewart’s test ripped apart 
Regester without formally overruling it.  What disturbed Justice White, who 
dissented forcefully, was not Stewart’s substitution of an intent for an effect 
 
175. See Bolden, 446 U.S. 55. 
176. Id. at 60 (plurality opinion). 
177. Id. at 62. 
178. Id. at 65. 
179. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 386–94 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d, 571 F.2d 238, 
rev’d, 446 U.S. 55. 
180. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion) (“A plaintiff must prove that the disputed 
plan was ‘conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.’” 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)). 
181. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
182. 485 F.2d 1297, 1303–07 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. per curiam E. Carroll 
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
183. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 73–74 (plurality opinion). 
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standard.  After all, Justice White had written the opinion of the Court in 
Washington v. Davis, and his opinion in Regester, which made no clear dis-
tinction between intent and effect, fit well under either rubric.  What 
concerned White, rather, was Stewart’s apparent unwillingness to rely on 
objective evidence of intent and his replacement of the totality-of-
circumstances inquiry with one that dismissed as insubstantial any factor that 
was not conclusive by itself.184 
Although Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a dissent that was nearly twice 
as long as Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion, specifically disavowed any 
constitutional right to proportional representation, he did contend that it was 
unnecessary to prove discriminatory intent in vote-dilution cases, and he as-
serted that voting deserved special protection as a fundamental right.185  In a 
biting response that prefigured the Reagan Administration’s position over the 
next two years, Justice Stewart scorned the view that voting was a funda-
mental right and equated an effect standard and any recognition of 
discrimination against African-Americans as a group with a “claim, however 
phrased, that the Constitution somehow guarantees proportional 
representation.”186  The battles for black recognition on the Cincinnati City 
Council slates left quite a mark on Potter Stewart. 
If one ignored all the opinions except Stewart’s, Bolden seemed a 
terrible blow to the VRA.187  But Stewart did not command a secure majority 
for any position he took.  Justice Harry Blackmun merely assumed an intent 
standard for the sake of argument.  He thought the evidence proved Mobile’s 
discriminatory purposes, and he concurred in the outcome only because he 
thought Judge Pittman’s remedy, substituting a mayor-council form of gov-
ernment for the commission, went too far.188  Justice John Paul Stevens did 
not agree to an intent standard, particularly not a subjective one, and he en-
dorsed group voting rights.189  Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall agreed 
with Blackmun that the evidence in the case supported a finding of discrimi-
natory intent and stressed that they believed the Constitution perfectly 
 
184. Id. at 101–03 (White, J., dissenting). 
185. Id. at 111 & n.7, 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
186. Id. at 79 (plurality opinion).  Several decisions of the Supreme Court rendered during 
Stewart’s tenure treated the right to vote as fundamental, notably Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
336 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969); Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–
62 (1964); and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964).  Stewart fully joined two of the 
majority opinions in these cases: Reynolds and Dunn.  None of these opinions has been specifically 
overruled by the Supreme Court, despite Stewart’s view in Bolden. 
187. See Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights 
Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1355 (1983) (citing media coverage that 
characterized the decision as a “major defeat” and a “big[] step backward”). 
188. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 80–82 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result). 
189. Id. at 84–85 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 




compatible with a discriminatory-effect standard.190  Had Section 5 not been 
up for renewal in 1982, Bolden might have been treated as a murky ebb in 
the general flow of voting rights. 
Stewart’s blow to the VRA might also have seemed more glancing had 
observers paid more attention to another case decided on the same day as 
Bolden—City of Rome v. United States.191  In 1966, Rome, Georgia, a cov-
ered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the VRA, adopted a majority-vote 
system, reduced the number of wards, and staggered the terms of its city 
commissioners and board of education.192  It also carried out sixty annexa-
tions between 1966 and 1975.193  It sought preclearance of none of these 
changes except one annexation in 1974, a move that led the Department of 
Justice to discover Rome’s other actions.194  The Department then required 
Rome to submit them for preclearance and, when it did, refused to validate 
most of them.195  Rome sued in a three-judge federal court, lost, and 
appealed.196 
Contrary to what one might have expected from reading the plurality 
opinion in Bolden, the United States conquered Rome, 6–3, with Justice 
Marshall writing the opinion of the Court and Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
Rehnquist in somewhat amazed dissent.  Having failed to comply with 
Section 5 since the enactment of the VRA, Rome proposed to “bail out” of 
coverage before it had ever opted in.197  Over the virulent protest of Justice 
Powell,198 Justice Marshall and the majority followed the explicit guidance of 
the 1965 House and Senate Reports and rejected Rome’s effort to secede 
from the coverage that affected the whole State of Georgia.199 
Marshall then confronted the question of whether Congress could, under 
the Fifteenth Amendment, ban practices without proof of discriminatory 
intent, and he not only gave the opposite answer to Stewart’s, he also 
cavalierly dismissed the necessity “to examine the various approaches ex-
pressed by the Members of the Court” in Bolden in a brief footnote, 
disrespecting the plurality opinion by not singling it out, even for 
condemnation.200  Citing cases as far back as another Justice Marshall’s 
 
190. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 94–95, 97 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 103–04, 
112, 123 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
191. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
192. Id. at 160.  Terms of elected officials are said to be staggered when not all members of a 
body are elected at the same time. 
193. Id. at 161. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 161–62. 
197. Id. at 167. 
198. Id. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
199. Id. at 169 (majority opinion). 
200. Id. at 173 n.11. 
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McCulloch v. Maryland,201 the more recent Justice Marshall ruled that 
Congress had discretion in enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment with 
“appropriate” legislation, that it did not have to confine itself to banning 
practices that a court had found or would find violative of the Constitution, 
and that precedents from South Carolina v. Katzenbach on had ruled the 
VRA an appropriate use of congressional power.202  In a passage clearly di-
rected at Stewart’s plurality opinion in Bolden, Marshall concluded: 
[W]e hold that the Act’s ban on electoral changes that are 
discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting the 
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of 
the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting.  
Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral 
changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional 
racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful 
discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a 
discriminatory impact.203 
While on its face, this judgment of appropriateness might seem to exempt 
from the VRA jurisdictions that were not covered under Section 5, it must be 
noted that the same suspicions that justified an impact standard for Section 5 
would lead to an impact standard for Section 2 for places like Mobile, which 
was part of a covered jurisdiction, the State of Alabama.  If Congress more 
clearly wrote an effect standard into Section 2, it would be constitutional un-
der Marshall’s ruling in City of Rome, at least as applied to jurisdictions 
subject to Section 5.  Finally, previewing issues much discussed in prepara-
tion for renewal of Section 5 in 2006, Marshall ruled that the VRA was not 
an unconstitutional infringement on state sovereignty, for the Reconstruction 
Amendments necessarily justified such an intrusion.204  He also concluded 
that the VRA and Section 5 had not “outlived their usefulness by 1975,” in 
view of the length of time since the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment 
in 1870 in which that Amendment had been effectively nullified.205 
While Justice Powell’s dissent concentrated on the bailout issue, Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, challenged Marshall on more abstract 
grounds, referring pointedly to Bolden, beginning in the first sentence.  To 
Rehnquist, as to Stewart in Bolden, only barriers to black voter registration, 
voting, and candidacy violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.206  
By this definition, Rome had not “engaged in any discrimination against 
blacks for at least 17 years.”207  Applying the same standards to Section 5 as 
 
201. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
202. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 174, 178–79. 
203. Id. at 177 (footnote omitted). 
204. Id. at 178–80. 
205. Id. at 180, 180–82. 
206. Id. at 208 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
207. Id. at 209. 




Stewart had to Section 2, Rehnquist asserted that the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments only allowed Congress to take remedial action to 
prohibit intentional discrimination.208  While Allen and subsequent cases had 
held that Congress intended to ban electoral structures that had discrimina-
tory effects, Rehnquist continued, they had not squarely confronted the 
questions of whether such structures were unconstitutionally discriminatory 
in themselves and, if not, whether Congress had the power to ban them 
anyway.209  He concluded that because many jurisdictions all over the 
country had adopted at-large elections “as a reform measure designed to 
overcome wide-scale corruption in the ward system of government,” and be-
cause it was discrimination by individual white voters who refused to vote 
for black candidates, not governmental actions per se, that produced the dis-
criminatory impact of electoral structures, such structures could not be 
purposefully discriminatory.210  Congressional action to ban them could be 
justified only on the assumptions “that white candidates will not represent 
black interests, and that States should devise a system encouraging blacks to 
vote in a bloc for black candidates,”211 assumptions that Rehnquist and 
Stewart obviously did not share.212  Rehnquist did not consider whether 
politicians in states and counties who consciously organized their political 
structures in order to facilitate white bloc voting that would always or usually 
defeat blacks were engaging in intentional discrimination. 
In City of Rome, Rehnquist and Stewart would not only have extended 
the judicial veto of congressional legislation banning laws with discrimina-
tory effects to Section 5, they would also have prevented Congress from 
protecting anything more than the acts of voting and running for office.  It 
was a radical position—and it attracted only two votes. 
F. Washington Outlook: Overcast 
In 1980, with two years to go before Section 5 was scheduled to expire, 
the VRA’s provisions seemed less clear and more shaky than at any previous 
time in the Act’s history.  Although Section 5 explicitly and Section 2 im-
plicitly encompassed both purpose and effect, Section 2’s effect standard had 
been stripped off, at least according to the four-Justice Bolden plurality.  
Section 5 retained its effect standard, but in stunted form, banning only those 
changes that made minorities worse off than they had been.  Despite the fact 
that all nine Justices repeatedly agreed that no section of the VRA guaranteed 
proportional representation, conservative Justices and many even less 
 
208. Id. at 210–18. 
209. Id. at 211–12. 
210. Id. at 217, 216–17. 
211. Id. at 218. 
212. See id. (“The findings in this case alone demonstrate the tenuous nature of these 
assumptions.”). 
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judicious critics never tired of charging liberal Justices with a craving for 
quotas.213  While the Bolden plurality rested the Act solely on the narrowly 
stated and rarely litigated Fifteenth Amendment, Rehnquist and Stewart in 
their City of Rome dissent noted that several prior cases connected the VRA 
to the much more expansive Fourteenth Amendment, and they recognized the 
joint paternity of the two constitutional Amendments.214  More liberal 
Justices seemed to care less about the exact fatherhood of the VRA than 
about the tests used to evaluate evidence in voting rights cases.  Instead of 
trying to overturn Regester explicitly, the Bolden plurality recast its frame-
work as one about intent, which made Regester relevant to the VRA whether 
it was necessary under the statute to prove intent or effect.  By failing to kill 
Regester, the Bolden plurality had unintentionally made it applicable to a 
wider range of cases.  Meanwhile, local and state jurisdictions were increas-
ingly including Section 5 submissions in their bureaucratic routines, and the 
Justice Department was leaning more and more on Beer’s exception to the 
retrogression standard, which allowed it to refuse preclearance to schemes 
that it concluded violated the Constitution, whether or not they led to a retro-
gression in minority political status.215  In all, the Judiciary and the Executive 
had created a great deal of confusion at just the time when jurisdictions were 
flooding the Department of Justice with submissions and civil rights groups 
had begun to file a wave of Section 2 challenges to noncovered jurisdictions 
and to pre-1964 laws everywhere.  To simplify or, to be more realistic, to 
complicate matters further, Congress was about to revisit the Act. 
IV. Rebirth 
A. Renewal 
Because there have been no studies of the entire first forty-plus years of 
the VRA, two odd facts have gone largely unnoticed.  First, every renewal of 
the VRA has taken place during a Republican presidential administration, 
which, with varying degrees of intensity, favored weakening or deleting 
 
213. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75–76 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“Whatever 
appeal the dissenting opinion’s view may have as a matter of political theory, it is not the law.  The 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation 
as an imperative of political organization.  The entitlement that the dissenting opinion assumes to 
exist simply is not to be found in the Constitution of the United States.”); Boyd & Markman, supra 
note 187, at 1397–403 (quoting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Bradford Reynolds, Dr. 
Walter Berns, Senator Orrin Hatch, and others as charging that a results test in Section 2 would lead 
to the use of “quotas” or “proportional representation”). 
214. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 207 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  The 1965 House Report 
rests the VRA on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Article I, Section Four.  H.R. REP. 
NO. 89-439, at 6 (1965). 
215. Motomura, supra note 162, at 242–45.  Submissions totaled 5,976 from 1971 through 
1975, but they totaled 25,857 from 1976 through 1980.  BALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 248–49. 




Section 5 and opposed significantly expanding other provisions of the Act.216  
Second, and in particular, the VRA was rejuvenated and the Act reached the 
apogee of its authority during the twelve years of the most conservative 
presidential regimes since that of Calvin Coolidge.  The most southern-
dominated administrations since Woodrow Wilson not only failed to reverse 
the central political result of the Second Reconstruction but actually, 
grudgingly, presided over its expansion. 
The 1975 renewal had gone relatively easily, as the Democratic sweep 
in the 1974 “Watergate election” had given liberals more power in Congress 
than they had enjoyed in 1970.  The principal change was an extension of 
voting protections to “language minorities” under a new section numbered 
203.217  Efforts to drop Section 5 entirely or to dilute it by extending it 
nationwide, which was designed to overwhelm the understaffed Voting 
Section with so many submissions that scrutiny of any one would be com-
pletely superficial, failed in the Senate.218  The most serious such proposal, 
by Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, lost by only 48–41, with half of the 
Republicans who voted and nine northern Democrats joining fifteen of 
seventeen southern Democrats in favor of effectively scuttling 
preclearance.219  Knowing how critical Section 5 had been in the redistricting 
of the 1970s, the House passed a ten-year, rather than a five-year, extension 
of Section 5 so that it would not run out just as redistricting was beginning in 
the 1980s.220  Unelected President Gerald Ford, who as House Minority 
Leader in 1970 had led Nixon’s effort to delete Section 5, at first endorsed 
the 1975 bill, then withdrew his support during the time when the Senate was 
considering it, apparently feeling the warm breath of a right-wing challenge 
for the Republican presidential nomination from Ronald Reagan, and finally 
reversed himself again in the face of criticism from more moderate 
 
216. Tucker, supra note 12, at 206.  The Ford Administration in 1975 did not oppose the 
addition of coverage for those who speak “minority languages.”  142 CONG. REC. 21,185 (1996) 
(statement of Rep. Conyers).  The George W. Bush Administration was a partial exception, 
declining to take any firm position at all on the legislation until July 13, 2006, the day the House 
voted on the bill.  Tucker, supra note 12, at 251.  The Senate acted just a week later.  Id. at 264. 
217. See Voting Rights Act of 1965—Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 203, § 4(f), 89 Stat. 
400, 401–02 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)) 
(amending the Voting Rights Act to add Section 203, which along with amendments necessary to its 
application comprise the bulk of the Act’s text). 
218. STEVEN F. LAWSON, RUNNING FOR FREEDOM: CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN 
AMERICA SINCE 1941, at 187 (1991); see also Days & Guinier, supra note 18, at 172–73 
(discussing a similar proposition made during debates concerning the 1982 extension of Section 5). 
219. See 121 CONG. REC. 24,766, 24,766–69 (1975) (reporting the introduction of, and voting 
upon, Senator Nunn’s amendment to “provide permanent coverage of section 5 on a nationwide 
basis”). 
220. See Congress Clears Voting Rights Act Extension, 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 521, 525 
(1975) (discussing the argument in favor of a ten-year extension by Arthur Fleming, Chairman of 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights). 
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quarters.221  Unmoved by, though perturbed at Ford’s stumbling shifts, the 
Senate eventually passed the bill by 77–12 with a compromise seven-year 
extension, and the House, under pressure to act quickly as the deadline for 
renewal approached, acquiesced in the Senate amendments without conven-
ing a two-house conference committee, 346–56.222 
Yet the liberal failure in 1975 to extend Sections 5 and 203 for ten years 
turned out to be fortuitous, for the necessity to consider extension gave the 
civil rights forces an opportunity to overturn Beer and the plurality opinion in 
Bolden.223  Two characteristics of those decisions lent themselves to legisla-
tive attack—their sharp departures from previous Supreme Court rulings and 
congressional understandings and the unwillingness or inability of their au-
thors to overrule those previous judgments explicitly.  Liberals could, with 
considerable evidence, represent themselves as conservatives merely trying 
to restore the status quo as it existed before the radical Beer and Bolden 
decisions.224 
Two more factors shaped the congressional debate of 1981–1982 in a 
surprising fashion.  First was the 1980 triumph of Ronald Reagan and the 
“movement conservatives” who had long ago hitched their horses to his 
movie-prop chariot.  Before 1981, Democrats had controlled both houses of 
Congress every time the VRA had been considered.225  In the 1980 election, 
Republicans gained control of the Senate, putting South Carolina’s Strom 
Thurmond, the 1948 Dixiecrat candidate for president, in command of the 
Judiciary Committee.226  Ronald Reagan had opposed the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act in 1964227 and the VRA in 1965,228 and he had won his first 
office, as California governor, partly on the white backlash against the state’s 
1963 Rumford Act against racial segregation in the sale and rental of 
housing, a backlash he actively stimulated as spokesman for Proposition 14, 
which repealed the fair-housing law.229  Because proponents of voting rights 
 
221. LAWSON, supra note 218, at 187. 
222. Congress Clears Voting Rights Act Extension, supra note 220, at 529–33. 
223. See Derfner, supra note 43, at 149 (noting that the 1982 expiration date ensured a lively 
debate on voting rights issues and that this created an opportunity to overturn Bolden). 
224. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 19–24 (1982) (arguing that the proposed amendment to Section 
2 would return to the original legislative intent by restoring the legal standard that governed voting 
discrimination prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bolden).  The parallels with the liberal 
stance on Georgia v. Ashcroft and Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II ) in 2006 
relieved anyone of the necessity of learning new lines. 
225. See Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, Party Divisions of the U.S. 
House of Representatives (1789 to Present), http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/party 
Div.html; Senate Historical Office of the United States Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789 to 
Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm. 
226. William M. Welch, Former Senator Thurmond Dies, USA TODAY, June 26, 2003, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-06-26-strom_x.htm. 
227. LOU CANNON, REAGAN 111 (1982). 
228. LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 520 (1991). 
229. See CANNON, supra note 227, at 111 (describing Reagan’s support for Proposition 14 as 
helpful to his candidacy). 




feared that Reagan, Thurmond, and Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Chair 
Orrin Hatch would undermine or derail the Act, they knew they had to or-
ganize early and fight long and hard.230  All of their gains in the last decade 
were at stake.  The combination of danger with opportunity was bracing. 
A second factor was the transformation of southern politics, which was 
partly the product of the VRA itself.  While covered southern jurisdictions 
had by 1981 become accustomed to the bureaucratic routine of preclearing 
their election laws, black southerners feared, with considerable historical 
justification, that if the VRA were weakened, their newfound political power 
would dissolve or at least lessen.  Thus, white southerners no longer fought 
the law, while black southerners insisted on its strengthening.231 
When he signed the much-enhanced VRA into law on June 29, 1982, 
President Reagan, without the slightest hint of his Administration’s vehement 
opposition to the amended Act, pronounced the right to vote “the crown 
jewel of American liberties” and asserted that the enactment of the VRA 
“proves our unbending commitment to voting rights.”232  The bill’s passage 
by the House, 389–24, and the Senate, 85–8, at once revealed the national 
consensus in favor of equal political rights for minorities and concealed the 
difficult struggles and stealthy victory of the VRA’s proponents, organized as 
inside and outside lobbyists by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 
(LCCR).233  Each side played complicated legislative games, but the voting 
rights forces were more ambitious, pragmatic, and united, and they won a 
startlingly easy victory for the strongest voting rights law in American 
history. 
Both sides in the 1981–1982 debates engaged in creative misreadings of 
judicial opinions and the selective exaggeration typical of public-policy 
discussions.  To rally support for changes in the VRA, the LCCR, 
sympathetic members of Congress, and newspaper editorial boards often 
treated Stewart’s Bolden plurality opinion as solid authority, yet ignored the 
fact that it was based on the Constitution, not a statute.234  Congress can over-
turn a court’s interpretation of a statute, but not one based on the 
Constitution.  If the civil rights forces had accepted Stewart’s syllogism235 as 
the authoritative statement of current law, they would have been unable to 
 
230. See Boyd & Markman, supra note 187, at 1351 (“[G]roups within the institutional civil 
rights community began to organize for what they anticipated would be a difficult political fight.”). 
231. Id. at 1387–88. 
232. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1982 (June 29, 1982), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/62982b. 
htm. 
233. House Passes Bill to Extend Voting Rights Act, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 415, 415–18 
(1981); Voting Rights Act Extended, Strengthened, supra note 3, at 376. 
234. The discussion in the S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 41 (1982) masterfully blurs the constitutional 
and statutory lines. 
235. See supra text accompanying notes 176–78. 
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argue that all Congress needed to do to overturn it was to amend Section 2 of 
the VRA to restore its original intent to ban laws that had discriminatory 
effects.  Yet the other side was just as creative, pretending that Section 2 and 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had always been interpreted to 
require proof of discriminatory intent.236  Had “conservatives” carried out the 
implications of that view, they would have had to acknowledge that it sug-
gested that the reapportionment cases—Baker v. Carr and its progeny—and 
every case involving the VRA before 1980 were implicitly overturned by 
Bolden because none of them had been explicitly decided on intent grounds.  
Several conservatives also misrepresented the civil rights leadership as op-
posing changes in Section 2, a charge easily and embarrassingly refuted.237  
While the LCCR and its allies exaggerated the difficulty of proving intent238 
and the Washington Post called it “virtually impossible,”239 the Reagan 
Administration and its confederates exaggerated the ease with which 
electoral structures would fall if an effect standard were written into Section 
2, hyperventilating that every legislative body in the country elected at large 
in which minorities lacked proportional representation would instantly be 
declared illegal.240  Despite the fact that the main battle was over Section 2, 
which applied nationwide, not just in the largely southern covered 
jurisdictions, no one presented any evidence of the extent of racial 
discrimination in political processes outside the South.241  Each side paid 
much less overt attention to what had always been the VRA’s most contro-
versial provision, Section 5, arguing principally about the details of the 
bailout mechanism, the way states or localities escaped having to preclear 
their election laws.242  Bolden was the issue, not Beer.  Yet as we shall see, 
the Justice Department and the courts were instructed that the 1981–1982 
amendments to Section 2 were to determine their interpretation of Section 5.  
It was a strange and oblique debate. 
 
236. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 130–31. 
237. Boyd & Markman, supra note 187, at 1394–95. 
238. See Derfner, supra note 43, at 153 (stating that during the House subcommittee hearings at 
least thirty witnesses testified to the “difficulty or near impossibility of proving discriminatory 
purpose in even the most egregious violations”). 
239. Editorial, Voting Rights: Be Strong, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1982, at A18. 
240. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 151–58 (suggesting that any electoral law in any governmental 
unit in the country might be subject to court-ordered restructuring in cases where minorities lacked 
proportional representation). 
241. Boyd & Markman, supra note 187, at 1394 n.231.  In contrast, in 2006 when Section 2 
was not endangered, Professor Ellen Katz presented a complete analysis of Section 2 legal cases 
from 1982 through 2005, 52% of which were filed outside covered jurisdictions.  Ellen D. Katz, Not 
Like the South?  Regional Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006, at 183, 215 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007). 
242. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 43–62 (outlining the lengthy discussion regarding the bailout 
mechanism); Boyd & Markman, supra note 187, at 1369–91 (discussing the lengthy full-committee 
debate over the bailout mechanism but paralleling the committee’s actions by giving relatively little 
attention to concerns over Section 5). 




The House considered the bill first.  After extensive hearings, many 
proposals, and much negotiation between Republicans and Democrats, often 
including representatives of the LCCR, the House Judiciary Committee voted 
23–1 for a bill that inserted an explicit results test into Section 2, but included 
a provision stating that a lack of proportional representation was not in and of 
itself proof of a violation; extended Section 5 permanently; and made it 
somewhat easier for local jurisdictions to escape coverage of Section 5, thus 
undercutting part of the holding in City of Rome.243  In an implicit rejection 
of the Beer nonretrogression test, however, the bill allowed jurisdictions to 
bail out only if they eliminated methods of election that denied “equal 
access” to the political process, which was interpreted by the Justice 
Department to mean that they had to rid their laws of at-large elections, 
majority-vote requirements, and similar procedures—not just avoid adopting 
such laws anew.244  Along the way, negotiators rejected attempts to weaken 
Section 5, the most radical one being to require preclearance of laws only 
after a federal court’s judgment that a jurisdiction had previously engaged in 
a pattern or practice of discrimination.245  On the House floor, unfriendly 
amendments were overwhelmingly voted down and the Judiciary 
Committee’s bill passed.246 
At the beginning of the process, some civil rights leaders favored 
settling for a simple extension of Section 5 and no amendment to Section 2.  
By the time of the House passage, a continuation of the status quo was the 
best outcome that opponents of minority rights could hope for.  Divided 
internally, the Reagan Administration waited too long, failing to take a public 
position on any aspect of the bill until after the House had passed it and 
sponsors had employed extensive grass-roots and senator-to-senator lobbying 
to line up a filibuster-proof sixty-one-vote majority for the House bill in the 
Senate.  As insurance against a Judiciary Committee roadblock, liberals had 
initiated an obscure parliamentary maneuver that would allow the House bill 
to be placed on the Senate calendar without the Judiciary Committee’s 
approval, if that proved necessary.247  The bill’s momentum was palpable.248 
 
243. See Days & Guinier, supra note 18, at 174–75 (describing the bailout provisions in the 
1981 House bill); Derfner, supra note 43, at 151–53 (describing the drafting of the 1981 House bill 
and the vote in the House Judiciary Committee). 
244. Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: An 
Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 420 (1985). 
245. House Opens Hearings on Voting Rights Act, 39 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 819, 819 (1981); 
House Passes Bill to Extend Voting Rights Act, supra note 233, at 418. 
246. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 42–43 (1981) (detailing bailout provisions in the bill); Days 
& Guinier, supra note 18, at 174–76 (recounting the House actions on the bailout provisions); 
Derfner, supra note 43, at 152–54 (recounting the exhaustive hearings before the House Judiciary 
Committee, the Committee’s adoption of the bill, and the bill’s passage in the House). 
247. House Passes Bill to Extend Voting Rights Act, supra note 233, at 418. 
248. See generally id. at 415–18 (discussing the strong growth in support for the Act); Boyd & 
Markman, supra note 187, at 139–51 (same). 
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Senator Orrin Hatch, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, tried to halt that momentum with 
witnesses, calling conservative professor after professor, backed by a Justice 
Department that tried to make up for in zeal what it lacked in timing.249  
Abandoning any effort to phase out Section 5 through a much weaker bailout 
or incapacitate it by applying it to every local and state government in the 
nation, which had been the Administration’s first suggestions, Justice 
Department officials announced that the President favored a ten-year 
extension of Section 5, not making it permanent, as the House had; an un-
specified bailout provision, but one less stringent than the House had passed; 
and a pure intent standard for Section 2.250  In their testimony, 
Administration witnesses and their compatriots chanted one refrain: 
Anything except Stewart’s opinion in Bolden would lead inevitably to the 
proportional representation of minorities, a horrifying specter to them, 
compared to the grossly disproportionate overrepresentation of whites, which 
had always been the American way.251 
Yet however potent the opponents’ rhetorical ploy of equating an effects 
test with quotas,252 it was a tactical mistake, easily countered.  If the House 
bill’s renunciation of proportional representation was not enough, that renun-
ciation could be expanded in the text of the law and in the extremely detailed 
and explicit Senate Report on the Act.  When the Senate Judiciary 
Committee threatened to deadlock, former Republican national chairman and 
vice-presidential candidate Robert Dole, one of the two undeclared members 
of the Judiciary Committee at the time, negotiated a much wordier guarantee 
with the bill’s sponsors, which stated that Section 2’s results test did not es-
tablish a right to proportional representation and that a failure to elect 
members of a “protected class,” such as African-Americans, in proportion to 
their population was only “one circumstance” of the totality of circumstances 
that had to be assessed to prove a violation.253  VRA supporters happily ac-
corded the Kansas Republican full and highly public credit for the “Dole 
 
249. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 139–51 (1982) (quoting from the testimony of conservative 
professors and lawyers). 
250. Boyd & Markman, supra note 187, at 1385–87. 
251. See id. at 1397–403 (recounting the Senate subcommittee debate over whether the results 
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172–74 (recounting House actions on Section 5); Memorandum from John G. Roberts, Jr., Special 
Assistant to the Att’y Gen., to William French Smith, Att’y Gen. of the United States (Jan. 26, 
1982), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/025-voting-
rghts-act/folder025.pdf#page=4 (warning about proportional representation). 
252. See Memorandum from John G. Roberts, Jr., Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen., to 
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253. Boyd & Markman, supra note 187, at 1415, 1414–15. 




Compromise.”254  Facing a bill now certain to come to the floor, with one of 
his party’s most prominent leaders as the public face of the effort, and 
backed by veto-proof majorities in both houses, President Reagan did a 
quick, total costume change and joined the celebration of the Act’s renewal 
as though he had always been planning to attend.255 
The ninety-seventh Congress’s undermining of Beer attracted much less 
attention than its attack on Bolden, and the hearings and floor discussion de-
voted little attention to the definition of effect under Section 5.256  But 
revisions of both major sections of the bill were intertwined from the 
beginning.  As noted above, the House bailout criteria required a jurisdiction 
to show not only that the rights of its minority citizens had not retrogressed 
since 1964, but also that it had eliminated barriers to effective minority po-
litical power, such as at-large elections.  The Senate adopted that part of the 
House bill without amendment.257  The Senate Judiciary Committee also 
indicated in a striking footnote to its report: 
Under the rule of Beer v. United States, a voting change which is 
ameliorative is not objectionable unless the change “itself so 
discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the 
Constitution.”  In light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended 
that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself 
so discriminates as to violate section 2.258 
That is, the amendments to Section 2 were meant also to eliminate the 
nonretrogression test that Stewart had imposed on Section 5.259  The 
Congress aimed at Bolden, but according to the Senate Report and statements 
 
254. Although “[f]ormulated in coordination with representatives of the Leadership 
Conference,” id. at 1414, the amendment was universally known as the Dole Compromise, see 
Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What Is the 
Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1, 10–11 (1987) (crediting Senator Dole with developing 
the compromise).  The Kansas Senator was given named credit for it in the published accounts of 
the 1982 legislative events by two of the most prominent civil rights lobbyists of the 1981–1982 
renewal campaign, as well as other standard accounts.  See, e.g., Chandler Davidson, The Recent 
Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION 
IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 21, 34 (Chandler 
Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (explaining that changes to the bill sought by the “voting 
rights bar” were made thanks to Dole); Derfner, supra note 43, at 155 (recounting Dole’s role in 
drafting the language of the amendment); Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 748 (1983) (noting that the 
agreement was termed the Dole Compromise). 
255. See STEVEN A. SHULL, A KINDER, GENTLER RACISM?: THE REAGAN-BUSH CIVIL RIGHTS 
LEGACY 166 (1993) (detailing Reagan Administration actions); Derfner, supra note 43, at 154–56 
(recounting Senate and lobbyist actions). 
256. Boyd & Markman, supra note 187, at 1421 n.365. 
257. See id. at 1415 (noting that the sole change to Section 5 provided by the “Dole 
Compromise” amendment replaced the permanent extension provided in the House bill with a 
twenty-five-year extension). 
258. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 12 n.31 (1982) (citations omitted). 
259. For a less explicit statement of the same point, see H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 28 (1981). 
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on the House and Senate floors by two of the most prominent sponsors of the 
bill, Senator Edward Kennedy, a Democrat, and Representative James 
Sensenbrenner, a Republican, Congress meant the bullet to ricochet and hit 
Beer as well.260 
Congress could have been more forceful and amended the text of 
Section 5, explicitly stating that it meant to impose the same effects test that 
courts had found in the Fourteenth Amendment.  But critics who downplayed 
the importance of the footnote261 bear a heavy burden of proof, even if we 
concentrate only on the text.  First, the text itself only mentioned effect, not 
retrogressive effect.  Second, after the 1982 amendments, the results test for 
Section 2, which applied nationally, was actually stronger than the 
retrogressive-effects test of Section 5, which covered only the most suspect 
jurisdictions in the country.  Those who doubt that Congress meant to con-
nect Sections 2 and 5 must believe that Congress desired to perpetuate this 
paradoxical double standard.262  Third, Justice Stewart’s opinion in Beer it-
self rested wholly on a partially quoted sentence from a congressional 
report.263  What could have been more appropriate than to employ the same 
type of authoritative document on the intent of Congress—this time, 
relieving the Court of the necessity of quoting out of context and ignoring 
contrary statements in other congressional reports—to overturn a Supreme 
Court decision that rested solely on congressional intent?  It is more than a 
bit contradictory for the “conservative” side, which spent the 1981–1982 re-
newal debate insisting on an intent standard, to undermine one of the two 
major achievements of that struggle (overturning Bolden and Beer) later by 
substituting a nontextual reading of Section 5 for footnote thirty-one’s admi-
rably clear and explicit statement of congressional intent. 
 
260. See generally Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
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University of South Carolina). 
262. See generally Mark E. Haddad, Note, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
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A few days before the Dole Compromise was announced, Judge Virgil 
Pittman issued his decision that the plaintiffs had proven that Mobile had 
adopted its at-large systems for electing city commission and school-board 
members with a racially discriminatory intent.264  After Stewart’s opinion, 
the NAACP-LDF and Justice Department attorneys had employed historians, 
including the author, to detect the motives of the framers of Mobile’s at-large 
schemes, which the historians traced back to 1874 for the city government 
and 1876 for the board of education.265  Immediately after the Bolden remand 
decision was announced, Reagan Justice Department officials attempted to 
use it as evidence that civil rights forces trying to amend Section 2 had no 
valid fears, thus using one hard-won, but short-term victory for minority 
rights to try to stave off a larger, longer term defeat for the Administration.266 
But the Administration’s argument was unconvincing for two reasons.  
First, the historians did not adopt Stewart’s one-consideration-at-a-time form 
of assessing purpose but painted the whole historical context in which the 
crucial decisions were made.267  Bolden was not overturned with the weapons 
Stewart provided.  Second, the Administration attorneys, addressing 
Congress, did not discuss the position of their then-favorite Justices in City of 
Rome, which contradicts that of Pittman’s remand decision in Bolden and 
sets out an intent standard that is much more difficult to meet than Stewart’s 
in his Bolden Supreme Court opinion.  In their City of Rome dissent, 
Rehnquist and Stewart implied that because at-large systems were not in 
themselves racially discriminatory, they could not become so because of the 
subjective motives of those who adopted them or of the white blocs that 
formed under them to deny African-Americans their preferred 
representatives.268  While the civil rights forces had often castigated what 
 
264. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982). 
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they characterized as Bolden’s subjective-intent standard during the 1981–
1982 debates, focusing on the motives of those who were responsible for en-
acting a particular law at least holds open the possibility of concluding that 
the law was discriminatory.  The position that certain types of laws are non-
discriminatory per se does not. 
The Bolden remand decision was not the only indication that the 
permutations of intent and effect were more complicated than they appeared 
in the congressional debate.  In its detailed guidance for the Justice 
Department and the courts on how to implement and interpret the amended 
VRA, Senate Report 417 listed seven factors to be considered in Section 2 
cases, drawing them not from hearings, congressional studies, or judicial 
opinions in Section 2 cases, but from Regester, a case brought under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.269  Justice Stewart’s opinion in Bolden had treated 
the VRA as authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment, not the Fourteenth, and 
it had interpreted Regester as an intent case, not an effect case.270  But here 
was the Congress, overturning Bolden and declaring that the Regester factors 
were to be used to determine, under a statute, whether an election law had a 
racially discriminatory effect!  It was an illustration of how closely related 
evaluations of intent and effect were and how interchangeable members of 
Congress considered statutes and constitutional provisions. 
Two days after President Reagan signed the amended VRA, the 
Supreme Court showed that it shared the congressional disregard for nice 
legal distinctions by outfitting Regester in intent garb.  In a 6–3 decision by 
Justice White, the Court overturned Stewart’s opinion in Bolden without ex-
actly saying so.271  In the early twentieth century, rural, majority-black Burke 
County, Georgia, had established an at-large county commission elected with 
numbered posts by majority vote.272  The principal distinction between 
Rogers v. Lodge 273 and the first Bolden case was that the district and appeals 
court judges who decided the Burke County case were more careful to phrase 
their opinions in the language of intent.  Pointing out that the vote in Bolden 
on whether discriminatory intent had been proven was 4–4, with Justice 
Stevens taking no position on the issue, Justice White invoked the Regester 
factors to analyze intent much more coherently than the now-retired Justice 
Stewart had in Bolden.274  Doing so picked up not only the vote of Justice 
Blackmun, who had been ambivalent in Bolden, but that of Chief Justice 
Burger, who had joined Stewart in Bolden, and of Stewart’s replacement, 
 
Fourteenth Amendment may be violated only by state action, not by private action.” (citation 
omitted)). 
269. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982). 
270. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
271. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
272. Id. at 614–15. 
273. 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
274. Id. at 620, 622–27. 




Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.275  And not only did Justice White’s intent 
analysis in Lodge look almost exactly like what Congress had just advised 
judges to perform under the heading of effect, but the criticisms of White’s 
opinion by the three dissenters, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, 
echoed the liberals’ criticisms of Stewart’s opinion in Bolden during the 
1981–1982 debate—that proving “subjective” intent was itself subjective, 
judicially unmanageable, and inherently political.276  Two years, one judicial 
replacement, and a highly visible congressional debate, and no one was de-
fending Bolden anymore.  Some might have wondered whether the epic 
battle of 1981–1982 had been entirely necessary.277 
The other 1982 battle, the Beer battle, continued for another five years 
in courts, within the Reagan Justice Department, and between the 
Department, voting rights lawyers, and sympathetic members of Congress.  
Even before footnote thirty-one, the District of Columbia District Court had 
sidestepped Beer’s retrogression standard in two ways—by recalculating the 
status quo benchmark and by emphasizing the purpose prong of Section 5.  
Indeed, after analyzing over 800 Justice Department objection letters written 
before 1983, Hiroshi Motomura concluded that compared with proof of vote 
dilution or racially discriminatory purpose, “the retrogression prong of the 
Beer analysis has had relatively little impact on the development of the sub-
stantive law of section 5.”278  For example, the Wilkes County, Georgia, 
Board of Commissioners shifted during the 1970s from a malapportioned 
single-member-district system, in which African-Americans comprised no 
more than 37% of the registered voters in any district, to an at-large system 
with staggered terms and a majority-vote requirement, in which only 29% of 
the registered voters were black.279  The Justice Department refused 
preclearance, and in Wilkes County the District of Columbia District Court 
compared the newer system not just with the old, malapportioned districts 
but also with a hypothetical set of equally populated districts.280  The court 
concluded that the new plan had both a discriminatory purpose and a dis-
criminatory effect, even if blacks were unlikely to have been able to control 
any district previous to the changes, and the Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed.281 
 
275. Id. at 614. 
276. Id. at 628–31 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 631–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
277. One might suggest two reasons why Lodge has so seldom been cited.  First, the more 
highly publicized and more nearly unanimous congressional amendment to Section 2 served the 
purpose even better.  And second, the fact that Lodge followed Bolden by only two years and did 
not explicitly overrule it may have made Lodge seem a less secure precedent. 
278. Motomura, supra note 162, at 245. 
279. Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 tbl.1 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 439 
U.S. 999 (1978). 
280. Id. at 1173–77. 
281. Id. at 1173–78. 
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But in a 1983 case, a 6–3 majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Powell, disregarded Wilkes County and did not consider intent.282  
Lockhart, Texas, had added two more city commissioners elected to num-
bered posts to its original two.283  Under Beer, the effect case turned on the 
trivial question of whether the numbered-post provision continued the earlier 
system.  For nearly sixty years, contrary to Texas law, Lockhart had used 
numbered posts to elect its commissioners.284  Following Wilkes County, the 
Carter Justice Department and two of the three District of Columbia District 
Court judges declared the proper benchmark to be how Lockhart should le-
gally have run its elections, not what it actually did.285  Assuming that 
benchmark, Lockhart had retrogressed, and the judges did not have to reach 
the questions of discriminatory purpose or nonretrogressive discriminatory 
result.  But before the oral argument in the Supreme Court, in November, 
1982, the Reagan Justice Department switched sides, joining Lockhart and 
leaving Mexican-American plaintiffs to fight alone for the former position of 
the U.S. government.286  More significantly, when the Mexican-Americans 
contended that even if there was no retrogression in their position because of 
Lockhart’s actions, the result did discriminate against them and that because 
of footnote thirty-one, the change should not be precleared, the Justice 
Department filed a reply brief arguing that Congress had not intended to 
apply Section 2’s results test to Section 5.287  Justice Powell reversed the dis-
trict court decision on the benchmark, thereby finding no retrogression,288 
and he “decline[d] to review” the question of whether the 1982 changes had 
applied Section 2 standards to Section 5 because that question had not been 
considered in the lower court.289  Justice Marshall dissented vigorously, 
citing the evidence from Senate Report 417.290  The decision left the Section 
2–Section 5 connection in a fog. 
Nowhere was the fog denser than in the Justice Department.  Like the 
Nixon Administration a decade earlier, the Reagan Administration sought to 
undermine the VRA, especially Section 5, through guidelines and legal posi-
tions espoused in its briefs.  But the Administration was inconsistent, 
evidently reflecting internal differences.  Although the Justice Department 
continued to take the position in other cases in the early 1980s that Section 
 
282. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983). 
283. Id. at 127–28. 
284. Id. at 135. 
285. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 581, 587 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that 
allowing the city’s discriminatory electoral scheme to escape Section 5 scrutiny “would reward [the 
city] for its illegal activities in the past”), vacated, 460 U.S. 125. 
286. See Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 130 (noting the change in the Government’s litigation posture). 
287. Brief for Appellee Cano at 48–50, Lockhart, 460 U.S. 125 (No. 81-802); Reply Brief for 
the United States at 4, Lockhart, 460 U.S. 125 (No. 81-802). 
288. Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 136. 
289. Id. at 133 n.9. 
290. Id. at 141, 145–46 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 




2’s results standard did not apply to Section 5, it refused to preclear at least 
two changes in Mississippi in 1983 on the grounds that they violated the 
amended Section 2, while in the same year, it precleared a change in 
Alabama but threatened a Section 2 lawsuit.291  And it formulated guidelines 
in 1985 that confused the issue further.  Without any case authority or evi-
dence of congressional intent in hearings, reports, or floor discussions, the 
Department announced that it would only refuse to preclear a law under 
Section 2’s results test if “the party or parties alleging violations” showed by 
“clear and convincing evidence” that the change had a discriminatory 
result.292  This reversed the burden of proof that had always been an integral 
part of Section 5, it required the involvement of lawyers representing 
minorities, who played no formal role in Section 5 proceedings and, indeed, 
were often not participants at all, and it set a particularly high standard (that 
is, clear and convincing evidence), which had never been a requirement of 
Section 5.293  The rationale given by Assistant Attorney General William 
Bradford Reynolds for Section 2’s burden shift was that by itself, Section 2 
had always placed the burden of proof upon the party alleging 
discrimination.294  If Section 2 was going to be inserted into Section 5, he 
reasoned, it would bring its burden of proof with it.  Moreover, according to 
the proposed guidelines, only “significant reductions” in minority political 
strength could be considered retrogressive, and even then, if the jurisdiction 
could cite a “legitimate governmental goal[]” for its change, the Department 
would preclear the changes.295 
Under attack on the issue in the oversight hearings from House 
Judiciary Subcommittee Chair Don Edwards and his counsel, Reynolds 
openly doubted that Congress meant Sections 2 and 5 to be connected and 
floated as an alternative the redundant suggestion that the Department would 
refuse to preclear changes that a judge had already declared illegal under 
 
291. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to William H. Ward, Att’y (June 17, 1983), in Proposed Changes to Regulations 
Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 232, 232–34 (1986); Letter 
from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Thomas P. Lewis, Amite County Chancery Clerk (June 6, 1983), in Proposed Changes to 
Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Oversight Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 229, 
229–31 (1986); Hancock & Tredway, supra note 244, at 420 n.195. 
292. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965; Proposed 
Revision of Procedures, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,122, 19,131 (proposed May 6, 1985) (to be codified at 28 
C.F.R. pt. 51). 
293. Another possible, and no less illogical, interpretation of the guideline was that some 
Justice Department lawyers would be parties, while others in the same office would serve, in effect, 
as judges. 
294. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965; Proposed 
Revision of Procedures, 50 Fed. Reg. at 19,131. 
295. Id. 
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Section 2.296  The pressure of the hearings and the subsequent, harshly criti-
cal committee report apparently caused the Department, after a much 
lengthier period of deliberation than its leaders had planned to take, to revise 
the proposed Section 5 guidelines very substantially, incorporating a results 
test with no burden shifting and only “clear” evidence required, and elimi-
nating the ability of covered jurisdictions to rationalize their way around the 
retrogression standard so easily.297  Although the Department incorporated 
the revised Section 2 into its standard operating procedures for evaluating 
Section 5 submissions, it seldom mentioned Section 2 in objection letters, 
and when it did, it generally also mentioned discriminatory purpose.298  
Nonetheless, the results test remained a part of Section 5 for a decade, and it 
may have served as a deterrent to antiminority racial gerrymandering during 
the redistricting of the early 1990s because southern legislators knew that 
adopting redistricting plans in which minorities had “less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice”299 
might invite a Section 5 objection from the Justice Department. 
C. Redefinition 
The explosion of Section 2 litigation that followed the 1982 anti-Bolden 
amendment first reached the Supreme Court in the 1986 case of Thornburg v. 
Gingles.300  North Carolina had kept the number of African-American state 
legislators at a minimum by submerging some black population concentra-
tions in majority-white at-large districts and splitting others between two or 
more single-member districts.301  After initially objecting, the Reagan 
 
296. Proposed Changes to Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Oversight 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 149–51, 163 (1986) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Reynolds Statement]. 
297. See Proposed Changes to Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: 
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986) (providing the testimony of witnesses before the subcommittee); 28 
C.F.R. § 51.55 (1987) (mandating that a violation of Section 2 requires the Department to refuse 
preclearance under Section 5); MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST: 
RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 26–27 (2001) (recounting the Edwards–
Reynolds struggle over Section 5 regulations). 
298. See Days & Guinier, supra note 18, at 170 (summarizing Justice Department procedures 
required by the 1982 amendments); McCrary et al., supra note 154, at 298 tbl.3 (categorizing 
objection letters in detail); Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance 
Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S, at 
80, 84–87 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (summarizing objection letters). 
299. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 82 (1982) (quoting Section 2 as revised in 1982). 
300. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see Hancock & Tredway, supra note 244, at 420 n.194 (stating that 
sixty cases making Section 2 claims were filed in the first three years after Section 2 was amended); 
Miller & Packman, supra note 254, at 16–73 (detailing cases). 
301. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 349, 349–50 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (outlining the 
“gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim” that North Carolina submerged African-American voters in large 
majority-white multimember districts and fractured African-American majorities between 
legislative districts), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30. 




Administration precleared the 1981 plan for the North Carolina state 
legislature and joined with the state in defending it.302  Blacks sued and won 
under the new Section 2’s results standard before a three-judge panel303 
whose opinion exhaustively examined each of the seven “Senate factors” 
from Senate Report 417, which had been drawn from Regester.304  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s opinion in part, with all nine 
Justices signing onto opinions that recognized the legitimacy of Section 2’s 
results test and therefore, implicitly, of Congress’s rejection of Bolden.305  
For a five-person majority, Justice Brennan picked out two of the Senate 
factors as particularly important—racial bloc voting and regular white 
victories—and added another consideration that was especially relevant to at-
large elections and redistricting but that Congress had not included in the list: 
the minority group had to show that it could comprise a majority of a 
“compact” single-member district.306 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell 
and Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment that North Carolina’s multimem-
ber districts discriminated against blacks in violation of the results standard 
of the amended Section 2, but she criticized Brennan for abridging the Senate 
factors; for setting out a general formula, rather than requiring a different 
“intensely local appraisal,” in the words of Regester,307 in every case; and for 
requiring minorities to prove only that they usually lost, instead of that their 
victories were infrequent.308  O’Connor would have made proof of 
discrimination against minorities much more difficult, granting them a voting 
rights remedy only if they lost nearly all of the time, as they did in the mul-
timember districts in North Carolina.  Brennan’s emphasis on black electoral 
success, O’Connor declared, was tantamount to guaranteeing a right to 
 
302. For a history of the Justice Department’s denial and then preclearance, see id. at 350–51.  
For the Justice Department’s participation against the black plaintiffs, see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 54–
55. 
303. See Gingles, 590 F. Supp. 345. 
304. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29, 28 & n.113.  The Justice Department did reject the State’s 
first congressional plan, not on retrogression grounds but on the basis of allegations that “the 
decision to exclude Durham County from Congressional District No. 2 [the State’s most heavily 
black district] had the effect of minimizing minority voting strength and was motivated by racial 
considerations.”  KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 252.  After the State drew a plan that was slightly 
more favorable to African-Americans, the Department precleared it.  Id. at 252–54.  The revised 
congressional plan was originally part of the Gingles lawsuit, but it was dropped before the 
amended Section 2 was passed.  Id. at 254. 
305. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34–35; id. at 82–83 (White, J., concurring); id. at 83–84 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 106–08 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
306. Id. at 46 n.12 (majority opinion).  Justice White dissented from Brennan’s elaborate 
discussion of racially polarized voting and favored a more-intent-oriented definition drawn from his 
own opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, but he concurred in Part I of Brennan’s opinion, in which the 
three-pronged Gingles test is set forth.  Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring). 
307. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973). 
308. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83–105 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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proportional representation; she was only willing to safeguard a right to some 
representation.309 
What O’Connor did not criticize, but which became important in later 
cases, was the test’s vagueness—how was compactness to be measured, and 
was population, voting-age population, citizen voting-age population, or the 
number of registered voters to be the index of sufficiently large minority 
concentrations?310  Viewed at the time as a great victory for minority rights, 
Brennan’s three-part Gingles test simplified VRA cases, allowing the 
always-poverty-stricken civil rights forces to bring more cases and to 
pressure numerous local governments to settle out of court.311  Yet in the 
longer run, Brennan’s ruling that one or (perhaps) more minority groups had 
to form a majority of a compact district to be eligible for Section 2 relief was 
employed to undermine minority political power.312  Gingles was also ulti-
mately eroded by the spillover from partisan issues in redistricting.  In a case 
decided the same day as Gingles, Davis v. Bandemer,313 the Supreme Court 
ruled that judges could declare partisan gerrymanders unconstitutional, but 
Justice White, for a plurality of four, defined violations so vaguely that few, 
if any, claims could succeed.314  As a consequence, many party clashes over 
redistricting were later transformed into racial ones for the purposes of 
litigation.315  Both Republicans and Democrats claimed only to be interested 
in protecting the rights of racial minorities.316  Those with a taste for irony 
 
309. See id. at 94, 99–100. 
310. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959–60 (1996) (plurality opinion) (discussing 
compactness); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1021 n.18 (1994) (discussing measures of 
population equality). 
311. GROFMAN, HANDLEY & NIEMI, supra note 18, at 61; MCDONALD, supra note 114, at 181, 
185. 
312. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647, 658 (1993) (suggesting that North Carolina’s 1991 
redistricting plan disregarded compactness among other so-called traditional districting principles). 
313. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
314. See id. at 132 (plurality opinion) (limiting unconstitutional gerrymanders to those in which 
“the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of 
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole”).  The classic discussion of Bandemer is 
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer’s Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 64 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). 
315. Compare, e.g., Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (rejecting a complaint 
against partisan gerrymandering of North Carolina congressional districts, especially the 
“serpentine” District 12), aff’d mem., 506 U.S. 801 (1992), with Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) 
(accepting a complaint against racial gerrymandering of District 12).  The chief counsel of the 
Republican National Committee (RNC), Michael A. Hess, was an active counsel in both cases, 
sitting at the counsel table, for instance, in the remand case of Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 
(E.D.N.C. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 899.  See Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 393 (listing Hess as counsel); see 
also RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S, supra note 298, at x (describing Hess, former chief 
counsel for the RNC, as a “key player in the redistricting battles of the 1980s and 1990s”).  As an 
expert witness for the NAACP-LDF in Shaw v. Hunt, I was in the district courtroom for three days 
of the six-day trial, where I observed Mr. Hess at the plaintiff’s counsel table. 
316. North Carolina Democrats defended the ungainly black-majority First and Twelfth 
Congressional Districts on Section 2, Section 5, and historical racial-discrimination grounds, 
pointing out that they enabled the elections of the first African-American members of Congress in 




found delightful the contortions of a Republican party, so prone to jeremiads 
against affirmative action, defending maximum racial consciousness in 
drawing legislative districts.317 
With the constitutionality of Section 2 unchallenged and the provision 
given a seemingly simple, objective test in Gingles, with the widely dissemi-
nated Section 5 guidelines explicitly incorporating Section 2’s results test, 
and with a string of Section 2 victories stretching from the Deep South to Los 
Angeles, civil rights forces were optimistic as they approached the 1990s 
round of redistricting.318  They hoped that Section 2 and Section 5, working 
in tandem, chiefly as deterrents to discrimination, would expand minority 
opportunities more than any postcensus redistricting since 1965.  They were 
not disappointed. 
D. Reward 
In 1990, there were 204 black state legislators and only 5 black 
members of Congress from the eleven southern states that had managed to 
secede from the Union during the Civil War.319  After the decennial 
redistricting of 1991–1992, those numbers skyrocketed to 260 African-
American state legislators and 17 members of Congress—the largest two-
year increase in the total numbers since southern blacks had first been en-
franchised between 1866 and 1868.320  The increase was the direct and 
 
ninety-four years from North Carolina, a state that in 1990 was nearly a quarter black.  Shaw v. 
Hunt, 517 U.S. at 909–14. 
317. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 297, at 145 (noting that the Republican Party 
generally opposed affirmative action but vigorously advocated a minority-candidate “quota 
system”); Lee Atwater, Altered States: Redistricting Law and Politics in the 1990s, 6 J.L. & POL. 
661, 668 (1990) (arguing that the Republican Party supports “the enfranchisement of groups 
deprived of their full representational strength due to historically unfair redistricting plans”).  See 
generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 297, at 104–10 (discussing the extensive Republican efforts to 
create majority–minority districts). 
318. See Davidson, supra note 254, at 35 (demonstrating that the U.S. Supreme Court’s dilution 
test in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) was heralded by civil rights attorneys as an 
important step in eliminating minority-vote dilution); see also Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 
F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (recognizing a Voting Rights Act violation in a nonsouthern state), 
aff’d, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). 
319. KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 19; Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the 
Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures 
and Congressional Delegations, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, supra note 254, at 335, 341. 
320. KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 19.  The increase in the number of Latino legislators in 1992 
was less dramatic in the nine ex-Confederate states because there were insufficient population 
concentrations outside Florida and Texas to draw majority-Latino districts at the time.  See 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE 1990S: A PORTRAIT OF 
AMERICA 19, 47–48, 203, 318, 415, 549, 669, 686, 762 (1993) (tabulating the percentage of 
Hispanic voting-age persons by congressional district for Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia).  In only one district in those 
nine states did the percentage even reach 8%.  Id. at 762 (Virginia’s District 8).  The proportion of 
voting-age citizens who were Hispanic would surely be smaller than these figures.  Such 
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indirect result of the VRA.  First, the substitution of single-member districts 
for at-large elections and other changes in electoral structures brought about 
by lawsuits and preclearance actions enabled a cadre of black politicians to 
win local and state legislative offices.321  The 1970s and 1980s, in other 
words, established minor leagues for black politicians for the first time since 
the First Reconstruction.  Second, the increasing numbers of African-
American officeholders in the Democratic party drove whites to the 
Republicans, and the white flight increased black influence in Democratic 
primaries and in Democratic delegations in state legislatures that oversaw 
redistricting.322  Completing the virtuous circle, as whites became more 
accustomed to seeing black and brown faces in offices, minority Democratic 
nominees could often gain enough white support in general elections to beat 
white Republicans.323  Third, the number of successful VRA and constitu-
tional lawsuits about redistricting and other facets of the electoral structure 
convinced more minorities to bring them and more white officeholders to 
fear them.  Those who carried out the redistrictings of the 1990s and the 
interest-group lawyers and minority politicians who took part in the process 
or watched it closely had reason to be attuned to possible violations of the 
VRA.324  Fourth was the factor that deserved and attracted the most attention.  
The 1982 VRA amendments, the weapons that Gingles placed in minority 
hands, and the prospect that district lines that were not fair to minorities 
would not be precleared or would prompt Section 2 litigation combined to 
produce the huge surge in districts, almost always less than half white in 
population, that would be carried by minority political candidates in 1992 
and afterwards.325 
 
concentrations were obviously too small to use to draw effective Latino districts not only for 
Congress but also for state legislative seats. 
321. See Handley & Grofman, supra note 319, at 339–41 (documenting litigation to end 
multimember districts and explaining how the resulting single-member districts increased minority 
representation); see also Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election 
Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: 
THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, supra note 254, at 301, 319–21 
(documenting the enormous increase in black representation at the municipal level due to the 
elimination of multimember districts). 
322. In 1991–1992, blacks comprised 15.9% of the Democrats in state legislatures in the eleven 
ex-Confederate states; in 2001–2002, the legislatures were 29.6% black.  These figures were 
compiled from statistics from COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES (2002); 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES (1992); JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & 
ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS (2002); and JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. 
STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS (1993). 
323. See David L. Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Trends in Minority Representation, 1974 to 
2000, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 61, 66 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006) 
(attributing improved black electoral results to greater willingness among whites to vote for black 
candidates). 
324. Posner, supra note 298, at 94–95. 
325. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 297, at 6 (criticizing the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted 
after Gingles, for leading to the clustering of minority voters, thereby increasing the chances of 
Republicans in nearby districts); Bernard Grofman, Introduction to RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN 




The role of the Justice Department and Section 5 in bringing about the 
new minority-opportunity districts is controversial.326  Previous to the 1990s 
round of redistricting, the Justice Department had been criticized primarily 
for being too timid in pushing for minority rights and too cozy with local and 
state officials,327 and in the 1970s and 1980s, staff attorneys had had to oper-
ate within administrations that were unsympathetic to minority concerns in 
general and minority voting rights in particular.328  Although it is clear that 
the Department never espoused a “maximization strategy” during the 1990s, 
critics, including a prominent panel of federal judges, were outraged that 
Justice Department employees consulted at all with civil rights interest 
groups or minority legislators before plans were finalized in the states.  
According to critics, friendly advice to white state and local government 
officials was a praiseworthy accommodation to federalism; consorting with 
the ACLU or the Black Caucus was a conspiracy.329 
But the sometimes strangely shaped districts that attracted so much 
attention and scorn were more the product of developments in computer 
redistricting software and unprecedentedly detailed census and partisan data, 
which allowed planners to fine-tune district boundaries, than they were of 
pressure from the Justice Department.330  Substantively, the new districts 
 
THE 1990S, supra note 298, at 1, 3 (approving of the Voting Rights Act for leading to increased 
direct representation of minorities). 
326. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 297, at 6 (criticizing the Justice Department’s 
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act for serving as a political tool of the Republican Party); 
Posner, supra note 298, at 80–81 (defending the 1990s Justice Department as nonpartisan). 
327. See, e.g., BALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 202 (complaining in 1982 that an “excessive 
commitment to negotiated settlements” with local governments drastically reduced the effectiveness 
of the Voting Rights Act). 
328. See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 297, at 16–32 (narrating struggles over the 
administration of Section 5 from 1965 through the 1980s). 
329. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per curiam) 
(condemning the “max-black” plan), aff’d, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Posner, supra note 298, at 82 
(denying that the Justice Department had a “maximization” policy). 
330. J. Morgan Kousser, Whatever Happened to Shaw v. Reno? 8 (2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (citing the use of more precise census-block-level 
data, new computing hardware, and redistricting software as reasons for the “unusually ungainly 
districts”).  For the 1990 census, the Census Bureau made available unprecedentedly detailed, 
machine-readable Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) files 
keyed to redistricting, designed to make geographic integration with other information, such as 
political data, much easier than ever.  For an overview of the data and formats, see U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 1990: POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT COUNTS 
(1991), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/D1-D90-STS1-14-TECH. 
pdf.  Having participated in redistricting in the 1980s and closely studied the processes of 
redistricting in the 1990s, I am aware of the widely known facts that in the 1980s, redistricting 
required mainframe computers and mylar map overlays; in the 1990s, everything could be done 
easily on a desktop computer with convenient, inexpensive software.  For a discussion of nonracial 
reasons for the irregular boundaries in plans at issue in cases from Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Texas, respectively, see Miller, 515 U.S. at 942–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), which notes the 
nonracial reasons for district irregularities in Georgia; KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 265–66, which 
notes the same in North Carolina; and id. at 298–303, which notes the same in Texas. 
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represented attempts to protect white Democratic incumbents while making 
way for ambitious black politicians, a transition hastened by the VRA but 
otherwise similar to other ethnic political transitions.  And if minority politi-
cians used all of the tools available, including threats of VRA lawsuits or 
preclearance battles, to tailor make districts for themselves, well, what could 
be more typical of American politicians than self-interested action clothed in 
pious rhetoric?331  Considering the controversy over Bolden in 1982, it is 
amusing to note that the rationale for possible objections by the Justice 
Department laid out before redistricting actually got underway, as well as the 
objection letters on redistricting eventually sent out by the Department, 
stressed purpose, not results.332  According to the Department and the public-
interest lawyers, it was not necessary to draw a minority-opportunity district 
whenever it was possible to do so, but it was necessary to justify a choice not 
to draw one, and pleading incumbent protection or partisan advantage was an 
insufficient justification if those protected or advantaged were all white.333 
V. Redemption 
A. The Creation of an Era 
C. Vann Woodward was more than anything else the historian of 
Redemption, the period after Reconstruction in the South.  In that era, 
Woodward believed, a largely new class of hard-capitalist, antipaternalist 
planters and a rising urban bourgeoisie captured the South from their 
regional, class, and racial opponents, who had been ascendent during 
Reconstruction; reshaped it into a “New South”; defended their creation from 
the Populist threat; and solidified their power for generations through a bat-
tery of discriminatory laws that gave them control over social and political 
life.  Before the solidification in law, it was a contradictory, transitional 
period, with sometimes shifting alliances, sometimes hopeful moments, and 
sometimes flashes back to the past or forward into the future.  Prior to 
Origins of the New South, the scattered studies of the post-Reconstruction 
period had often romanticized its leaders, gloried in their white-supremacist 
ideology, indulged their mythology, ignored their faults, and endorsed their 
 
331. See generally KOUSSER, supra note 16, chs. 5–6 (discussing redistricting in North 
Carolina and Texas in the 1990s). 
332. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 297, at 73–76 (recounting the Justice Department’s 
struggles to define “discriminatory purpose,” as particularly evidenced in statements by Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights John R. Dunne); McCrary et al., supra note 154, at 297–99 
(analyzing objection letters); Posner, supra note 298, at 97 (“The great majority of the redistricting 
objections were based on the purpose prong of the Section 5 test.”). 
333. The central case cited on this point was Garza v. County of Los Angeles.  For the evidence 
used to decide the point in Garza and the rationale for its purpose standard, see KOUSSER, supra 
note 16, chs. 2, 7. 




final solution.  Woodward changed all that, imposing coherence on the pe-
riod and offering deep criticism of its leaders and its ways.334 
Although the Second Redemption has not yet found its historian, 
parallels between it and the First Redemption abound, as I have argued 
elsewhere.335  In particular, the role of the Supreme Court in reversing pro-
gress toward racial equality and integration was crucial in both periods. 
B. Reaction 
It might be thought that the strangest, most ironic page in the story of 
the VRA was the use of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, passed 
principally to safeguard the rights of African-Americans from racial 
discrimination, to reverse the march toward political equality of that group 
and other underrepresented minority groups.  But while it might be ironic, it 
was not unusual in American history for discriminators to fashion tools from 
the malleable abstractions of the Constitution.  Thus Chief Justice Roger 
Brooke Taney found protection for slavery in the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause in Dred Scott,336 Justice Henry Billings Brown discerned 
“separate but equal” in the Fourteenth Amendment in Plessy,337 and Chief 
Justice Warren Burger read an intent requirement into the same Fourteenth 
Amendment, thus ensuring racial isolation in central-city schools, in Milliken 
v. Bradley.338  When the 5–4 “conservative” majority of the Supreme Court 
witnessed the ultimate results of the 1982 changes in the VRA—the huge 
increases in black and brown elected officials after the 1991–1992 
redistrictings—and took action to reverse that trend, they were following a 
well-established judicial pattern. 
There were, broadly speaking, four ways by which the “Judicial 
Redeemers” could have sought to constrain or gut the VRA.  First, they could 
have followed the lead of Justice Thomas in his concurrence in Holder v. 
Hall 339 and declared that the VRA protected the individual right to vote, not 
any right to be free from discriminatory electoral structures or even that the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments only allowed Congress to protect the 
 
334. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877–1913 (1951). 
335. KOUSSER, supra note 16, ch. 1. 
336. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 411 (1857) (stating that slave 
owners’ property was protected by the Fifth Amendment), superseded by constitutional 
amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. 
337. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (“[W]e cannot say that a law which 
authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable[] 
or . . . obnoxious to the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment . . . .”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
338. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 754–56 (1974).  More recently, Chief Justice Roberts 
has read the Amendment—and Brown v. Board of Education!—to prohibit local governments from 
fostering racial integration in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767–68 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493–94). 
339. 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994). 
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individual right to vote.340  This very radical stance would have eliminated 
Allen and everything since, and it would have been met with shock and 
outrage.  Second, at least after City of Boerne v. Flores,341 the Court could 
have declared one or more sections of the VRA unconstitutional as 
excessive, inadequately justified exercises of congressional power.342  
Section 5 would then become another casualty of the same five Justices’ 
“federalism revolution,” joining the Violence Against Women Act, the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.343  Third, 
the Justices might have declared part or all of the VRA unconstitutional by 
holding that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not allow any 
state or local government, and the Fifth Amendment did not allow Congress, 
to take race into account in any governmental decision, even to remedy past 
discrimination.344  All of these bright-line, radical decisions would have 
eliminated the VRA, with the possible exception of allowing the federal 
government to guard the individual right to vote without discrimination on 
account of race.  Fourth was a much less radical, less publicly visible course, 
but one subject to congressional reversal: The Court could simply reinterpret 
Section 5 or any of the other provisions.  This course muddled doctrines and 
strained logic and consistency.  The Court chose the fourth course. 
C. Double, Shifting Standards 
When a challenge to the North Carolina congressional redistricting that 
had resulted in the election of the first African-American members of 
Congress from that state during the twentieth century arrived at the Supreme 
Court in 1993, voting rights supporters had reason for optimism because they 
had two solid precedents on their side.  In 1977, a year after Beer, Justice 
White had produced another of his pragmatic, fact-filled opinions, this one 
renouncing colorblindness in redistricting and sidestepping the nonretrogres-
sion standard because the available census data made it impossible to 
determine the direction of change in the new districts.345  Brooklyn, New 
York, had been covered by Section 5 after the 1970 amendments to the VRA 
because New York state had had a literacy test for voting and turnout in 
 
340. See id. at 914, 918–21 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Properly understood, the 
terms ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ in § 2(a) refer only to practices that affect minority citizens’ 
access to the ballot.  Districting systems and electoral mechanisms that may affect the ‘weight’ 
given to a ballot duly cast and counted are simply beyond the purview of the Act.”). 
341. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
342. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew Preclearance Provisions, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 323, at 81, 85–88 (discussing implications of City 
of Boerne v. Flores for the VRA). 
343. See infra subpart VI(A). 
344. Justice Clarence Thomas asserted this to be the correct constitutional theory in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2770–71 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
345. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 147–68 (1977). 




Kings and two other counties had been less than 50% in the 1968 election.346  
The Justice Department objected to a 1972 state legislative plan for Brooklyn 
that created several senate and assembly districts that were over 80% 
nonwhite.347  To unpack the black and Puerto Rican population, the 
legislators decided to split areas heavily populated by Hasidic Jews, who had 
previously controlled their own senate and assembly districts.348  Speaking to 
someone from the Voting Section of the Justice Department, a New York 
state legislative staffer “got the feeling” that if the new districts were de-
signed to be about 65% nonwhite, the Department would preclear them.349  
New York drew such districts, and the Department precleared them.350 
Leaders of the Hasidic community sued, but a three-judge district court 
dismissed the suit and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling 
that the plaintiffs had suffered no injury because even with the unpacked 
nonwhite districts, whites would likely enjoy more than proportional repre-
sentation in Kings County.351  The Supreme Court affirmed, finding implicit 
in the Beer and City of Richmond opinions that states and localities could 
legally use racial data in the drawing of districts, even for nonremedial 
purposes, and that they could establish a target number of seats as minority-
opportunity districts, as they would have to so as not to retrogress if there 
were any such existing districts.352  Additionally, New York state had no dis-
criminatory purpose, for all the legislature was trying to do was to comply 
with the requirements of Section 5, and this was a sufficient interest to satisfy 
the U.S. Constitution.353  The state could “deliberately use[] race in a 
purposeful manner” so long as “its plan represented no racial slur or 
stigma.”354 
Six weeks before the oral argument in the North Carolina case, the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that even though the majority-Republican 
Ohio Apportionment Board had misinterpreted Section 2 of the VRA to re-
quire that it maximize the number of majority-black districts and increase the 
black percentage in every district currently represented by an African-
American, its desire to comply with federal law “does not raise an inference 
of intentional discrimination; it demonstrates obedience to the Supremacy 
 
346. Id. at 148. 
347. See id. at 152, 151–52 (stating that the legislature decreased the two largest nonwhite 
majorities to below 90% “to overcome Justice Department objections”). 
348. Id. at 152. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 523 & n.21 (2d Cir. 
1975), aff’d sub nom. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144. 
352. United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 161–62. 
353. Id. at 165. 
354. Id. 
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Clause of the United States Constitution.”355  In her opinion of the Court, 
Justice O’Connor, the former Republican state senate majority leader in 
Arizona, dismissed the facts that packing blacks into fewer districts made it 
easier to elect Republicans in surrounding districts and decreased the total 
number of districts that blacks could win or influence,356 although both facts 
had been much stressed in the district court’s opinion.357  And she treated the 
endorsement of the maximization plan by some black interest groups as 
strong evidence that the plan had no discriminatory intent.358  The endorse-
ment of compliance with the VRA as a shield for race-conscious redistricting 
strengthened the United Jewish Organizations 359 (UJO) precedent on the eve 
of the Court’s consideration of the central Shaw v. Reno 360 case.361 
After the Justice Department refused to preclear North Carolina’s plan 
for the boundaries of twelve congressional districts, only one of which was 
majority black, the Democrats who controlled the legislature snipped out a 
second district, also 54% African-American in voter registration, carefully 
tailoring it to try to preserve the districts of as many white Democratic in-
cumbents as possible.362  The Department of Justice approved.363  
Republicans then filed a partisan-gerrymandering suit, and when that was 
dismissed,364 they backed a “racial gerrymandering” claim filed on behalf of 
five whites by a Duke University Law School professor.365  The district court 
relied almost wholly on UJO, dismissing the plaintiffs’ discriminatory-
purpose claim on the grounds that UJO expressly ruled that race-conscious 
redistricting was constitutional, especially when undertaken to comply with 
the VRA, and the discriminatory-effect claim because even if blacks won the 
 
355. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993). 
356. See id. at 157–59. 
357. See Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 698 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (explaining the 
mechanisms by which the Ohio voter-apportionment plan reduced the cumulative strength of 
minority voters), rev’d 507 U.S. 146. 
358. Quilter, 507 U.S. at 160.  The only common thread in Justice O’Connor’s opinions in 
Quilter and Georgia v. Ashcroft was that both plans were intensely partisan.  In Quilter, O’Connor 
disdained “influence” or “coalition” districts—those that candidates preferred by minorities could 
win even where whites comprised a majority of voters.  Id. at 154.  In Ashcroft, she celebrated such 
districts.  Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003).  In Quilter, the fact that all black leaders 
in the legislature opposed the plan and stood to lose power because the redistricting would cost the 
Democrats seats did nothing to undermine the Republican reapportionment; in Ashcroft, black 
endorsement of the Georgia Democratic plan and the connection between white Democratic seats 
and black power in the legislature legitimized the Democratic plan.  See infra subpart V(E). 
359. United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 144. 
360. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
361. KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 431–34. 
362. See id. at 243–44, 263–66, 269 (recounting events in the 1991–1992 redistricting). 
363. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 636. 
364. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 399 (W.D.N.C. 1992), aff’d mem., 506 U.S. 801 (1992). 
365. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 636–37. 




two seats, whites would still be overrepresented in the congressional 
delegation.366 
The Supreme Court reversed, 5–4, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, 
joined by the other members of the consistent majority in voting rights cases 
of the 1990s, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas.367  To circumvent the fact that the plaintiffs had suffered no per-
sonal or group injury and should, by the Court’s precedents,368 therefore have 
been denied standing to sue,369 O’Connor invented “a new cause of action,” 
one for racial classification in redistricting.370  Disguising the fact that the 
districts were the most integrated in the state’s history and more racially bal-
anced than many she had casually approved in Quilter by referring to them as 
“segregat[ed]”371 and resembling “political apartheid”372 and by never men-
tioning their racial admixtures explicitly, O’Connor ruled that because their 
designers took race into account in drawing them, the districts were subject 
to strict scrutiny, which required that they be justified by one or more com-
pelling state interests.373 
In a tinny echo of Gingles, North Carolina’s voting rights case of the 
previous decade, O’Connor announced that if the districts had been more 
compact and followed other “traditional districting principles,” the majority-
black districts might not have called so much attention to themselves and 
might consequently not have been considered racial classifications.374  The 
Justice provided no evidence that such principles had been followed in the 
past, and in North Carolina and many other states, they manifestly had not 
been.375  Remanding the case to the district court for evidence of why the 
state had acted and inquiry about whether the justifications were 
compelling,376 O’Connor suggested that Section 5 could not be a compelling 
state interest here because it only protected against retrogression.  Ignoring 
 
366. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 470–73 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev’d sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. 630; see also KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 379–83 (discussing Shaw v. Barr). 
367. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 632. 
368. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (holding that 
members of an environmental group lacked standing to challenge Interior Department action under 
the Endangered Species Act because they raised “only a generally available grievance about 
government—claiming only harm to [their] and every citizen’s interest in the proper application of 
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [them] than 
it does the public at large”). 
369. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 642. 
370. Id. at 679, 679–80 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
371. Id. at 652 (majority opinion). 
372. Id. at 647. 
373. Id. at 653–54. 
374. Id. at 647, 646–47. 
375. See generally KOUSSER, supra note 16, chs. 5–6.  Chapter 5 originated in a short history of 
racial redistricting in North Carolina for the case of Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) and was 
cited in the Supreme Court’s opinion at page 910. 
376. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 658. 
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the purpose prong of Section 5 entirely, the Justice also failed to consider the 
Section 2–Section 5 connection, which had been inscribed in the Justice 
Department guidelines since 1987.  Although she did not say so explicitly, 
O’Connor implied that the Justice Department could not refuse to preclear 
any nonretrogressive plan and that any covered jurisdiction that created a 
new minority-opportunity district could not justify its decision by a desire to 
comply with Section 5.377  This called into question the actions of the Justice 
Department and nearly every southern state legislature in the 1991–1992 
redistricting, undermined numerous court decisions, and reined in Section 5 
considerably further than Justice Stewart had ever contemplated, all with a 
minimum of legal reasoning or explicit renunciation of the apparently aban-
doned policies.  The Shaw revolution was strangely inarticulate. 
The vivid rhetoric of O’Connor’s peroration in Shaw v. Reno suggests 
either alarming naïveté or deliberate sarcasm.  Overturning almost perfectly 
racially balanced districts that integrated the state’s congressional delegation 
for the first time since 1900, drawn by the first North Carolina legislature to 
take equality in election laws seriously since the violent “white supremacy 
campaign” of 1898, O’Connor concluded: 
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our 
society.  They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of 
our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their 
skin . . . .  Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may 
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us 
further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer 
matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.378 
Rather than overruling UJO, O’Connor’s opinion distinguished it on the 
ground that the districts at issue in UJO were compact, rather than being ob-
viously based on racial geography.379  Miller v. Johnson,380 a much more 
radical decision than Shaw, explicitly overruled UJO on two points, holding 
 
377. See id. at 655, 654–55 (“A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the 
goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid 
retrogression.”).  States could attempt to justify new minority-opportunity districts on the basis of 
Section 2 alone or on the contention that they were trying to remedy past discrimination, and North 
Carolina provided considerable evidence for these contentions on remand in Shaw v. Reno, 
including quite-specific evidence of racial discrimination in congressional redistricting in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  See KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 269 (outlining the North Carolina legislature’s reasons 
for adopting new districts in 1991).  But in 1991–1992, according to Justice Department guidelines, 
Section 5 and Section 2 standards overlapped, so a Section 2 contention was not entirely 
independent, and past discrimination was easily brushed aside on the grounds that the legislature did 
not know about it.  See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 910 (“[T]here is little to suggest that the 
legislature considered the historical events and social-science data that the reports [of past 
discrimination] recount, beyond what individual members may have recalled from personal 
experience.”). 
378. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 657. 
379. Id. at 651–52. 
380. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 




that assigning any “significant number of voters”381  to any district of any 
shape whatsoever382 on the basis of race was always subject to strict 
scrutiny383 and that a covered jurisdiction could use its obligation to comply 
with Section 5 as a justification for considering race in redistricting only to 
preserve the racial status quo.384  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion rea-
soned that Section 5 banned only retrogression, and therefore, a jurisdiction 
could not have a discriminatory purpose under Section 5 in choosing to reject 
a proposal for a majority–minority district unless the total number of such 
districts was less than that in its previous plan.385  To establish a new 
minority-opportunity district, the state had to show a compelling interest, 
Kennedy declared, but to refuse to establish one, the state need only show a 
desire to adhere to any “other districting principles,” principles that he did 
not define, enumerate, or limit.386 
Adopting the angry tone of the district court in the case, Kennedy 
castigated the Justice Department’s interpretation of the constitutional 
purpose standard in Beer, characterizing the Department’s policy as one of 
maximization of the number of minority-opportunity districts.387  As in Shaw, 
Kennedy seemed to indicate that the Department could not object on the 
grounds of purpose or effect to any nonretrogressive redistricting plan or 
electoral structure.  According to Kennedy, this was Congress’s intent, and if 
Congress intended more, it might violate the Fourteenth Amendment.388  
Why the Fourteenth Amendment, which did not mention retrogression, or, 
indeed, race, allowed race-conscious electoral laws or districts to preserve 
the racial status quo, no more and no less, Kennedy did not explain.  To 
Kennedy, equal protection seemed to amount to protection equal to that pre-
viously enjoyed.  On this reading, the thirty-ninth Congress, which adopted 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, must have wished to preserve the infa-
mous southern Black Codes, which consigned African-Americans to near 
slavery; no court or Congress after 1910 could have reversed black 
disfranchisement; and all the NAACP Legal Defense Fund could have hoped 
for from Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 was to preserve segregation in 
the separate and very unequal form in which it then existed.  It was a curious 
constitutional stance for the Judicial Redeemers to take, committed as several 
of them claimed to be to original intent or strict fidelity to the text. 
Considered alongside Quilter, Miller also provided a parallel with the 
partisanship that motivated the First Redemption.  When Ohio Republicans 
 
381. Id. at 916. 
382. Id. at 915. 
383. Id. at 904. 
384. Id. at 925–26. 
385. Id. at 923–24. 
386. Id. at 924. 
387. Id. at 924–25. 
388. Id. at 926–27. 
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openly advertised their desire to maximize the number of majority–minority 
districts, blatantly misinterpreting Section 2 in order to do so, O’Connor did 
not apply strict scrutiny, and she praised the Ohio Apportionment Board for 
seeking to comply with federal law, however misguided its interpretation.  
When Georgia Democrats, in the same round of redistricting, agreed under 
Justice Department pressure to draw three majority-black districts, Kennedy 
applied a level of scrutiny that made Georgia’s case hopeless, and he derided 
the state’s legislature for acceding to what he considered a maximization in-
terpretation of Section 5.  Approval by pro-black interest groups legitimized 
the Ohio plan but fatally tainted the Georgia arrangement.  “Maximization” 
attracted praise from the Judicial Redeemers when it came from the North, 
but blame when it originated in the South.  The treatment of the VRA in 
these two cases was separate and unequal not only by race, but also by party 
and region. 
D. Retrogression to Retrogression 
Shaw and Miller had rather vaguely constrained Section 5, seeming to 
limit both its effect and purpose prongs to retrogressive actions.  Two cases 
from Bossier Parish, Louisiana, gave the Judicial Redeemers an opportunity 
to make that standard more explicit and to spell out the reasoning behind it.  
Their performances were not models of judicial craftsmanship. 
In Reno v. Bossier Parish,389 Justice O’Connor, for a seven-person 
majority, the usual five plus Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, rejected the 
connection between Sections 2 and 5 by distorting precedents, ignoring the 
shaky basis of Beer, disparaging the Justice Department’s interpretation of its 
own duties, sneeringly denigrating the authority of congressional reports, and 
ignoring other evidence of congressional intent.  Citing only Beer and City of 
Lockhart, O’Connor asserted that to allow a Section 2 violation to prompt a 
refusal to preclear a law under Section 5 would call into question “20 years 
of precedent.”390  But Beer rested on a misrepresentation of one congres-
sional report and what must be assumed to be a deliberate avoidance of 
contrary information in another,391 and Lockhart explicitly reserved the ques-
tion of the connection between Sections 2 and 5.392  O’Connor also treated 
Bolden as overturning Regester,393 though Stewart claimed not to be doing 
so,394 and not only did Rogers v. Lodge treat Regester as a viable 
 
389. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier I ), 520 U.S. 471 (1997). 
390. Id. at 480. 
391. See supra text accompanying notes 159–61. 
392. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 133 n.9 (1983). 
393. See Bossier I, 520 U.S. at 483 (asserting that after Bolden, “White ceased to represent the 
current understanding of the Constitution . . .”). 
394. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 69 (1980) (plurality opinion) (claiming that 
White v. Regester indicated that “only a purposeful dilution of the plaintiffs’ vote would offend the 
Equal Protection Clause”).  In dissent, Justice Byron White, the author of White v. Regester, noted 




interpretation of the Constitution and place it within the stream of intent 
decisions,395 but O’Connor signed onto Justice White’s opinion in Lodge,396 
her first voting rights case as a Justice.  In Bossier I, she did not repudiate 
Lodge, apparently desiring to wipe out precedents one case at a time.397 
Although recognizing that the Court usually deferred to Justice 
Department interpretations of the VRA, O’Connor made an exception in this 
case because she thought congressional intentions not to mix standards for 
Section 2 into those of Section 5 were clear.  Congress in 1982 made no 
change in the text of Section 5, but merely “drop[ped] a footnote,”398 the 
Justice remarked dismissively.  The House Report on the same subject, she 
reinterpreted.399  The House oversight hearings and report,400 she derided.401  
The Kennedy and Sensenbrenner floor remarks, she ignored.  Turning to the 
question of discriminatory purpose, Justice O’Connor made more explicit 
and extreme Justice Kennedy’s judgment in Miller that there could be no 
 
that Justice Stewart’s Bolden plurality opinion did not “question[] the vitality of White v. Regester.”  
Id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting). 
395. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 619 (1982) (noting that White v. Regester is consistent 
with “the basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
396. Id. at 613. 
397. Justice O’Connor was the apparent heroine and inspiration for Cass Sunstein’s ONE CASE 
AT A TIME (1999). 
398. Bossier I, 520 U.S. at 484. 
399. Compare id. (interpreting the House Report’s discussion of Sections 2 and 5 as indicating 
that they were exclusive, rather than overlapping grounds for objections), with id. at 506 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (asserting that the House Report demonstrates an intent 
to evaluate violations of Sections 2 and 5 under the same substantive standard). 
400. See generally, e.g., Proposed Changes to Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 44–56 (1986) (statement of Laughlin McDonald, American 
Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Southern Regional Office); Proposed Changes to Regulations 
Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 100 (1986) (statement of 
Judith Sanders-Castro, Att’y, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund); Reynolds 
Statement, supra note 296, at 163; Proposed Changes to Regulations Governing Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 168–70 (1986) (statement of Frank R. Parker, Joint 
Center for Political Studies); Post-Trial Brief for the United States of America, County Council v. 
United States, 555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983) (No. 82-0912), in Proposed Changes to Regulations 
Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 172, 172–87 (1986). 
401. See Bossier I, 520 U.S. at 484–85 (declining to give controlling weight to statements made 
in the oversight hearings and the subsequent 1986 House Report because such sources, as part of the 
postenactment legislative record, were the views of a subsequent Congress and therefore “form[ed] 
a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one”).  However, Justice O’Connor’s criticism 
neglected the fact that Beer was based on a similar report, a 1975 House Report on the 1965 text of 
the VRA.  See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 60 
(1975) to buttress the argument that Section 5 sets up a nonretrogression standard for voting-
procedure changes).  Both the 1975 and 1982 reports, like the 1986 report, were postenactment 
legislative records. 
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discriminatory purpose under Section 5 in choosing not to draw a minority-
opportunity district.  O’Connor declared that jurisdictions could reject 
minority-opportunity districts, as did the Bossier Parish School Board, which 
had been fighting to preserve segregated schools since 1954, not only to 
preserve “traditional districting principles” but also for “no reason at all.”402 
One question that Justice O’Connor left open for consideration by the 
district court on remand was whether Justice Stewart had meant the retro-
gression test to apply to purpose, as well.403  On this point, Justices Breyer 
and Ginsburg left her.404  Because the Justice Department had rarely used 
violations of Section 2, standing alone, to refuse preclearance, but it had in-
creasingly employed what it and virtually all commentators believed to be 
Beer’s nonretrogressive, but still-discriminatory, purpose standard,405 the 
possible redefinition of purpose under Section 5 posed a much graver threat 
to the protection of minority rights than did the disentangling of Section 2 
from Section 5.  Thus, although intellectually indefensible, Justice 
O’Connor’s decision in Bossier I was not terribly damaging to the substance 
of minority rights. 
In Bossier II,406 Justice Scalia completed the job of interpreting away 
Section 5 that Justice Stewart had started in Beer, Congress and the Justice 
Department had delayed until Shaw, and the Redeemers had been pursuing 
from that case forward.  A majority of the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia, on remand, had found that the school board had not adopted its 
electoral boundary lines with a discriminatory purpose, retrogressive or 
nonretrogressive,407 thus forcing the Supreme Court to answer its own 
question without any assistance from below.  For the usual five Justices, 
Justice Scalia obliged, reading Section 5’s purpose language to prohibit only 
retrogressive purpose.  The logic of his argument focused on three points.  
First, Section 5 addressed only changes, and the necessary benchmark for 
changes is the status quo.  Therefore, unlike the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
uses the same denying or abridging phraseology408 but applies not just to 
changes in laws but to all voting laws, Section 5 is concerned only with 
 
402. Bossier I, 520 U.S. at 488. 
403. Id. at 486. 
404. Id. at 493 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
405. See, e.g., Peyton McCrary et al., The Law of Preclearance: Enforcing Section 5, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 323, at 20, 26–27 (counting legal grounds cited in 
objection letters); Posner, supra note 298, at 84 (describing Justice Department policy). 
406. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II ), 528 U.S. 320 (2000), superseded by 
statute, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 5, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c). 
407. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 528 U.S. 320, 
superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 sec. 5, § 5. 
408. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 324; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” (emphasis added)). 




“backsliding.”409  Second, the language of purpose and effect was parallel in 
Section 5 (“does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridging”410), and if the majority opinion in Beer virtually inserted retro-
gressive before effect, then consistency demanded that later Justices also 
insert retrogressive before purpose.411  Third, because the Court has never 
held that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution412 and the 
Fifteenth Amendment is the constitutional basis of the VRA, interpreting 
Section 5 to prohibit dilution risks having it declared unconstitutional.413 
As Justice Scalia’s denunciation in Bossier II of “a raw interpretation of 
the statute”414 suggests, these are peculiar arguments for a self-proclaimed 
textualist.415  The first argument fails because the language of Section 5 does 
not say “abridging more than the right is currently abridged,” but simply 
“abridging.”416  A discriminatory law that replaced a former discriminatory 
law would still, itself, abridge, as Bossier Parish’s 1992 apportionment plan 
did.  The second argument is inadequate because it takes for granted that it is 
correct to insert retrogressive before effect, regardless of the fact that retro-
gressive does not actually appear there.  The third assumes that the VRA 
rests only on the Fifteenth Amendment, but as we have seen, Justices have 
often treated it as founded on the Fourteenth, as well,417 and the dilution stan-
dards of Regester, a Fourteenth Amendment case, were adopted by Congress 
in 1982 for Section 2 of the VRA.418  Clearly, neither the Court nor Congress 
has been consistent about the constitutional basis of the VRA.  Unless the 
Court is willing to overturn Gingles and all subsequent Section 2 vote-
dilution cases, that section of the VRA prohibits vote dilution, so why not 
Section 5, with its almost identical language, as well? 
Justice Scalia’s efforts to distinguish previous cases that contradicted 
his retrogressive-intent standard were no more convincing.  In City of 
 
409. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 335, 335–36. 
410. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (1965) (amended 2006). 
411. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 330–32.  As discussed infra note 543 and accompanying text, 
Congress in 2006 changed and in this phrase to or specifically to overturn Bossier II. 
412. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3. 
413. See id. at 336 (suggesting that such an interpretation would create “substantial” federalism 
costs, “perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 5’s constitutionality”). 
414. Id. at 336 n.5. 
415. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
23–25 (1997) (expounding his views on textualism); see also DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER 
E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 80–81, 178–79, 183–84 
(1996) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s strict textualism often causes him to break ranks with other 
judicial conservatives). 
416. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
417. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 n.13 (1980) (noting that Justice 
Douglas treated the VRA as constitutionally justified by Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
418. See supra text accompanying notes 269–70. 
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Richmond v. United States,419 five members of the Supreme Court allowed 
Richmond, Virginia, to annex areas that reduced the black percentage of the 
population from 52% to 42%, but only after the Justice Department refused 
to preclear the annexation unless Richmond switched from an at-large to a 
single-member-district system of election in which African-Americans could 
expect to elect four of the nine council members, even though they com-
prised only 37% of the voting-age population and only if it could be 
convincingly shown that the city had no discriminatory purpose.420  In his 
discussion of Richmond, Justice Scalia neglected to mention the switch to 
single-member districts, which considerably offset the discriminatory effect, 
and he asserted that Justice White, who wrote the opinion of the Court in 
Richmond, meant discriminatory purpose to denote only retrogressive dis-
criminatory purpose,421 when White made no such distinction.  Apparently 
realizing the weakness of his arguments, Scalia tried to limit Richmond to the 
topic of annexation,422 despite the fact that White had specifically not limited 
it, stating, “An official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for 
the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race has no 
legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute.”423 
Likewise, Justice Scalia tried to explain away Justice Stewart’s 
statement in Beer that even an ameliorative change could be objected to if 
“the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as 
to violate the Constitution”424 by suggesting that it referred to an outright de-
nial of the vote, not an abridgement.425  But the only way an apportionment 
could deny the vote would be to exclude minorities from every district, which 
is absurd.  Again appearing to admit his own illogic, Scalia dismissed the 
constitutional exception to retrogression in Beer as “dictum,” unnecessary to 
the decision in the case,426 even though the Justice Department had made it 
the prime justification for objections for two decades without complaint from 
the judiciary.427 
 
419. 422 U.S. 358 (1975). 
420. Id. at 366–72.  The Justice Department was simply following black activists in Richmond, 
who had opposed city–county consolidation and annexation since 1961 unless the city shifted from 
at-large to single-member-district elections.  The activists sued to reverse the annexations in 1971.  
MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH 
281, 283–84 (2005). 
421. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378.  Note that White dissented in Beer, the year after City 
of Richmond was decided.  See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 143–67 (1976) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
422. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II ), 528 U.S. 320, 330–31 (2000), 
superseded by statute, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 5, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 
580–81 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c). 
423. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378 (emphasis added). 
424. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. 
425. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 337–38. 
426. Id. at 338. 
427. McCrary et al., supra note 154, at 297. 




Justice Scalia compounded the absurdity in his discussion of Pleasant 
Grove v. United States.428  In Pleasant Grove, the Justice Department used 
Section 5 to prevent a town with no black voters from annexing all-white 
areas because the Department believed the town’s attempt to remain lily-
white was discriminatory.429  Revisiting Pleasant Grove in Bossier II, Scalia 
not only disregarded the fact that the six-member Pleasant Grove majority—
including himself!—rejected the three-person minority’s embrace of the con-
cept of retrogressive intent, but he also invented the self-contradictory 
concept of future retrogression.  Because the town had no black voters at the 
time, its actions could not have had a retrogressive purpose.  But, he 
speculated, the town fathers could have been planning to preempt the effect 
of any future intrusions of blacks by annexing areas now that could be ex-
pected to fill up with whites after the blacks moved in, thus causing a 
retrogression in African-American political power at some unstated time in 
the future.430 
As if to taunt proponents of a vigorous Section 5, Justice Scalia 
announced three times in Bossier II that the Justice Department and the 
District of Columbia District Court had an obligation to preclear unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory, but nonretrogressive changes in laws.431  The purpose 
prong of Section 5, Scalia exulted, had been reduced to “the ability to reach 
malevolent incompetence,” the actions of a governmental body that tried to 
impose a retrogressive change but failed to injure minorities.432  By that 
definition, the Judicial Redeemers could certainly not be charged with a 
discriminatory purpose, as they had manifestly succeeded in their goal of 
severely undermining the protections for minority political rights.433 
E. O’Connor’s Influence 
Having divorced Sections 2 and 5 in Bossier I, Justice O’Connor 
rejoined them, in a rather less formal living arrangement, in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft.434  Seeking to preserve Democratic control in the Georgia state 
senate, Democratic legislators, led by African-Americans, reduced the black 
percentages of some overwhelmingly black districts, slightly increasing the 
overall number of districts that black Democrats could carry, as long as they 
 
428. 479 U.S. 462 (1987). 
429. Id. at 466 & n.5. 
430. See Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 340 (reading Pleasant Grove to hold “that a jurisdiction with no 
minority voters can have a retrogressive purpose, at the present time, by intending to worsen the 
voting strength of future minority voters”). 
431. Id. at 332, 335, 339. 
432. Id. at 332. 
433. The Bush Justice Department quickly rewrote its guidelines to state that “[r]edistricting 
plans that are not retrogressive in purpose or effect must be precleared, even if they violate other 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution.”  Guidance Concerning Redistricting and 
Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 5412, 5412 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
434. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
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got enough white “crossover” votes.435  The arrangement also raised the 
number of black influence districts, those where white Democrats 
sympathetic to most black concerns could win if they received enough 
African-American support.  The Justice Department believed that the black 
percentages in three districts had been reduced too far for black candidates to 
be able to carry them in the always racially polarized elections.436  
Republicans, who wanted blacks to be packed into fewer districts so that 
their party could win more seats, intervened in the name of several black 
individuals.437  The legal issues were whether Section 5 allowed such trade-
offs to satisfy a retrogressive-effect standard, and if so, how the various kinds 
of districts were to be weighed to determine whether the tradeoffs brought 
the balance of minority power to at least the level before the redistricting.438 
Speaking for her usual 5–4 majority, Justice O’Connor reinvigorated 
Section 5 by blessing the tradeoffs, proposing that the balance be evaluated 
by considering the totality of the circumstances, a Section 2 standard, and 
repeatedly citing her own opinion in Gingles, a Section 2 case, as a guide.439  
Among the circumstances she listed were the number of blacks elected, the 
degree of racial polarization in elections, the power of black leaders in the 
legislature, the extent to which they endorsed the plan, and the Democratic 
percentage of the voters and the responsiveness to black interests of whites 
elected from districts containing significant numbers of African-
Americans.440  Surprisingly, Justice O’Connor explicitly introduced 
partisanship into her analysis when she recognized that blacks were likely to 
be able to exert influence only on Democratic legislators.  In particular, she 
noted approvingly that in thirty-three of the thirty-four state senate districts in 
which blacks constituted over 20% of the voting-age population, a majority 
of the voters were Democrats, treating this as a sign that black votes would 
be influential in the outcomes because Democrats were the likely winners.441  
Stressing the race-conscious placement of blacks into influence, coalition, 
and majority-black districts throughout her opinion, Justice O’Connor made 
no reference in that part of her opinion to Miller v. Johnson, the 1995 case 
about Georgia congressional districts, nor did she try to reconcile her ap-
proach with Miller’s requirement of strict scrutiny any time any minority 
voters were placed in any districts or Miller’s constitutional bar to drawing a 
 
435. Id. at 469.  A voter who crosses over the racial line to vote for a candidate of a different 
race is referred to as a crossover voter. 
436. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 5–9, Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (No. 02-182). 
437. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 470–74. 
438. Id. at 479–84. 
439. Id. at 479–80.  Justice O’Connor did not cite the plurality opinion by Brennan in Gingles, 
raising the question of whether it is still considered good law. 
440. Id. at 485–90. 
441. Id. at 489. 




district for a predominantly racial reason.442  These omissions raised Justice 
Kennedy’s ire sufficiently that he mentioned them in a concurrence, decried 
the necessary race consciousness of the Section 5 process, and implied that if 
any of the legal parties had used Miller to attack the constitutionality of 
Section 5, the votes in Ashcroft might well have been different.443 
Reaction to Ashcroft in the voting rights community split.  Pessimists 
joined Justice Souter, who wrote the dissent for his three colleagues in the 
case,444 believing that Ashcroft’s amorphous standards were unworkable, at 
least in the sixty-day period of review that the Justice Department lawyers 
and paralegals had to evaluate Section 5 submissions from covered 
jurisdictions.445  More important, they feared that Ashcroft would weaken the 
retrogression standard, allowing states and localities to make any changes 
they wished so long as their leaders could rationalize the alteration as some-
how increasing black political potency.446  For instance, single-member 
districts could be switched to at-large on the argument that blacks would then 
influence the election of more officials.447  Optimists, on the other hand, 
declared that Ashcroft strengthened Section 5 by bringing in Section 2’s 
dilution standards and making the concept of minority political power more 
realistic.448  Eliminating the 50% bright line meant that in places and times 
where there was little white crossover voting, minority voting strength would 
have to be concentrated, while in times and places in which larger 
 
442. After discussing Miller in the history section of her opinion, id. at 466–71, Justice 
O’Connor never discussed the substantive connection between her analysis in Ashcroft and Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis in Miller.  A coalition district is one in which fewer than half of the voters 
belong to a particular racial minority but where that group plus a predictable number of other voters 
can usually carry the district in a general election.  Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at 
War with Itself?  Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1539–40 
(2002).  I have argued elsewhere that there is no general fixed line between influence and “control” 
districts.  J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in 
Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 565 (1993). 
443. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 491–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
444. Id. at 492 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
445. See, e.g., An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal 
Issues Relating to Reauthorization, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
259, 259–60 (2006) (statement of Laughlin McDonald, Director, ACLU Voting Rights Project) 
[hereinafter McDonald Statement] (criticizing the majority opinion’s “new, difficult to apply, and 
contradictory standards”). 
446. See, e.g., Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (Part I ): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 39 (2006) (statement of Debo P. 
Adegbile, Associate Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.) 
[hereinafter Adegbile Statement] (warning that the majority opinion gives legislatures too much 
leeway and “could lead to a very substantial undermining of minority communities to have their 
voices heard in legislatures”). 
447. Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 
ELECTION L.J. 21, 31–32 (2004). 
448. Thomas B. Edsall, High Court Orders Review of Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST, June 
27, 2003, at A17 (quoting optimists). 
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percentages of whites were willing to vote for qualified minority candidates, 
minority voters could be spread more thinly, increasing minority influence.449  
Measuring influence districts and other aspects of political power that 
O’Connor mentioned, according to the optimists, was quite similar to what 
the Justice Department’s Section 5 unit was experienced in doing.450 
There is a third position, yet to find a voice: skepticism.  Even before 
Ashcroft was argued in the Supreme Court, the hardheaded calculations that 
created the opportunity for O’Connor’s practical, ad hoc opinion had proven 
wildly incorrect.  The Democrats lost seats in the Georgia legislature as 
Republicans, waving another bloody shirt, the Confederate flag, surged in the 
state’s 2002 elections.451  Among the victims was Senate Majority Leader 
Charles Walker, an African-American and a chief sponsor of the plan upheld 
in Ashcroft.452  The state’s new Republican Governor, Sonny Perdue, then 
convinced four white Democratic senators to switch sides, giving the 
Republicans control of one house of the Georgia legislature for the first time 
since 1874,453 and Perdue tried to withdraw the state as a party to the 
Ashcroft lawsuit.454  Only a ruling by the state supreme court allowed state 
Attorney General Thurbert Baker, a black Democrat, to continue the 
litigation.455 
A skeptic would treat Ashcroft as an aberration, the last important 
voting rights opinion by the pivotal Justice on the Rehnquist Court, Sandra 
Day O’Connor, one that sidestepped or ignored so many precedents as to 
have been shaky on the day it was issued.  Moreover, Ashcroft was 
 
449. See Richard H. Pildes, Op-Ed., Less Power, More Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at 
A15 (expressing optimism about Ashcroft). 
450. See Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 
DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 231–37 (2003) (describing how Section 5 works); Meghann E. Donahue, 
Note, “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated”: Administering Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2004) (arguing against “the 
general perception that Ashcroft struck a fatal blow to Section 5 administration”). 
451. The successful 2002 Republican gubernatorial candidate, Sonny Perdue, bitterly attacked 
the replacement of the 1956 state flag, which prominently featured the Confederate battle flag and 
had been chosen to symbolize southern white resistance to integration, with a more subdued state 
flag containing tiny replicas of all of the former state flags.  See Cynthia Tucker, Miller’s Words 
Make Clear Perdue’s Duty, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 19, 2003, at A15 (arguing that Perdue used 
“the Confederate battle emblem as a wedge issue” in his 2002 gubernatorial campaign).  For a 
discussion of the 1956 flag, see KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 212–13.  In the late nineteenth century, 
Republicans who stressed the party’s role in saving the Union were said to “wav[e] the bloody 
shirt,” which they sometimes did literally.  ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 487 n.46 (1988). 
452. Jim Wooten, Op-Ed., Thinking Right: After the Vote, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 8, 2002, 
at A21.  Walker was reelected to the state senate in 2004.  Doug Gross, Walker Faces Challenge in 
Return to Senate, TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Nov. 5, 2004, at B3. 
453. Nancy Badertscher, Perdue Has Remarkable Debut Week, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 19, 
2003, at C1. 
454. Rhonda Cook, Stands Harden in Remap Dispute: Baker, Purdue Dig In Their Heels over 
Appeal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 7, 2003, at F1. 
455. Rhonda Cook, Attorney General’s Authority Upheld, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 5, 2003, 
at A1. 




undermined by the district court decision in Larios v. Cox,456 which was 
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.457  Republicans in Georgia con-
vinced a panel of district judges to throw out the 2001 redistricting of both 
houses of the state legislature, the subject of Ashcroft, on the grounds that the 
Democratic districts were underpopulated compared to the Republican 
districts, although the population deviations were within the margins that the 
Supreme Court had previously considered constitutional.458  While the 
Supreme Court has never been able to agree on an operational definition of 
partisan gerrymandering,459 in this case, simple numerical comparisons of the 
population of districts carried by Republicans and Democrats sufficed.  
Miraculously, neither the degree of population inequality nor the extent of 
partisan bias, taken separately, was enough to overturn a redistricting plan, 
but when compounded, they formed a mixture that satisfied the Supreme 
Court.460  Because Larios was decided before the District Court for the 
District of Columbia could apply the complicated totality-of-circumstances 
instructions that O’Connor had given it, Ashcroft was never actually applied 
by a court before Congress acted to reverse it in 2006.  Nor did the Justice 
Department, which hastened to rewrite its guidelines after Bossier II, 
reconsider them after Ashcroft.461  When Voting Section staff lawyers 
meticulously drew on Ashcroft in their elaborate seventy-three-page memo 
recommending rejection of the notorious 2003 Texas “re-redistricting” plan 
for Congress,462 political appointees of the Department of Justice dismissed 
 
456. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per curiam), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
457. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
458. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1350–51; see Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 843 (1983) 
(holding that a district in Wyoming with a 60% deviation from population equality was 
constitutional). 
459. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC ), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2635 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (refusing to declare the Texas legislature’s 
mid-decade redistricting unconstitutional on partisan-gerrymandering grounds); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (leaving open the possibility of 
overturning a redistricting on grounds of partisanship but admitting that “[n]o substantive definition 
of fairness in districting seems to command general assent”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 
123, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that claims of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable 
but disagreeing as to the standard); id. at 161 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Partisan 
Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544, 544–54 (2004) (“The Court’s inability to create a 
stable set of rules reflects several factors: the changing technology of the redistricting process itself; 
changes in political dynamics within individual states; and changes and uncertainty about 
fundamental questions of representation and political fairness.”). 
460. See Larios, 542 U.S. at 947–50 (accepting the reasoning of the lower court’s opinion). 
461. See Donahue, supra note 450, at 1676 n.154 (describing the “nearly identical regulations 
despite significant doctrinal changes” after Ashcroft).  The current guidelines are published at 28 
C.F.R. § 51 (2007). 
462. Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum, supra note 26, at 25–71 (analyzing the Texas 
re-redistricting plan using Ashcroft). 
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the analysis without argument and granted preclearance to the “DeLay 
plan.”463 
In the wake of Larios, a special master redrew the Georgia state 
legislative districts,464 and the subsequent election resulted in extremely few 
close contests,465 a Republican takeover of the lower house of the state 
legislature,466 and considerably less power for the remaining black 
representatives.  During its next session, the legislature initiated a midterm 
redrawing of the state’s congressional boundaries in an ultimately unsuccess-
ful effort to pick up two more Republican seats.467  The strategy of the 2005 
Republican congressional plan was to turn Ashcroft on its head by removing 
blacks from the districts of white Democratic incumbents, resulting in a re-
duction of black influence, reversing Ashcroft’s increase in black influence.  
As the Republican congressman who led the re-redistricting commented on 
the treatment of one Democrat’s district, “[I]t’s been bleached.”468 
Putting the cases from 1993 through 2006 together, the nonretrogression 
standard on the eve of the VRA renewal seemed, at least on its face, to mean 
that a state did not retrogress when it reduced the number of majority–
minority districts, so long as it increased the number of influence districts;469 
that it could always decrease the number of minority-influence districts with-
out retrogressing, so long as it kept the same number of majority–minority 
districts;470 but that it must have an extremely strong interest if it wished to 
increase the number of districts in which minorities could influence or 
 
463. Eggen, supra note 27. 
464. Rhonda Cook, Mapmakers Unveil Redistrict Lines Today, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 15, 
2004, at D4. 
465. See Posting of Nathaniel Persily, npersily@law.upenn.edu, to Election Law Listserv, 
election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://mailman.lls.edu/pipermail/ 
election-law/2004-November/006015.html (stating that only 11 of 235 contests for the Georgia state 
legislature had margins of 5% or less). 
466. Lynn Westmoreland, Op-Ed., Fairer District Lines Will Serve All Georgians, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Feb. 11, 2005, at A15. 
467. See Tom Baxter & Jim Galloway, D.C. May Have a Finger in Senate Remap Plan, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 24, 2005, at C5 (describing redistricting plans and their political 
consequences); Tom Baxter & Sonji Jacobs, House, Senate Leaders Unveil Redistricting Proposals, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 16, 2005, at B4 (same). 
468. Jeff McMurray, Congressmen Tread Lightly on Redistricting, TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), 
Mar. 28, 2005, at 3A. 
469. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 483 (2003) (“The State may choose, consistent 
with § 5, that it is better to risk having fewer minority representatives in order to achieve greater 
overall representation of a minority group by increasing the number of representatives sympathetic 
to the interests of minority voters.”). 
470. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC ), 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) 
(holding that the Texas legislature was under no federal statutory or constitutional obligation to 
maintain the number or character of minority influence districts); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 
146 (1993) (holding that the Republican-dominated Ohio Apportionment Board could pack 
minorities into legislative districts, even under a mistaken interpretation of its duties under the 
Voting Rights Act, rather than create additional influence districts). 




control the outcome.471  This the Judicial Redeemers considered equal 
protection of the law and a lack of abridgement of suffrage because of race. 
In 2005, Ashcroft lay damaged, disparaged, and disused.  It is remark-
able that its specter haunted the debate over the VRARA. 
VI. Caution and Duplicity: The 2006 Renewal of the Voting Rights Act 
A. Ironies of Evidence 
As the June 29, 2007 expiration date of Section 5472 began to loom, the 
question of whether the temporary provision was still justified acquired a 
name, Boerne, that shaped the form but, surprisingly, not the content of the 
debate over renewal.  The centerpiece of the New Federalism jurisprudence 
of the Rehnquist Court,473 City of Boerne v. Flores, written by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy on behalf of the same majority responsible for Shaw, 
Miller, and nearly all of the other “racial gerrymandering” cases, declared the 
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it was not a “congruen[t] and proportional[]” means to combat 
the injury it aimed to prevent or remedy.474  Although Justice Kennedy re-
ferred favorably to the Voting Rights Act seven times in his opinion,475 
contrasting the record of widespread and persisting racial discrimination that 
supported the passage of the VRA with the lack of  “examples of modern 
instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry” in 
the past forty years to buttress the RFRA,476 voting rights supporters 
worried,477 and opponents hoped,478 that the Court would demand an 
 
471. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (stating that in order to satisfy strict 
scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that districting legislation based on race is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling interest). 
472. Actually, the expiring section was § 4(a)(8), which specified coverage under Section 5, but 
nearly all commentators used the shorthand that Section 5 was expiring.  Michael P. McDonald, 
Who’s Covered?  Coverage Formula and Bailout, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 
supra note 323, at 255, 261. 
473. Other cases include United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 
541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); and Seminole 
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
474. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
475. Id. at 525, 528, 530, 533. 
476. Id. at 530. 
477. See, e.g., McDonald Statement, supra note 445, at 11–12 (noting that opponents had 
launched new challenges against the Voting Rights Act in light of Boerne); Hasen, supra note 342, 
at 85–88 (discussing the need for Congress to provide adequate evidence of unconstitutional 
conduct by the states for the post-Boerne Supreme Court); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and 
Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 
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overwhelming record of widespread, quite-recent racial discrimination in 
voting to justify a 2007 renewal.479 
The specter of a demand for new evidence of violations for a statute—
that, unlike the subjects of the New Federalism cases,480 had been judged by 
the Supreme Court to have adequate evidentiary support before481—exposed 
three paradoxes.  First, to the extent that Section 5 had been effective in 
changing the behavior of officials in covered jurisdictions by deterring them 
from passing racially discriminatory election laws, there would be few recent 
examples of such laws, and therefore, seemingly little justification for 
reauthorization.482  The more congruent and proportional the law to the evils 
it addressed, the less evidence for the need to continue it.483  Second, 
although the number of Justice Department objections to changes in election 
laws or practices remained roughly constant from 1971 until 1995, it sank 
thereafter, not only because the 1990s round of redistricting had mostly been 
litigated by then and because many at-large systems of local government had 
already been changed to district systems as a result of Section 2 or Section 5 
actions, but also because the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Shaw line of 
 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69, 71 (2003) (asserting that decisions such as Boerne suggest that 
the Act is not as constitutionally immune as previously thought). 
478. See, e.g., Thernstrom, supra note 70, at 42 (arguing that there has not been sufficient 
electoral discrimination of late to allow renewal of Section 5 to pass a future application of the 
congruence-and-proportionality test). 
479. Having used the VRA as the benchmark for congruence and proportionality in City of 
Boerne, as well as its progeny (Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 
736, 738 (2003); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 
(2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640, 647 (1999)), the Court 
might hesitate to employ those precedents to erase the benchmark. 
480. See Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Response to Our 
Nation’s History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 103–04 (2006–
2007) (distinguishing judicial review of the RFRA in Boerne from potential judicial review of the 
reauthorization of Section 5 on the grounds that the VRA has previously passed the congruence-
and-proportionality test, while the RFRA had not); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer, Rethinking Section 5, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 323, at 38, 
48–50 (arguing that a drop in the number of Justice Department objections to preclearance requests 
should not be considered evidence of a drop in Section 5 violations). 
481. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180–81 (1980) (citing 1975 
congressional findings on racial disparities in registration and officeholding, as well as on Section 5 
objections by the Department of Justice); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329–31 
(1966) (stressing the evidence of voting discrimination that Congress had considered based on 
findings by federal courts, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on Civil Rights).  Ellen 
D. Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A Response to Professor Karlan, 44 HOUS. 
L. REV. 33 (2007) makes the most thorough argument for emphasizing this point. 
482. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the 
Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007) (arguing that “the evidence of things not seen” 
supported reauthorization of Section 5 in 2006). 
483. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE 
L.J. 174, 200 (2007) (pointing to the negotiations prior to local governments submitting changes for 
preclearance and “requests for more information” from the Justice Department as evidence of the 
deterrent effect of Section 5). 




cases and Bossier I and II left the Justice Department with little power to 
object.484  These judicial restrictions on Section 5 stripped the record of evi-
dence possibly necessary to pass muster with the same Court’s Boerne 
decision.485  Third, if the Court read Miller v. Johnson, LULAC v. Perry,486 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,487 
and other “colorblind” decisions strictly, then racial considerations would be 
deemphasized or even banned from governmental decision making.488  But to 
justify a renewal of Section 5 and satisfy at least the most extreme interpre-
tations of the Boerne line of cases, racial matters would have to be stressed, 
the continuation of racial divisions underlined, and the prospect of a return to 
a harsher discriminatory regime in currently covered states and counties, if 
Section 5 were allowed to lapse, highlighted. 
Faced with such dilemmas, proponents pointed out the first two (the 
effectiveness of the law and the restrictions on Justice Department action), 
ignored the third (the colorblind decisions), and then compiled the most vo-
luminous and systematic evidentiary record for the VRA ever offered.  Not 
only did a foundation-backed Commission on the Voting Rights Act hold ten 
hearings around the country, providing forums for local activists and experts 
to supplement the witnesses that the judiciary committees heard in 
Washington,489 but the ACLU compiled an 867-page dossier on Section 2 
 
484. See Posner, supra note 480, at 109–17 (summarizing objection statistics and explaining 
trends). 
485. Richard L. Hasen treats this not as an irony but as a statement of fact.  See Hasen, supra 
note 342, at 91–92 (arguing that once Justice Department objections based on interpretations of 
Section 5 that go beyond retrogressive intent or effect are discounted, there is very little in the 
Department’s evidence that Congress could use to support a case for renewal of Section 5).  But if 
Beer and Bossier II had governed the interpretation of Section 5 in 1965, there would never have 
been enough evidence of discrimination to justify Section 5, for one would have had to prove, for 
instance, that Dallas County, Alabama, officials wished to reduce the number of black registered 
voters below their then-current 1% or that white supremacists in Mississippi had taken actions that 
had the effect of reducing the number of black elected officials to fewer than zero. 
486. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC ), 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
487. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
488. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Miller v. Johnson condemned “the Justice 
Department’s implicit command that States engage in presumptively unconstitutional race-based 
districting” in its interpretation of Section 5 of the VRA and avoided “these troubling and difficult 
constitutional questions” by ruling that Congress never intended the Department to adopt such an 
interpretation.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995).  Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in 
LULAC v. Perry contained a plaintive cry, at the least, for “colorblind” electoral rules: “It is a sordid 
business, this divvying us up by race.”  LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2663 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).  And Roberts’s plurality opinion in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 announced dramatically: 
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”  
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (plurality opinion). 
489. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK, 1982–2005, at 102 (2006), available at http://www.votingrights 
act.org/report/finalreport.pdf. 
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and Section 5 cases from throughout the United States,490 the Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights entered fourteen state reports on voting 
discrimination into the House and Senate hearing records,491 and Professor 
Ellen Katz and her students at the University of Michigan Law School col-
lected and analyzed a database of all published Section 2 cases since the 
1982 renewal.492  In addition, the Russell Sage Foundation and the Earl 
Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity published twenty-seven 
articles by notable voting rights experts reporting on original ideas and re-
search that explored issues related to the renewal.493  There were numerous 
scholarly conferences on related topics. 
Opponents of the VRA, who regarded Boerne and the Shaw cases not as 
threats but as opportunities, also organized evidence to buttress their case.  
Because they desired to eliminate, rather than to correct, Section 5 and al-
most everyone expected Congress to renew Section 5 in some form, 
opponents’ appeals were more narrowly targeted at courts, rather than at both 
courts and Congress.  More than VRA proponents, opponents were torn be-
tween a Boerne strategy of denying the necessity of continuing Section 5 and 
a Miller strategy of denying the morality or constitutionality—they generally 
elided the two494—of any race-conscious governmental actions.495  
 
490. See LAUGHLIN MCDONALD & DANIEL LEVITAS, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE CASE 
FOR EXTENDING AND AMENDING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: VOTING RIGHTS LITIGATION, 1982–
2006: A REPORT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/votingrights/2005_report.pdf. 
491. Tucker, supra note 12, at 218. 
492. See Ellen Katz with Margaret Aisenbrey et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: 
Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
643 (2006). 
493. See THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 323 (containing fifteen articles 
published by the Russell Sage Foundation); VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006, 
supra note 241 (containing twelve articles published by the Earl Warren Institute).  Although, 
because of the speed at which the renewal occurred, these two collections were not published until 
after the VRARA passed, many of their substantive points were made in testimony before 
congressional committees, often by the authors of the articles. 
494. See, e.g., Understanding the Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Abigail Thernstrom, 
Senior Fellow, The Manhattan Institute) [hereinafter Thernstrom Statement] (asserting that “race-
conscious maps send the wrong message” and quoting Justice Kennedy’s decision in Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995)). 
495. See, e.g., Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Roger Clegg, 
President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity) [hereinafter Clegg Statement] 
(stating that the VRARA proposal “tries to guarantee racial gerrymandering and racial 
segregation”); id. at 15 (condemning the VRARA proposal “because it has no plausible record 
basis”); Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15, 14–15 (2005) 
(statement of Edward J. Blum, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) [hereinafter Blum 
Statement] (arguing that the data on minority participation in Georgia’s election process, collected 
in CHARLES S. BULLOCK III & RONALD KEITH GADDIE, AM. ENTER. INST., AN ASSESSMENT OF 
VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN GEORGIA (2005), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060210_ 




Concentrating on abstract generalizations,496 rather than the graphic human 
stories and specific local facts that had enlivened the case for federal protec-
tion of voting rights since the head-cracking troopers had backed up the 
registration-denying election administrators at Selma,497 opponents eschewed 
hearings or reviews of the myriad discrimination cases.  Instead, they pre-
sented tables of estimates of registration, turnout, and minority 
officeholding498 and graphs of final Justice Department Section 5 
objections.499  This was an odd type of evidence to prepare to influence the 
courts, which specialize in concrete controversies featuring individual plain-
tiffs and defendants, seeing the world only through a grain of sand, rather 
than the comprehensive surveys that Congress, legislating for the nation, 
must necessarily contemplate.  The “conservatives’” emphasis on abstrac-
tions constituted an implicit recognition of the departure from judicial 
traditions—the policy-setting, legislative nature of the Boerne line of cases.  
Yet their “hard” statistical argument rested on a soft, unverifiable, culturally 
based foundation—the assumption that the apparent decline in discrimination 
and behavioral inequities represented a change of heart, a revolutionary shift 
in cultural attitudes,500 rather than, as the more skeptical proponents of the 
VRA asserted,501 the deterrent effect of changes in institutional rules, an ef-
fect that might disappear if the rules were suspended.502 
 
Georgia.pdf, “simply don’t justify the stringent and unique infringement on federalism principles 
that the Court recognized in . . . City of Boerne”); Thernstrom & Blum, supra note 8 (“Draconian 
federal intrusion into local elections was justified when it was the only way to enfranchise Southern 
blacks—but 40 years on, it’s an unconstitutional travesty.”). 
496. See Clegg Statement, supra note 495, at 21 (condemning proponents for having produced 
evidence that was “almost all scattered and anecdotal rather than systematic and statistical”). 
497. For an example during the 2005–2006 hearings, see Understanding the Benefits and Costs 
of Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) 
(statement of Armand Derfner, Att’y, Derfner, Altman & Wilborn). 
498. See generally, e.g., American Enterprise Institute, Minority Voting Studies of Jurisdictions 
Covered by Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23859, 
filter.all/pub_detail.asp (providing links to studies collecting data on minority participation in the 
election process of states covered by Section 5 and arguing that discrimination against black voters 
has abated to the point that Congress should allow Section 5 to expire). 
499. See generally, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT & 
REAUTHORIZATION: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S RECORD OF ENFORCING THE TEMPORARY 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT PROVISIONS, at x fig.ES-1 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT & REAUTHORIZATION]. 
500. See id. at 83 (concurring statement of Commissioner Abigail Thernstrom) (concluding that 
the VRA “revolutionized the status of blacks” and that “America was changed irrevocably”). 
501. See Understanding the Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5–6 (2006) (statement of Drew S. Days III, Professor, Yale 
Law School) (arguing that the historical record of vigorous enforcement of Section 5 by the Justice 
Department proved a deterrent to any attempt by a covered jurisdiction to make a change that would 
not meet the criteria of Section 5). 
502. Thus, “conservatives” in the VRARA debate revealed themselves as the true followers of 
the tradition of the French Revolution, while “liberals” perhaps more closely resembled the 
Revolution’s classic conservative Anglo-Saxon critic, Edmund Burke.  See generally EDMUND 
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Perhaps even more interesting than the evidence actually introduced 
during the formal congressional hearings was the evidence not presented.  
Civil rights organizations had for some years been challenging the disfran-
chisement of felons, often including those on parole and sometimes lasting 
for life, as racially discriminatory under Section 2 of the VRA, as well as 
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.503  Supporting their posi-
tion was a series of social-scientific studies on the incidence and effects of 
the practice.504  Even though this was a restriction on individuals’ votes, the 
type of restriction that critics of the VRA believed less objectionable than 
attacks on structural rules,505 no testimony on the subject was given before 
Congress and no amendment banning or restricting the practice was 
entertained.506  Another individual-level restriction that was invisible during 
the hearings, one that bitterly split the major political parties in every state 
where it was suggested, was the requirement that voters who appeared at the 
polls had to present some form of government-issued identification in order 
to be able to vote.507  Nor were there hearings on the administration of 
Section 5, an explosive topic because of partisan considerations that 
apparently resulted in overturning staff recommendations to deny 
preclearance in high-profile submissions from Mississippi, Texas, and 
 
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 
2003) (1790). 
503. See, e.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 
(2004); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated, reh’g granted, 405 
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1015 (2005); Farrakhan v. Washington, 
338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g denied, 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. 
Locke v. Farrakhan, 543 U.S. 984 (2004); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc); 
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 WL 1889273 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006); 
Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Gooden v. Worley, No. CV-2005-5778-
RSV (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jefferson County Aug. 23, 2006), rev’d sub nom. Chapman v. Gooden, No. 
1051712, 2007 WL 1576103 (Ala. June 1, 2007).  See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote 
Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006) (arguing 
that Section 2 should be applied to voter identification and felon disfranchisement). 
504. See, e.g., SASHA ABRAMSKY, CONNED: HOW MILLIONS WENT TO PRISON, LOST THE 
VOTE, AND HELPED SEND GEORGE W. BUSH TO THE WHITE HOUSE (2006); JEFF MANZA & 
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2006); J. Morgan Kousser, Disfranchisement Modernized, 6 ELECTION L.J. 104 (2007) (reviewing 
ABRAMSKY, supra, and MANZA & UGGEN, supra). 
505. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 18, at 24 (contending that “[b]asic enfranchisement 
had been the sole goal” of the VRA). 
506. Because most criminal disfranchisement laws derived from laws passed some time ago, 
they might not be subject to Section 5, but their critics could always have sought to amend Section 
2, as other critics had when Section 5 had come up for renewal in 1980–1982. 
507. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 33, 33 (2007) (mem.) 
(granting certiorari in a challenge to Indiana’s requirement that voters present photo identification at 
the polls); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1372–73 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(examining, under the Voting Rights Act, a Georgia statute requiring photo identification at the 
polls); see also Tova Andrea Wang, Century Found., ID and Voting Rights (Aug. 29, 2005), 
http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1084 (referring to new voter-identification laws as 
“the voting rights barrier of the 21st Century”). 




Georgia.508  Any of these issues could have wrecked the bipartisan coalition 
in favor of the carefully negotiated framework of the bill.  Finally, neither 
side presented systematic social-scientific studies on changing the basis of 
Section 5 coverage, that is, which counties would be covered509 and what 
evidence there was of discrimination in those and similar places.  Civil rights 
forces feared that they would lose congressional supporters if they tampered 
with the coverage formula,510 while opponents only presented contrasts be-
tween conditions in currently covered and currently uncovered states in order 
to undermine any continuation of Section 5 at all.511 
Before and even after the bills were finally formulated and 
simultaneously introduced into the House and Senate,512 discussions of 
changes in the VRA were wide-ranging and extensive.  Among the most far-
reaching proposals were: 
 restrictions on felon-disfranchisement and voter-identification 
laws;513 
 election-day registration, facilitation of the naturalization of legal 
aliens, and noncitizen voting, all of which would increase Latino 
turnout;514 
 
508. See Dan Eggen, Democrats Won’t Get Justice Memo: Texans Say Document Could 
Embarrass GOP, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2004, at A23 (discussing the Justice Department’s refusal 
to release internal documents analyzing the Texas re-redistricting); Eggen, supra note 27 (exposing 
the existence of a Justice Department staff memo finding that the Texas re-redistricting violated the 
VRA); Dan Eggen, Politics Alleged in Voting Cases: Justice Officials Are Accused of Influence, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at A1 (discussing the politicization of Voting Section decisions in 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas); Todd J. Gillman & Michelle Mittelstadt, AG Says Texas Remap 
Approval Not Political: Democrats Hoping Leaked Justice Memo Will Help Their Case Before 
Supreme Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 3, 2005, at 1A (reporting on Democrats’ 
acquisition of a Justice Department internal memorandum opposing the Texas district map). 
509. Two opponents of the VRARA did later total the number of counties in each state that 
would be covered under the “Norwood Amendment,” which proposed changing the coverage 
formula to target those counties where overall turnout was less than 50% in the last three 
presidential elections.  Charles S. Bullock, III & Ronald Keith Gaddie, Good Intentions and Bad 
Social Science Meet in the Renewal of the Voting Rights Act, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13–15 
(2007). 
510. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 483, at 209, 208–09 (arguing that debating the coverage 
formula would likely cause the “complete unraveling of the bill”). 
511. See, e.g., EDWARD BLUM & LAUREN CAMPBELL, AM. ENTER. INST., ASSESSMENT OF 
VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN JURISDICTIONS COVERED UNDER SECTION FIVE OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT 2–8 (2006), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060515_BlumCampbell 
report.pdf (using voter-registration data to demonstrate similar rates in states covered by Section 5 
and those not covered). 
512. S. 2703, 109th Cong. (as introduced on May 3, 2006); H.R. 9, 109th Cong. (as introduced 
on May 2, 2006). 
513. E.g., VERNON FRANCIS ET AL., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, 
PRESERVING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 15 (2003). 
514. Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Reshaping the Tub: The Limits of the VRA for 
Latino Electoral Politics, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 323, at 139, 
148–54. 
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 changing coverage to emphasize minority percentages, rather than 
1960s’ literacy tests and 1960s’ and 1970s’ turnout;515 
 basing coverage on more recent elections;516 
 using a multifactor test to determine coverage;517 
 covering counties, not states, automatically releasing from Section 
5 coverage those counties without recent Section 5 objections and 
automatically covering counties anywhere that lost Section 2 
cases;518 
 allowing cities, towns, villages, or special-purpose districts to bail 
out even if the county in which they were situated could not or did 
not bail out;519 
 simplifying bailout procedures or advertising them more widely, 
which would target the law more precisely at the most likely 
violators;520 
 moving preclearance of statewide redistricting entirely into the 
federal courts to reduce the influence of partisan concerns;521 
 allowing appeals by private parties of the Justice Department’s 
failure to object to changes in election laws;522 
 explicitly allowing multimember districts elected by using 
proportional representation;523 
 eliminating coverage according to explicit criteria but allowing 
minority citizens, generally represented by formal interest groups, 
to “opt in” to Justice Department preclearance;524 
 
515. Persily, supra note 483, at 195, 218. 
516. McDonald, supra note 472, at 264–67. 
517. Spencer Overton, The Coverage Curve: Identifying States at the Bottom of the Class, in 
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 323, at 242, 242–46.  All coverage changes 
would exclude some southern jurisdictions that are currently covered and include other jurisdictions 
in southern and nonsouthern states.  See id. at 246, 242–46 (arguing that application of a “diverse 
array of factors,” by providing a “more comprehensive measurement” of current “racial 
dysfunction,” could change which states must comply with the preclearance provisions). 
518. An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues 
Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13 (2006) 
(statement of Samuel Issacharoff, Professor, New York University School of Law) [hereinafter 
Issacharoff Statement].  As a result of the withdrawal of coverage at the state level, statewide 
redistricting would not be subject to Section 5 requirements under the Issacharoff proposal. 
519. J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006, supra note 241, at 257, 274. 
520. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 513, at 11; McDonald, supra note 472, at 267–69. 
521. Persily, supra note 483, at 215.  This proposal assumes that judges are immune to partisan 
concerns in VRA cases, an assumption belied by Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the 
Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
522. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 513, at 14. 
523. Id. at 16. 
524. See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, in THE FUTURE 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 323, at 277. 




 continuing the current preclearance regime for local jurisdictions, 
but allowing citizens’ groups to force states to negotiate about state 
laws, and if negotiations failed, submitting the state law to a new, 
bipartisan Voting Rights Enforcement Commission—if the 
Commission deadlocked, federal courts would take over;525 
 moving from the race-oriented “antidiscrimination model” of the 
VRA to “protection of voting rights as such,” on the model of the 
National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act.526 
Proposals to overturn the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft and 
Bossier II ( but not Bossier I )527 were less far-reaching, only restoring the 
status quo ante 2000, and moves to scrap Section 5 entirely528 were, of 
course, even more radical. 
Politics eliminated all but the smallest changes in Section 5 from being 
seriously considered. 
B. The Politics of Renewal 
Proponents of renewal in 2006 suffered from the lack of an enemy to 
rally against.  In 1965, sluggish southern federal judges and slugging 
Alabama State Troopers provided inspiring targets, and in 1970, 1975, and 
1982, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan had opposed extensions of Section 
5.  But polarizing President George W. Bush first seemed uninformed about 
the Act,529 then generally committed to renewal,530 wavering during the week 
after House passage of the bill, and only after a majority of the Senate en-
dorsed the measure was he in full support of the Act.531  Substituting a 
nostalgic nemesis for a current one, the sponsors symbolically named the 
VRARA for the heroine of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, 
Fannie Lou Hamer, and two icons of the southern struggle against 
segregation, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King, seeking successfully to 
 
525. Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 HOW. 
L.J. 785, 830–41 (2006).  Tokaji’s principal concern is avoiding partisanship in preclearance 
decisions by the Justice Department. 
526. The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 206 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes, Professor, New York University 
School of Law) [hereinafter Pildes Statement].  For an expansion of Pildes’s argument, see Richard 
H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 
HOW. L.J. 741 (2006).  The purpose would be to deal with such laws as felon disfranchisement, 
voter identification, and redistricting, where courts and the Justice Department have difficulty 
distinguishing racial from partisan motives. 
527. Explicitly reversing Bossier I would restore, more securely, the connection between 
Sections 2 and 5, making dilution of minority votes a reason for denying preclearance and 
effectively reversing Beer. 
528. Edward Blum & Roger Clegg, Color Inside the Lines, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.–Dec. 2003, 
at 18, 20; Jackson’s Plan Would Extend Voting Wrongs, MOBILE REG., Mar. 12, 2005, at A12. 
529. McDonald, supra note 472, at 270. 
530. Tucker, supra note 12, at 211. 
531. Id. at 259–60. 
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identify those who voted against the Act with opponents of the Civil Rights 
Movement.532 
If the Bush Administration was tepid, Republicans in Congress were 
split.  By July 2005, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and the whole House 
Republican leadership had joined Republican National Committee Chair Ken 
Mehlman, the party’s most visible proponent of attracting minority votes, in 
strong support of renewal.533  House Judiciary Committee Chair James 
Sensenbrenner, a dependable friend of minority voting rights since the 1981–
1982 renewal hearings, guaranteed that the bill would move rapidly.534  
Indeed, the impetus behind renewing Sections 5 and 203 a year before they 
were to sunset was the prospect that Sensenbrenner would be replaced as 
Judiciary Committee Chair by Representative Lamar Smith of Texas, an 
outspoken opponent of renewing Section 5.535  On the other hand, Republican 
intellectuals, such as Abigail Thernstrom, Edward Blum, and Roger Clegg, 
opposed any renewal as a violation of “colorblind” policies, and they testi-
fied in Congress and harshly criticized the Republican leadership in op-eds in 
conservative newspapers and on conservative Web sites.536  Some 
Republican politicians from currently covered jurisdictions favored changes 
in coverage formulas that would free their areas from preclearance,537 and the 
anti-immigrant fervor that especially affected southern and midwestern 
Republicans often overflowed into opposition to language provisions for 
citizen voters and threatened to hold up renewal as a whole.538 
By contrast, Democrats were steadfastly united, benefitting from the 
party’s 1994 loss of southern moderates, who might have opposed the bill’s 
effort to overturn Ashcroft, and in general from their dozen years as a 
powerless, beleaguered minority, which bred a desperate solidarity.  As if to 
disprove Justice O’Connor’s assertion in Shaw v. Reno that “segregated” 
minority-opportunity districts would elect insular representatives who 
 
532. That this appeal succeeded with an American public notoriously ignorant of and oblivious 
to history may have been due to its embodiment in the almost-martyred civil-rights-leader-turned-
Congressman John Lewis, who remarked during the floor debate: 
We cannot separate the debate today from our history and the past we have traveled.  
When we marched from Selma to Montgomery in 1965, it was dangerous.  It was a 
matter of life and death.  I was beaten[;] I had a concussion at the bridge.  I almost 
died.  I gave my blood, but some of my colleagues gave their very lives. 
Id. at 253. 
533. Id. at 212–13, 259. 
534. Id. at 213–17. 
535. Id. at 216, 238 n.332.  By the rules of the 1994 “Contract with America,” Republicans 
could serve as House Committee Chairs for only three terms, and Sensenbrenner’s six years would 
be up in January 2007.  Id. at 216 n.105. 
536. See Thernstrom Statement, supra note 494; Clegg Statement, supra note 495; Blum 
Statement, supra note 495; Blum & Clegg, supra note 528, at 20; Blum, supra note 8; Thernstrom 
& Blum, supra note 8; Abigail Thernstrom, Emergency Exit: Abigail Thernstrom on Why Congress 
Would Be Wise to Let Part of the Voting Rights Act Expire, N.Y. SUN, July 29, 2005, at 10. 
537. Tucker, supra note 12, at 237, 243–44. 
538. Id. at 236–43. 




listened only to their black constituents,539 the Democrats named Mel Watt, 
Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, who was elected from the dis-
trict targeted in Shaw and who served his white constituents well enough to 
survive the court-ordered reconfiguration of the district into a majority-white 
seat, as the party’s chief negotiator with the Republican leadership.540  Watt 
reportedly worked well with Sensenbrenner and kept his own troops in line, 
for example, convincing black members not to campaign too intensely for the 
bill, for fear of alienating Republicans, and not to offer amendments that 
would disturb the agreement carefully negotiated with Republican leaders.541 
Anxious to pass a bill before Representative Sensenbrenner lost his 
chairmanship, Democrats and civil rights groups refrained from explicitly 
trying to impede the passage of voter-identification laws or to make any 
other substantial changes542 and settled for a renewal of Section 5 with four 
principal provisions: 
 a straightforward reversal of Bossier II that substituted or for and 
between purpose and effect, and defined purpose as any 
discriminatory purpose, which together would allow for a denial of 
preclearance on the basis of retrogressive effect alone or 
discriminatory purpose alone, and for any discriminatory racial 
purpose, not just a purpose to retrogress;543 
 a more equivocal reversal of Ashcroft that stated that the purpose of 
Section 5 “is to protect the ability of such citizens to elect their 
preferred candidates of choice,”544 which was meant to deny 
congressional approval of trade-offs of control districts for 
influence districts; 
 a renewal for twenty-five years; and 
 no changes in coverage or bailout provisions. 
 
539. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (“[T]he plan, on its face, was so highly 
irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. . . .  
[W]hen a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one 
racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent 
only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole.”). 
540. Tucker, supra note 12, at 213–14.  Civil rights organizations agreed to let Watt negotiate 
for them as well.  Id. at 213–14. 
541. See id. at 214–16 (recounting the Watt–Sensenbrenner negotiations and Watt’s role in 
disciplining other black members); Mikhail Posting, supra note 10 (describing cautionary restraints 
placed on black members of Congress). 
542.  Mikhail Posting, supra note 10; see also Congress to Consider Voting Rights Act, LA. 
WKLY., Oct. 31, 2005, available at http://www.louisianaweekly.com/weekly/news/articlegate.pl? 
20051031b (reporting that, except for two amendments, “civil-rights activists want Congress to pass 
a clean 25-year extension”). 
543. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 222 (“In this manner, Congress clarified that a Section 5 
objection could be made based upon discriminatory purpose, effect, or both.”). 
544. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 5, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c) (emphasis added). 
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The short list of changes was less impressive than the 1970 permanent 
ban on literacy tests and expansion to nonsouthern counties, the 1975 addi-
tion of special protection for language minorities, or the 1982 invigoration of 
Section 2 and liberalization of the bailout provisions by letting counties es-
cape coverage,545 but these changes protected “hard-won gains [in minority-
held elective offices] from disappearing”546 and served some interests of civil 
rights groups and both major political parties without alienating a blocking 
coalition. 
The most important part of the VRARA, the “Bossier II fix,”547 attracted 
the least attention, while the proposal for the most straightforward change in 
the coverage formula, the Norwood Amendment in the House of 
Representatives, would have established a coverage pattern so bizarre548 as to 
guarantee that the Act would be “Boerned.”549  Because the Justice 
Department had increasingly objected to proposed changes because of their 
discriminatory, but not necessarily retrogressive purposes during the 1980s 
and 1990s, failure to overturn Bossier II would have doomed Section 5 to 
disuse, as it essentially had since 2000.550  Because Republicans, except for 
“colorblind” purists like Roger Clegg,551 wanted to avoid being seen as 
 
545. Before 1982, only states could bail out if the whole state was a covered jurisdiction.  The 
1982 Senate Report had expected “most” covered jurisdictions to bail out as a result of the 1982 
amendments.  S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 60 (1982). 
546. Adegbile Statement, supra note 446, at 49. 
547. In The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, Nate Persily dismisses the 
Bossier II amendment in a footnote, Persily, supra note 483, at 217 n.165, emphasizing instead the 
amendment that dealt with Ashcroft, id. at 217.  I disagree on two grounds.  First, because most of 
the at-large election systems that could be dismantled under the VRA have been dismantled and 
most of the minority-opportunity districts, for African-Americans at least, that could be created 
have been created, the number of retrogressive-effect objections under Section 5 is very likely to 
continue to decline.  Purpose objections increased markedly as a percentage of all objections before 
Bossier II, and they will resume their growth with its reversal.  Second, as explained above, 
Ashcroft was a very insecure precedent after Justice O’Connor’s retirement, and as explained below, 
the legislative plan at issue in the case might well have passed muster under the VRARA.  That is, 
the Ashcroft “fix” may not have fixed anything. 
548. The Norwood Amendment would have covered only those jurisdictions with a 
discriminatory policy currently in place or in which less than 50% of those eligible to vote had 
actually turned out in one of the last three elections.  Historic Voting Rights Act Extended, 62 CONG. 
Q. ALMANAC 16-6, 16-8 (2006).  If it had been adopted, fewer than half of the counties in 
Mississippi and only 10% of the parishes in Louisiana would have been covered, but more than 
two-thirds of the counties in Tennessee and over half of those in Kentucky, two border states that 
had never been covered before, would have been subject to preclearance.  Bullock & Gaddie, supra 
note 509, at 15.  Nearly as many counties would have been covered in Indiana and Pennsylvania, as 
in Alabama and South Carolina.  Id.  While Sensenbrenner declared that the Norwood Amendment 
“turns the Voting Rights Act into a farce,” Watt charged that it represented an effort to render it 
unconstitutional.  Tucker, supra note 12, at 255.  The amendment was defeated 318–96.  Id. 
549. Coined here as a verb, “to Boerne” means for a court to declare a law unconstitutional by 
ruling that it is not, in the judges’ opinions, congruent and proportional to the evils it aims to 
correct. 
550. See McCrary et al., supra note 154, at 313–14 (noting that Bossier II caused an 83% drop 
in Section 5 preclearance objections). 
551. See Clegg Statement, supra note 495, at 13–15 (opposing overthrow of Bossier II ). 




outright opponents of Section 5 renewal,552 and Democrats had to remain true 
to their minority supporters and colleagues, it was inevitable that the Bossier 
II change in the VRA would pass easily.553 
Despite a great deal of rhetoric, Congress did not so much reverse 
Ashcroft as remand it to the courts with equivocal instructions.554  
Republicans, believing that the decision might have some life left in it even 
after Justice O’Connor’s retirement, were concerned that where Democrats 
controlled redistricting, they would strategically spread minority voters to 
maximize the number of elected Democrats,555 while civil rights groups, 
sharing the Republicans’ anxieties, worried that the Democratic redistricters’ 
actions would mean fewer minorities in office.556  Democrats hesitated to 
attack the unusual alliance between Republicans and civil rights groups for 
fear of alienating their normal allies and derailing the negotiated settlement, 
leaving lawyers and political scientists as the only defenders of Ashcroft.557 
 
552. See Persily, supra note 483, at 180 (“[V]irtually no one wanted to be on record opposing 
the legislation.”). 
553. There was no separate roll-call floor vote on the Bossier II fix. 
554. Recognizing this fact, Nate Persily spends nearly half of his article on the VRARA trying 
to construct a standard, without much guidance in the congressional records.  See Persily, supra 
note 483. 
555. See, e.g., Renewing the Temporary Provisions of the Voting Rights Act: Legislative 
Options after LULAC v. Perry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10–11 
(2006) (statement of Michael A. Carvin, Partner, Jones Day) (asserting that Democratic efforts to 
establish influence districts provided minorities with the opportunity to elect their representatives of 
choice—if their choice was a white Democrat); Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, “A 
Legislative Task”: Why Four Types of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, 
Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L.J. 2, 12–27 (2005) (detailing the Democrats’ influence-district 
strategy and giving examples of Democratic redistricting plans that shifted blacks from minority 
districts to white Democratic districts).  Carvin argued the Bossier cases for the parish before the 
Supreme Court and represented nine states in post-2001 redistricting cases.  Id. at 2; Reno v. 
Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II ), 528 U.S. 320, 322 (2000), superseded by statute, Fannie 
Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and 
Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 5, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973c); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier I ), 520 U.S. 471, 473 (1997). 
556. See McDonald Statement, supra note 445, at 130 (denouncing Justice O’Connor’s 
transformation of the retrogression standard into “something subjective, abstract, and 
impressionistic” that prevents minorities from electing candidates of their choice or own race); 
Adegbile Statement, supra note 446, at 52 (describing a Louisiana case in which the “ability-to-
elect standard protected against elimination of minority voting strength” because Georgia v. 
Ashcroft did not govern the outcome). 
557. See Reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act’s Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives and 
Views from the Field: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property 
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 272 (2006) (statement of Carol M. Swain, 
Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University) (approving Ashcroft 
“because it allows for the creation of more opportunities for minorities to form coalitions and exert 
influence on politicians outside their own racial and ethnic groups”); Pildes Statement, supra note 
526, at 198 (contending that reversing Ashcroft “will harm the long-term interests of minority 
voters, frustrate the formation of interracial political coalitions in the South, and be damaging to 
American democracy”); Hasen Statement, supra note 21, at 10 (favoring “tweaking rather than 
reversing the Ashcroft standard”); Robert F. Bauer, Gen. Counsel, Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Comm., Defending Georgia v. Ashcroft (While Supporting Renewal of the Voting Rights Act) 4 
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The crucial point, which was left in a muddle, was how large the group 
had to be in order to be considered able to elect its preferred candidate.  
Senate Republicans insisted that any district in which minorities constituted 
less than 50% of the voting-age or citizen-voting-age population would be 
ineligible for protection under Section 5.558  Thus, a 49.9% black district 
could be sliced up during redistricting without violating Sections 2 or 5.559  
The highly partisan Senate Report even claimed that the Ashcroft fix applied 
only to “naturally occurring majority-minority districts,”560 conveniently ig-
noring the entirely artificial, unnatural nature of redistricting.  Republican 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell went further, requiring that the minority-
preferred candidate in such a district had to be a member of a racial minority 
for Section 5 to apply.561  For these Republicans, color lines not only had to 
be drawn, they had to be very bright.  On the other hand, Democrats in both 
houses and the House Judiciary Committee read the language of the Ashcroft 
amendment differently, believing that it contained no impenetrable barrier at 
50%, but instead allowed coalition districts if minorities and enough sympa-
thetic Anglos could demonstrably elect candidates of their choice in 
particular areas.562  As the House Report put it, “Voting changes that leave a 
minority group less able563 to elect a preferred candidate of choice, either di-
rectly or when coalesced with other voters, cannot be precleared under 
 
(June 18, 2006), available at http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/clientfiles/GAvAshcroft.pdf 
(praising Ashcroft for “[a]djusting retrogression analysis to accommodate creative, flexible political 
action favorable to minority political interests”); David Epstein, Democratic Dilemmas: The 
Conversation No One Is Having About the Voting Rights Act, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 4, 2006, 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=democratic_dilemmas (contending that Ashcroft offered 
minorities more opportunities for election). 
558. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 20–21 (2006).  For an even clearer statement by perhaps the most 
influential Republican lobbyist on the VRARA, see Carvin & Fisher, supra note 555, at 14. 
559. The Republicans’ approach to the Ashcroft fix was largely undercut by their acquiescence 
in the Bossier fix, for the Justice Department could always object to a change as having a 
discriminatory purpose, even if the baseline district was less than 50% minority in the voting-age 
population or seemed noncompact or otherwise “unnatural.”  This observation reduces the 
significance of the Ashcroft fix even further. 
560. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 21.  The phrase naturally occurring majority–minority districts 
can be traced back at least as far as Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: 
Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 355 (1996). 
561. Persily, supra note 483, at 222–23. 
562. Even the chief trial counsel for the United States in Ashcroft, who was generally quite 
hostile to the Supreme Court’s decision in the case, included coalition districts among the “ability-
to-elect districts” that he thought should be preserved for a redistricting plan to satisfy Section 5.  
David J. Becker, Saving Section 5: Reflections on Georgia v. Ashcroft and Its Impact on the 
Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006, 
supra note 241, at 223, 250. 
563. Another ambiguity, one that has characterized the retrogressive interpretation of Section 5 
from the beginning, was the definition of the baseline condition.  Could an increasingly minority 
district in which minorities could not yet elect their candidate of choice have its minority percentage 
cut substantially without violating the amended Section 5?  Must a district currently occupied by a 
minority-preferred candidate, but which has fallen behind the state average in population growth, be 
redrawn to continue it as a minority-opportunity district? 




Section 5.”564  This described exactly the three state senate districts that were 
at issue in Georgia v. Ashcroft, even though the legislature miscalculated the 
chances of African-Americans in several districts in which the black voting-
age population was close to 50%.565  Did the VRARA really reverse 
Ashcroft? 
The arguments that civil rights groups made in 2006 for overturning 
Bossier II and Ashcroft contradicted those they had made against Bolden and 
Beer twenty-five years earlier, and the somersaults were yet another indica-
tion of how much weaker their political position had become.  In 1981–1982, 
those seeking to override Bolden had decried the necessity to prove purpose 
as both terribly difficult and as fundamentally irrelevant to whether the law 
now discriminated,566  and they had separated Section 2’s statutory effect 
standard from Bolden’s Fifteenth Amendment constitutional standard.567  In 
2006, the same forces demanded the restoration of a purpose requirement to 
Section 5, in full vigor, and insisted that the Fifteenth Amendment’s purpose 
interpretation guaranteed the constitutionality of the Bossier II amendment.568  
In 1981–1982, civil rights supporters had rather too quietly condemned 
Justice Stewart’s opinion in Beer,569 which may have prevented them from 
mustering the votes to overturn the Supreme Court decision expressly in the 
law’s text.570  In 2006, they treated Beer as a divinely inspired commentary 
 
564. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 71 (2006) (emphasis added). 
565. See supra notes 434–38 and accompanying text. 
566. See Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1189–201 (1982) (statement of Frank R. Parker, Director, Voting 
Rights Project, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law) [hereinafter Parker Statement] 
(arguing that the intent requirement subverts the purposes of the Voting Rights Act); S. REP. NO. 
97-417, at 16 (1982) (“The Committee has concluded that this intent test places an unacceptably 
difficult burden on plaintiffs.  It diverts the judicial inquiry from the crucial question of whether 
minorities have equal access to the electoral process to a historical question of individual 
motives.”). 
567. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 25, 25–27 (noting that Justice Stewart’s opinion in Bolden ruled 
that Section 2 “requires proof of discriminatory intent” and that the Fifteenth Amendment “does not 
reach voting dilution claims,” but nevertheless proceeding to amend Section 2 to delete the purpose 
requirement that Stewart had ruled necessary). 
568. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5—Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 27–28 (2005) (statement of 
Brenda Wright, Managing Att’y, National Voting Rights Institute) (calling for the reversal of 
Bossier II and the restoration of the Section 5 purpose test). 
569. See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 18, at 85, 105 (“The Supreme Court’s Beer decision dealt 
minority voting rights a severe setback.”).  Parker’s congressional testimony in 1982 did not 
mention Beer.  See Parker Statement, supra note 566. 
570. For a discussion of the 1982 Senate Report’s Beer footnote, see supra notes 258–60 and 
accompanying text. 
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on the scripture and as Justice O’Connor’s explicit endorsement of influence 
districts as heretical.571 
Although there was a vote in the House on a ten-year, rather than a 
twenty-five-year, extension of the expiring sections of the law,572 there was 
never any open, reasoned debate on the issue.  In light of the country’s 387-
year history of racial discrimination, no one could argue convincingly that 
any particular number of years would suffice to accomplish the necessary 
transformation.  What was hurried was not the timetable for expiration but 
the timetable for passage of the bill itself, as evidenced by the fact that start-
ing the twenty-five-year clock from 2006, rather than 2007, the original 
target date for renewal, meant that Section 5 would expire just as the 2031 
redistricting cycle was reaching its height. 
The only sustained public debate over the VRARA concerned coverage 
areas, and the focus even here was less on attacking continuing discrimina-
tion precisely than on satisfying the Supreme Court—not on actual 
congruence and proportionality but on getting five votes to sustain the 
VRARA under Boerne.573  In this debate, federalism concerns, which had 
bulked so large in 1965, were treated as a minor problem of abstruse 
philosophy, not actual practice.  By the year 2000, state and local 
governments in covered jurisdictions had become so accustomed to making 
submissions to the Justice Department574 that they had little difficulty in fil-
ing approximately 20,000 of them each year.575  Indeed, every major national 
 
571. See Adegbile Statement, supra note 446, at 47–48 (contending that the Supreme Court 
“suddenly abandoned the straightforward approach adopted in Beer” in its opinion in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft). 
572. The ten-year-extension amendment was sponsored by Texas Republican Representative 
Louis Gohmert; it failed 134–288.  Historic Voting Rights Act Extended, supra note 548, at 16-8. 
573. See Hasen Statement, supra note 21, at 8 (focusing on the necessity to pass a bill that 
“will . . . pass constitutional muster in the Supreme Court”); An Introduction to the Expiring 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 271 (2006) (statement of Theodore M. Shaw, Director–
Counsel and President, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.) (“After Boerne the 
Principal Constitutional Question Attending the VRA Renewal Is Whether Evidence of Continuing 
Discrimination Exists In Covered Jurisdictions.” (typeface altered)).  The first question that Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter asked Professor Richard Pildes to answer at length 
was: “Is there anything that Congress can do to ensure that the reauthorization of the Voting Rights 
Act is upheld by the Supreme Court under the ‘congruence and proportionality’ test articulated in 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)?”  Pildes Statement, supra note 526, at 105 
(emphasis omitted); see also Richard Hasen, Pass the VRA Bailout Amendment, ROLL CALL, July 
11, 2006, available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/bailout.pdf (arguing for bailouts likely to 
“insulate the the [sic] renewed VRA against inevitable constitutional challenge”). 
574. For especially pertinent testimony on this point, see Travis County’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 5–7, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-CV-01384 (D.D.C. 
May 15, 2007), available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/namudno-travis.pdf. 
575. Hasen, supra note 342, at 91.  During the VRARA hearings, those concerned about 
Boerne focused on the diminishing numerator of the objection-rate equation.  See, e.g., Hasen 
Statement, supra note 21, at 9 (“In the most recent 1998 to 2002 period, DOJ objected to a meager 
0.05 percent of preclearance requests.”); Clegg Statement, supra note 495, at 22 (“[T]he percentage 
of objections since 1995 is less than 0.2 percent . . . .”); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING 




organization of state and local governments endorsed the VRARA, an un-
equivocal indication of the fading of the problem of federalism.576  In twenty-
four years, only a dozen covered jurisdictions had bothered to take advantage 
of the eased bailout procedures in the 1982 law.577  For white politicians, a 
willingness to comply with Section 5 gives them credibility with minority 
constituents and perhaps some protection against Section 2 suits.578  For 
white officials in the Deep South, Section 5 has become more of a shield than 
a wound, an emblem of reformation more than an insult. 
Because submissions by local governments—which made up the vast 
majority of them—were estimated to cost about $500 each,579 no doubt virtu-
ally all in employees’ time spent compiling documents,580 it is possible to 
determine the “federalism costs”581 of complying with Section 5 literally.  
Approximately 20,000 submissions per year at $500 per submission gives a 
total cost of roughly $10 million.  In 2004, local governments spent 
$40,437,000,000 on employees’ salaries.582  Altogether, then, the cost of 
complying with Section 5 amounted to about a four-thousandth of the total 
salary expenses of local governments—much less than roundoff error.583 
 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT & REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 499, at 29 (emphasizing the decline in 
the number of objections from 161 per year in the period 1982–1994 to 13 per year in the period 
1995–2004).  But for issues of federalism, the denominator is more instructive. 
576. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 252 n.481 (citing 152 CONG. REC. H5146 (daily ed. July 13, 
2006)). 
577. Hebert, supra note 519, at 266. 
578. See Reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act’s Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives and 
Views from the Field: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property 
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13 (2006) (statement of Donald M. Wright, 
Gen. Counsel, North Carolina State Board of Elections) [hereinafter Wright Statement] (noting that 
Section 5’s preclearance requirements offer protection from litigation); Posner, supra note 480, at 
66 n.64 (noting that bailout lawsuits could create minority opposition to white elected officials). 
579. Hebert, supra note 519, at 271. 
580. As the general counsel of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, Donald M. Wright, 
noted in Senate testimony, “The costs of preclearance submissions are insignificant, except for 
redistricting submissions,” which were “very infrequent.”  Wright Statement, supra note 578, at 
313.  The average submission took “less than an hour to prepare and mail.”  Id.  In North Carolina, 
he said, county elections directors considered Section 5 submissions “a manageable burden 
providing benefits in excess of costs and time needed.”  Id. 
581. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995). 
582. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLLS: 1982 TO 2005, at 
1, tbl.447, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/08s0447.pdf. 
583. Because few of the submissions come from states, I have left states out of both the 
numerator and the denominator in the calculation in the text.  Even if state expenses for submissions 
were much higher than those for local governments, their very large employee-salary expenses 
would markedly reduce the overall percentage of governmental-salary expenses attributable to 
complying with Section 5.  The calculation in the text thus no doubt overestimates federalism costs 
as a percentage of salaries. 
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C. Defeat in Victory? 
The course of the VRARA in Congress undercut the solemn praise with 
which its introduction was greeted and its passage was celebrated.  The 
Republican leadership, which had maintained almost total control over its 
majority during the first six years of the George W. Bush Administration, 
had more trouble with Republican back benchers than with Democrats during 
consideration of the bill.584  Before the Senate’s one day of casual debate, a 
vociferous group of Republicans in the House, led by southerners whose 
party had been energized by the backlash against the VRA and other civil 
rights issues in the 1960s,585 held up the VRARA for a month protesting 
against the targeting of the South through the bill’s continuation of a cover-
age formula based on elections that took place decades earlier.586  The 
southern conservatives found unlikely allies in liberal academics who wor-
ried that if the coverage and bailout formulas were not updated, the Supreme 
Court might declare part of the VRA unconstitutional under Boerne.587  
“Populist” opposition to illegal immigrants—who, of course, could not 
vote—fueled attacks on the provisions of the VRA for language assistance to 
citizens with imperfect English,588 but it also drew attention away from 
Section 5.  As in 1970 when the Nixon Administration lost both the 
 
584. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 235–47, 254–58 (recounting efforts of Representatives King, 
Westmoreland, and Norwood to delay or pass crippling amendments to the VRARA). 
585. As Lee Atwater of South Carolina, eventually chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, put it: “As to the whole Southern strategy that Harry Dent and others put together in 
1968, opposition to the Voting Rights Act would have been a central part of keeping the South [for 
the Republican Party].”  Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-Party South: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 
in SOUTHERN POLITICS IN THE 1990S, at 1, 7 (Alexander P. Lamis ed., 1999). 
586. See Todd J. Gillman, Texans, Others Stall Voting Rights Renewal, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, May 19, 2006, at A1 (describing the efforts of Georgia and Texas conservative Republicans 
to delay the debate); Raymond Hernandez, After Challenges, House Approves Renewal of Voting 
Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A1 (narrating House actions in 2006); Bob Kemper, Charges Fly 
over Renewing ’65 Law, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 10, 2006, at A1 (detailing congressional actions 
and arguments by Georgians); Shailagh Murray, Voting Rights Act Extensions Pass House Despite 
GOP Infighting, WASH. POST, July 14, 2006, at A1 (summarizing the final day’s actions in the 
House); Patrick O’Connor, Leaders Move Forward on VRA Vote Despite Some GOP Unease, HILL, 
July 12, 2006, available at http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/leaders-move-forward-onvra-vote-
despite-some-gop-unease-2006-07-12.html (recounting intra-Republican struggles); Lynn 
Westmoreland, Op-Ed., Punitive Approach No Longer Needed, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 29, 2006, 
at A17 (arguing that Section 5 coverage should be based on the 2004 election). 
587. See, e.g., Pildes Statement, supra note 526, at 200–07 (warning that the Supreme Court 
may not permit a reauthorization of Section 5 without strong evidentiary support that such measures 
are necessary); Hasen Statement, supra note 21, at 8–9 (arguing that after Boerne, Congress will 
have to provide a strong evidentiary record of intentional discrimination in order to support 
legislation that burdens states); Issacharoff Statement, supra note 518, at 220–21 (suggesting that in 
Boerne the Court limited Congress’s power to enact discriminatory legislation); Hasen, supra note 
573 (advocating bipartisan support for Westmoreland’s amendment as a way of warding off an 
unfavorable ruling by the Supreme Court); Issacharoff, supra note 23, at 1714–20 (suggesting that 
the logic of Boerne and other recent seminal federalism cases would permit the reexamination of 
Section 5 of the VRA). 
588. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 239–43, 256–57 (explaining connections between English-
only bills and the VRARA). 




termination of Section 5 and the Carswell Supreme Court nomination, the 
two objectives became entangled589 and the 2006 conservatives reduced their 
small chances of success by attacking two very different provisions of the 
VRARA at once.  The House passed the bill July 13, 2006, by a vote of 390–
33, none of the proposed amendments garnering more than 185 votes.590 
A week later, the Senate passed the House bill intact, 98–0.591  Five days 
after the Senate vote, the Judiciary Committee issued its substantive report 
on the VRARA.592  That report departed from convention in two striking 
ways.  First, committee reports are generally published well before a bill is to 
be discussed on the floor, so that members can fully understand the often 
complex provisions and implications of bills.593  Second, in bills with broad 
committee support, reports are typically the products of bipartisan 
cooperation.  Not this time.  Although during the extensive hearings on the 
bill, there had been a facade of bipartisanship on the Committee, after it 
passed, the Republican majority curtly rebuffed a 145-page Democratic draft, 
produced a perfunctory document, and refused to give the Democrats time to 
fashion a detailed dissent or even to show them a final draft of the majority 
report before it was published.594  The Democrats were reduced to docketing 
 
589. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
590. Tucker, supra note 12, at 253–58. 
591. Id. at 264. 
592. See S. REP. NO. 109-295 (2006). 
593. Senate Report 417, the Senate’s much-cited report on the Voting Rights Act amendments 
of 1982, was published May 25, 1982.  See S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982).  The Senate passed the Act 
on June 18.  Voting Rights Act Extended, Strengthened, supra note 3, at 376.  In 1965, the gap 
between issuing the substantive committee report and the final Senate vote was thirty-five days.  
Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 3, at 544–45.  The convention is reflected in a quotation from 
an interview with an unnamed senator during the 1950s by Professor Matthews: “I try, and I think 
most other senators try . . . to read the report on a bill before voting on it . . . .”  MATTHEWS, supra 
note 4, at 251. 
594. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 54–55 (recording Democratic senators’ objection to the Judiciary 
Committee Report); Letter from Patrick Leahy, Ranking Democratic Member, U.S. Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, to Arlen Specter, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (July 25, 
2006), available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/leahy.pdf (requesting accommodation from 
Senator Specter so that Democratic senators could provide “additional and supplementary views”); 
Letter from Arlen Specter, Chairman, U.S Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. 
Senate (June 26, 2006), available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/specter-response.pdf 
(refusing Senator Leahy’s request).  An erstwhile friend of civil rights, Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Specter also provided ammunition to challenge its constitutionality in a floor speech.  See 
Tucker, supra note 12, at 261, 265 (arguing that Senator Spector undermined the Act by suggesting 
it had achieved its goals and was no longer necessary).  The most senior Republican on the 
Judiciary Committee when Senator Orrin Hatch reached his limit of six years as chairman of the 
Committee, Specter was bitterly opposed for the chairmanship after the 2004 election by 
conservatives who feared that he would block conservative judicial nominees.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Confirmation Battle in Senate Could Define Specter’s Career, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A1.  In 
addition to holding a series of meetings with conservatives inside and outside the Senate, Specter 
named Michael E. O’Neill, a former clerk of Justice Clarence Thomas, as his chief counsel on the 
Judiciary Committee.  Id.  Apparently the crucial Judiciary Committee staffer on the VRARA was 
young Federalist Society member Dimple Gupta, whose appointment by Specter had been 
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a brief, angry sputter, and concluding that “post-passage legislative history is 
a contradiction in terms.  Any after-the-fact attempts to re-characterize the 
legislation’s language and effects should not be credited.”595  The majority 
report offered only weak support for the necessity of continuing Section 5 
and fervently chastised the Justice Department’s interpretations and admini-
stration of the provision.596  Even more unusually, two Republican members 
of the Judiciary Committee who had voted for the law filed further remarks 
that virtually invited the Supreme Court to overturn it.597 
The lack of a debate or a conventional committee report in the Senate 
robbed friends of the VRARA of opportunities to embed evidence and argu-
ments for the necessity and constitutionality of the law in comments on the 
floor or to demonstrate the will of Congress by explicitly rejecting 
amendments.598  Despite all the civil rights forces’ planning, negotiating, 
researching, testifying, and compromising, the headlong rush to passage, 
which VRARA supporters were understandably reluctant to impede, reduced 
the significance of their overwhelming triumph for the arena that really 
mattered, the courts.  In legislatures, adversity overcome builds legal cases; 
 
“cheered” by conservatives because of her coauthorship of the so-called nuclear option, a tactic for 
getting conservative judicial nominees approved by effectively overturning the Senate filibuster 
rule.  The Prowler, Keystone Capers, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_ 
article.asp?art_id=7853.  According to the conservative American Spectator, “She was hired to get 
the conservatives off our backs, says a Judiciary staffer.”  Id.  The extreme position that the 
“moderate” Specter took on the VRARA suggests that O’Neill, Gupta, and perhaps other 
Committee staffers influenced Specter’s and the Committee’s actions on the VRARA.  Thus, in the 
House, the effort to avoid one conservative Judiciary Committee chairman sped up the bill, while in 
the Senate, the effort of a “moderate” to win the chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee may have 
helped to undermine the Act’s claim to constitutionality. 
595. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 55. 
596. Id. at 10–22. 
597. Id. at 25–53.  The legislative director of the Washington, D.C., office of the ACLU 
accused the two of seeking “to lay out a roadmap to challenge the constitutionality of the law.”  
Tucker, supra note 12, at 266.  One of the two, Senator John Cornyn, had been the attorney general 
of Texas when Gregory Coleman, the chief attorney for the plaintiffs in the NAMUDNO case, was 
the state’s solicitor general.  Id. at 267 n.655.  Coleman also testified against the VRARA.  Modern 
Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
20–21 (2006) (statement of Gregory S. Coleman, Att’y, Weil, Gotshal & Manges).  Coleman’s 
place as a law clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas from 1995 to 1996 was filled the next year by the 
man who was in 2006 the chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Michael O’Neill.  
Wikipedia, List of Law Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/List_of_law_clerks_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States (last modified Jan. 5, 
2008).  Representative Lamar Smith, in 2006 the ranking Republican member of the House 
Judiciary Committee, represented that part of Austin, Texas, that encompasses NAMUDNO.  
Tucker, supra note 12, at 267.  As pointed out above in supra note 535 and accompanying text, the 
principal reason that VRARA was pushed in 2006 instead of 2007 was to avoid a possible Judiciary 
Committee chairmanship by Smith, who opposed renewal.  Sometimes worlds are very small, 
indeed. 
598. Tucker implies this point by observing its contrapositive—that the revolt of House back 
benchers created a more extensive record than if the bill had sailed through, thereby providing 
evidence of congressional deliberation for the inevitable legal challenge to the VRARA.  See 
Tucker, supra note 12, at 258. 




silence undermines them.  The cost of tepid unanimity in Congress was a 
timid bill that only seemed a significant victory for the civil rights forces be-
cause they had recently seen so few, a victory deliberately undercut by 
conservatives aiming at winning in court what they did not dare to seek in 
Congress.599 
VII. Section 5 in Peril: The NAMUDNO Case 
A. Miss Under Standing? 
Eight days after the former Austin, Texas, resident who was now 
president, George W. Bush, signed the VRARA, Gregory Coleman, a 
prominent member of the Federalist Society, former law clerk for Justice 
Clarence Thomas, and former solicitor general of Texas,600 filed what the 
Legal Times called “the most significant assault on the Voting Rights Act in 
a quarter of a century” in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
on behalf of the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One 
(NAMUDNO).601  One of 107 municipal and special-purpose districts in 
Travis County,602 NAMUDNO was initially established in 1986 to provide 
water for a new, all-Anglo subdivision,603 and in 2000, it served a 700-
square-mile area of suburban tract housing that was home to only 1% of the 
county’s population.604  The NAMUDNO area was 7% African-American or 
Latino.605  While the first challenge to Section 5 in 1966 had been filed by a 
state, South Carolina, where the cannons trained on Fort Sumter still 
reverberated, the 2007 case came not from a whole state, and not from the 
 
599. Thus, Texas Republican Senator John Cornyn commented at the bill’s renewal, “I decided 
that any amendments would be defeated, so I decided not to offer any,” even though he complained 
that Texas should be released from the preclearance requirement for changing election rules.  
Samantha Levine, Cornyn Decides Voting Rights Act Changes Doomed, HOUS. CHRON., July 21, 
2006, at A3. 
600. What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 117 (2003) (statement of Gregory S. Coleman, Partner, Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges LLP). 
601. Emma Schwartz, Texas District Says DOJ Oversight Is Unlawful, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2007, at 1, 1.  An associate of prominent VRA opponent Edward Blum, Coleman convinced 
NAMUDNO to challenge the VRARA and took the case pro bono.  Id. at 8. 
602. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 22, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, 
No. 1:06-CV-01384 (D.D.C. May 15, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment], available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/plaintiff2.pdf. 
603. See id. at 35 (noting that African-Americans and Hispanics represented an estimated 0% of 
NAMUDNO’s general population in 1990). 
604. Travis County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, with Accompanying Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities at 3, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-CV-01384 
(D.D.C. May 15, 2007), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/SJ-
TravisCounty1.pdf; Schwartz, supra note 601, at 8. 
605. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 602, at 35. 
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Deep South, but from a sparsely populated area of the most progressive 
county in a state that was as western as it was southern.  NAMUDNO repre-
sented not states’ rights but suburban secessionism.606 
NAMUDNO had previously somewhat grudgingly complied with the 
VRA, submitting its eight minor election changes on time to the Department 
of Justice and never committing any serious voting rights infractions.607  
Coleman asked the court to allow NAMUDNO to bail out of Section 5 
coverage, opposing the Justice Department’s interpretation of the law as al-
lowing only jurisdictions that registered voters, such as counties, to bail 
out.608  But he would have been dismayed if the three Clinton appointees on 
the panel that he unluckily drew, Judges David S. Tatel, Paul L. Friedman, 
and Emmet G. Sullivan,609 simply granted his petition to bail out.  Whatever 
the composition of the panel, Coleman expected to lose the bailout issue.610  
The case, which attracted not only the forceful attention of the Justice 
Department but intervention and amicus briefs by all of the leading civil 
rights organizations, was really about whether the coverage formula of 
Section 5, under the conditions of 2007, violated Boerne.611 
At the time of this writing, the case has been heard, but not yet decided, 
by the district court.  Whatever the decision, it is certain to be appealed, and 
the case will probably appear on the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
midst of the extended 2008 presidential campaign and be scheduled for a de-
cision by that Court not long before the two political parties’ national 
conventions.  If the Judicial Redeemers on the Supreme Court wish to over-
turn Section 5 but not to inflame minority voters on the eve of an election 
that will elect a president who might appoint up to three new members of the 
 
606. Travis County intervened in the case in opposition to NAMUDNO.  Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 1, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-CV-01384 (D.D.C. June 
15, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition], available at http://www.projecton 
fairrepresentation.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/plaintiffs-memorandum-of-points-and-
authorities-in-opposition-to-defendants-motions-for-summary-judgment.pdf.  In response, Coleman 
bristled that the Justice Department was “politically interposing Travis County between 
[NAMUDNO] and the State of Texas, which is [NAMUDNO]’s only supervisory authority under 
state law.”  Id. at 25. 
607. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 602, at 7 (listing each of 
NAMUDNO’s previous preclearance submissions). 
608. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 606, at 9 (opposing the Justice 
Department’s reliance on a statutory definition of political subdivision based in part on voter 
registration).  Complicating its argument that it was independent of Travis County for voting 
purposes, the district from 2004 on contracted with the county government to conduct its elections.  
Id. at 7–8. 
609. See Pete Yost, Texas Locals Challenge Voting Rights Law, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 17, 
2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,,-6928892,00.html (pointing out 
Clinton appointments). 
610. Schwartz, supra note 601, at 9. 
611. See Ana Radelat, Fight over Voting Rights Act Expected to Reach High Court, JACKSON 
CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 23, 2006, at A1 (describing the filing of the case and the motives of the 
plaintiffs). 




Court before 2012, they might decide to delay a decision by denying standing 
to NAMUDNO, finding that the Justice Department guideline that prevents 
NAMUDNO from bailing out is not an irrational interpretation of what 
Congress had the discretion to order.  Separate bailouts for over a hundred 
special-purpose districts within a single county, and a like number of bailout 
requests from other areas, could shut down the District of Columbia District 
Court.612  If only scattered districts, towns, or villages within a county bailed 
out, it might be a nightmare for counties to conduct elections.  Either course 
would be a much worse federal burden on county governments than the cur-
rent system, which is now a straightforward matter of bureaucratic routine.  
Consequently, the Supreme Court might decide that the suit could best be 
dealt with by dismissing it without reaching the Boerne questions.613  Attor-
neys for the plaintiff, the defendant, and the amici could file away their 
papers until the election was over and new plaintiffs could be recruited, 
perhaps to face a new district court panel and a slightly different lineup on 
the Supreme Court. 
B. Moving the Policy Arguments to the Courts 
If the Supreme Court does not drain the legal life out of NAMUDNO, 
each side will reprise the arguments already raised in the VRARA hearings, 
in published scholarship, and to a much more limited extent, on the floor of 
Congress. 
NAMUDNO began its motion for summary judgment in the district 
court by rewriting the states’-rights language of an earlier era in New South 
business terminology, as their predecessors in the nineteenth-century New 
South had reworked antebellum states’-rights language.  Section 5, the 
 
612. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 57 n.192 (1982) (noting that “many thousands” of bailout 
actions would be filed if even the smallest political subunits could bail out separately). 
613. The Supreme Court has often changed its standards or otherwise manipulated procedural 
doctrines to take jurisdiction or to avoid decisions.  For instance, in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 
679 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting), Justice O’Connor announced, according to Justice Souter, what 
was arguably a “new cause of action.”  This new claim allowed white plaintiffs standing to sue even 
though they had shown no injury.  See id. at 659–60 (White, J., dissenting) (grounding his 
disagreement with the majority on the plaintiffs’ failure to show injury).  The majority seemed to 
contradict the decision a year earlier in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  For 
discussion of the contradiction, see KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 383–84.  In Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004), the Court employed California family law to 
avoid making a decision on whether the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violated 
the Establishment Clause.  The prevailing opinion in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) preserved the White House Office of Faith-Based Programs from attack 
under the Establishment Clause by creating an exception to the forty-year-old standing rule in Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).  Six Justices held that Flast could not be distinguished.  See Hein, 
127 S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (decrying, in an opinion joined by Justice 
Thomas, “the creation of utterly meaningless distinctions which separate the case at hand from the 
precedents that have come out differently” by the three-person plurality led by Justice Alito); id. at 
2584 (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting, in an opinion joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Stevens, the majority’s conclusion that Flast did not apply in that case). 
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motion contended, “puts all covered states and political subdivisions into a 
form of federal receivership” led by “a federal shadow executive with veto 
authority.”614  It was “perhaps the most intrusive abdication of core federal-
ism principles anywhere in federal law.”615  Conceding that Section 5 was 
“an extraordinary response to an extraordinary problem” in 1965616 and, less 
fulsomely, that changes, including those in 1982, had not been ruled 
unconstitutional, Coleman characterized Section 5 as exclusively aimed at 
“discriminatory gamesmanship” by voting authorities and charged that 
Congress in 2006 had not properly identified which, if any, areas were still 
guilty of such practices.617 
Even though the efforts of Congress to overturn Bossier II and Ashcroft 
might have been thought the strongest parallels to its attempt to reverse 
Employment Division v. Smith,618 which provoked the ire of the majority of 
the Supreme Court in Boerne,619 Coleman almost completely ignored the 
Bossier II and Ashcroft fixes, concentrating single-mindedly on Congress’s 
unwillingness to update the coverage formula or extend the Act for a shorter 
period.620  Drawing a wavering line between state action and private action, 
he asserted that (selectively cited) comparable racial registration and voting 
rates proved a lack of discrimination by authorities, while continued racially 
polarized voting was purely private and therefore irrelevant to whether in-
tentional discrimination by the state persisted.621  Prophylactic effects of the 
current law on discrimination and gamesmanship, Coleman largely 
ignored,622 as he did the slightness of the practical burden of submitting 
minor changes that were almost automatically approved.623  Instead, he 
sought to create an atmosphere of abstract crisis, lamenting Section 5’s 
 
614. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 602, at 36. 
615. Id. at 37. 
616. Id. 
617. Id. at 52, 47–52. 
618. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
619. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 454 (2000) 
(describing the Boerne majority as provoked by the overturning of Smith). 
620. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 606, at 54–58. 
621. Id. at 47–50. 
622. Indeed, he insisted that to justify the continuation of Section 5, Congress must have 
evidence of the conduct that it was designed to prevent.  See id. at 62 (requiring congressional 
findings that covered jurisdictions that “have recently engaged in or are likely to engage in the kind 
of discriminatory gamesmanship on which Congress grounded its original passage of 
preclearance”). 
623. The average annual expenditure for NAMUDNO for submitting its legal changes for 
preclearance was $223.  Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 
64, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-CV-01384 (D.D.C. May 5, 2007) 
[hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Defendant], available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/ 
pdfs/def2.pdf. 




“unparalleled strain on our federal structure.”624  And he contended that, in 
light of this strain, Section 5 could not be justified as a measure to prevent or 
deter voting discrimination unless the electoral procedures currently being 
resorted to by covered jurisdictions were “new and different.”625 
In contrast to Coleman’s hyperbolic federalist abstractions, the legal 
papers of the Justice Department and the civil rights organizations brimmed 
with real-world examples of discrimination taken from Section 5 objections, 
requests for more information, and published and unpublished Section 2 and 
constitutional legal cases decided since the VRA had last been amended in 
1982.626  Mixing instances of disfranchising and diluting devices from every 
decade since 1982 and all covered states, especially Texas, the defendants 
and their friends sought to create the impression of widespread continuing 
discrimination at the same time that they asserted that but for the deterrent 
effect of Section 5, “countless” discriminatory voting changes would have 
been implemented in covered jurisdictions.627  Because the evidence, which 
had been presented to Congress in 2006, was massive and, according to the 
Department and the civil rights groups, comparable to that used to justify 
previous renewals of the VRA, courts had no reason to come to a different 
conclusion than they had when they upheld the law in previous decisions.628  
Indeed, judges should be especially reluctant to depart from precedent in this 
 
624. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 602, at 52.  He also sought to 
distinguish between prohibitions of state or local action, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act, 
upheld in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 721–22, 727–28 (2003), 
and the requirement of preclearance in Section 5, contending that the latter was more intrusive even 
though it allowed much more state action than an absolute prohibition of, for instance, all at-large 
elections would have.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 606, at 58.  Yet outright 
prohibitions would surely be less congruent and proportional to the injury of racial discrimination. 
625. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 606, at 49.  Coleman did not claim 
textual or case-law authority for his novel interpretation, which would apparently put traditional 
discriminatory devices, such as at-large elections, racial gerrymandering, and annexations, outside 
the preclearance regime.  He also ignored the fact that the ploys used by southern jurisdictions in the 
1950s and 1960s were not “new and different” but were rather variations on practices of the period 
after the First Reconstruction.  See KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 25–38.  The history of racial 
discrimination in America is so long and deep that almost nothing is “new and different.” 
626. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
of Defendant-Intervenors, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-CV-01384 
(D.D.C. May 15, 2007) [hereinafter Civil Rights Groups’ Points and Authorities], available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/vrabrief_msj.pdf.  The groups included the NAACP, NAACP-
LDF, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, People for the American Way, ACLU, and 
Texas-Rio Grande Legal Aid; the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund filed 
separately.  See id. at 95–99. 
627. Memorandum in Support of Defendant, supra note 623, at 41–67.  The Defendant-
Intervenors’ Joint Statement of Material Facts contains a four-hundred-page summary of the 
evidence of continued discrimination presented to Congress in 2006.  Defendant-Intervenors’ Joint 
Statement of Material Facts, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-CV-01384 
(D.D.C. May 15, 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/vrafacts01.pdf. 
628. Memorandum in Support of Defendant, supra note 623, at 53–55, 60. 
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case because “Section 5 operates at the intersection of a citizen’s most fun-
damental right and a government’s most suspect classifications.”629 
The outcome of the case at the Supreme Court level seems likely to turn 
on four questions.  First, how radical is the majority of the Roberts Court 
willing to appear at this early stage of its tenure?  To strike down a sacred 
symbol of the nation’s great moral movement of the twentieth century, one 
almost universally lauded by the civic elite, a law that had been recently re-
newed by triumphant majorities of Congress, would risk widespread 
denunciation and would greatly heighten the fears of constituencies for every 
other rights advance since women’s suffrage.630  A backlash that turned the 
Supreme Court into a true voting issue for a substantial number of voters 
would be a real possibility, threatening the extension of the conservative 
majority on the Court.  Second, will the Court’s majority assess the federal-
ism costs of Section 5 practically or as a matter of pure principle?  In 
practical terms, Section 5 has never been much of a burden: at the beginning 
because it was not enforced and more recently because compliance with it 
has been built into simple bureaucratic routines—another, rather-easy form 
to fill out, now online.631  As a matter of principle, the unwritten strictures of 
federal–state separation are no more or less violated by Section 5 than they 
ever were, but the Roberts majority may construe them more strictly than the 
Warren, Burger, or Rehnquist Courts did.  Third, how will the Court’s domi-
nant five members weigh the plentiful, but scattered evidence of continued 
discrimination, and how will it solve the conundrum of the prophylactic ef-
fect of Section 5?  Will it refuse to conclude that, as the brief of the civil 
rights organizations characterized the plaintiffs’ argument, “Section 5 has 
been so successful that it must be struck down”?632  Or will the majority 
become “supreme social psychologists,” predicting that no increase in 
discrimination would follow a repeal of Section 5 because the hearts of the 
public and politicians are by now truly free of discriminatory desires?  
Fourth, how will the Court as a whole treat the coverage and sunset provi-
sions of the VRARA—the facts that the jurisdictions covered did not change 
 
629. Id. at 55–56.  For a more extensive discussion of the point, see Karlan, supra note 482, at 
13–14.  The plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the “fundamental right to vote” point by contending 
that the Fifteenth Amendment did not prohibit vote dilution.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum in 
Opposition, supra note 606, at 54.  This position was espoused by Justices Thomas and Scalia in 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 919–22 (1994) but rejected by implication by the other Justices in that 
and subsequent cases. 
630. It is worth noting that NAMUDNO has not asked the district court to strike down the 
VRARA on “colorblind” grounds.  A Supreme Court decision to do so, especially on its own 
initiative, would be truly radical. 
631. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant, supra note 623, at 64 (referring to online 
submission). 
632. Civil Rights Groups’ Points and Authorities, supra note 626, at 28. 




in 2006 and that the law was extended for another lengthy period?633  How 
will it assess the issue of possible under- and over-inclusiveness of coverage, 
and how will it decide if twenty-five years is too much or just enough, or if 
the decision should properly be left to Congress? 
Neither side in the NAMUDNO case discussed expanding coverage to 
different counties—the plaintiffs because they wished to eliminate all 
coverage,634 the defendants because they wished to justify current coverage 
and because they wanted to keep the historical justification for coverage that 
the Supreme Court had accepted in past cases.635  This reticence on both 
sides suggests an opening for the Justices to overturn the VRARA as incon-
gruent with the problem of racial discrimination in electoral processes and 
structures with a decision, perhaps joined in by members of both the moder-
ate and conservative wings of the Supreme Court, that would serve to invite 
Congress to expand as well as to contract the coverage of Section 5—to cor-
rect both under- and over-inclusiveness.636  That opportunity might also be 
used by civil rights forces to adopt other changes that would modify state and 
local electoral practices in order to outlaw those that discriminate against 
minorities. 
C. If NAMUDNO Wins: The Frederick Douglass, Thaddeus Stevens, and 
Charles Sumner VRA Revival Act of 2009 
When Gregory Coleman filed the NAMUDNO case on August 4, 2006, 
Republicans controlled both houses of Congress and the presidency, and if 
the 2006 elections for Congress went the same way as nearly all of those 
since 1994 had, Representative Lamar Smith and Senator Arlen Specter—
opponents of Section 5—would chair the judiciary committees of the House 
and Senate.  Thus, any proposals for revisions of the VRA prompted by a 
decision by the Supreme Court in NAMUDNO’s favor would face dim pros-
pects in Congress.  Yet even in early August, pundits were beginning to 
 
633. As Pildes puts it, by refusing to change the coverage scheme or renewal period out of 
reasons of “realpolitik,” Pildes, supra note 7, at 154, “Congress has, whether intentionally or not, in 
effect thrown down a gauntlet to the Court,” id. at 153. 
634. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 606, at 42. 
635. See generally City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173–83 (1980); Briscoe v. 
Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 414–15 (1977); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327–37 (1966); 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant, supra note 623, at 10 (citing Lopez v. Monterey County, 
525 U.S. 266, 283–85 (1999)). 
636. In her larger study and a short comment on Persily, supra note 483, Ellen Katz defends the 
VRARA on the grounds that there were still many Section 2 cases in jurisdictions covered by 
Section 5 and that plaintiffs won a larger percentage of Section 2 cases filed in those than in 
currently noncovered jurisdictions.  Katz, supra note 241, at 215–17; Ellen D. Katz, Mission 
Accomplished?, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 142, 146–47 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
images/pdfs/613.pdf.  While this evidence suffices to defeat the utopian contention that the Old 
South has been revolutionized, it does not meet the argument that some of the currently covered 
areas could be released without consequences for minorities, while some places not currently 
subject to Section 5 need to be. 
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predict that Democrats might win a majority in the House and perhaps even 
the Senate,637 and when those tentative predictions came true, the new chair-
men of the judiciary committees—John Conyers, the senior African-
American in the House, and Patrick Leahy, a trusted friend of minority vot-
ing rights—and new partisan majorities would be the first to consider any 
revisions of the VRA.  What must have seemed graveyards for the VRA at 
the time NAMUDNO was first being planned had become potential houses of 
recovery. 
A Supreme Court decision overturning Section 5 on Boerne grounds in 
2008 would present a new President and Congress in 2009 with the welcome 
opportunity to amend the law by adding new reforms, as well as more pre-
cisely tailoring its coverage scheme and reducing its renewal length, the 
latter prodding Congress into more frequent reversals of Supreme Court 
opinions it believes errant.  In the event of such a decision, Congress, 
following the 2006 precedent of naming the amended Act for prominent civil 
rights supporters, should consider emphasizing the historical path of dis-
crimination and struggles against it in the nation as a whole, not just in the 
South, by naming the revision for three then-prominent, but now largely for-
gotten nineteenth-century abolitionists.  Frederick Douglass, escaped slave, 
brilliant writer and lecturer, the most prominent African-American spokes-
person in the nineteenth century, should be as well known as he once was for 
his struggles against Jim Crow and for black suffrage in the antebellum 
North, as well as throughout the country after emancipation.638  Thaddeus 
Stevens, fearless defender of escaped slaves, framer of universal public 
education, scourge of secessionists and their northern sympathizers, merits 
rescue from the caricature that his racist enemies popularized.639  Charles 
Sumner, foremost sponsor of school integration in the North and the nation in 
the nineteenth century, near martyr to southern violence on the Senate floor, 
a man whose dying wish that colleagues pass the Civil Rights Bill that he had 
sponsored for so long was granted, deserves another legislative memorial.640  
To emphasize the grounding of the VRA in the nation’s turbulent history of 
race relations, the members might also want to consider having actual histo-
rians testify about the Act, as they did not in 2006. 
 
637. E.g., Charlie Cook, The Gathering Storm, NAT’L J., Aug. 5, 2006, at 68, 68, available at 
http://www.cookpolitical.com/column/2006/080506.php. 
638. See generally, e.g., FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM (Arno Press 
1968) (1855); NATHAN IRVIN HUGGINS, SLAVE AND CITIZEN: THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 
(1980); JAMES OAKES, THE RADICAL AND THE REPUBLICAN: FREDERICK DOUGLASS, ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, AND THE TRIUMPH OF ANTISLAVERY POLITICS (2007). 
639. See generally, e.g., FAWN M. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS: SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH 
(1959); HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS: NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGALITARIAN (1997). 
640. See generally, e.g., DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF 
THE CIVIL WAR (1960); DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 
(1970). 




As many observers noted during the preparations for the VRARA, as 
well as during the hearings, the coverage provisions are the most likely to 
attract skepticism by the judiciary.641  Linguistically, Boerne’s “congruence” 
matches the coverage provisions of the VRA better than any other section, 
and the fact that most of the affected jurisdictions were designated partly on 
the basis of turnout at elections from thirty-four to forty-two years before 
2006 invites doubts.  That more than half of the published Section 2 cases 
since 1982 have come from jurisdictions not covered by Section 5642 suggests 
that racial discrimination in voting rules is not limited to areas previously 
singled out for skepticism.  Like cases brought in the Deep South under the 
1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts, the Section 2 and constitutional cases have 
often been expensive and lengthy, and they frequently involved retrogressive 
changes that would have been inhibited had the areas been covered by 
Section 5.643 
Two examples are suggestive.  In 1988, the ACLU and the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) began planning a 
lawsuit to redraw the five districts of the Los Angeles County Board of 
Supervisors, the nation’s largest local government.644  Even though the 
population of Los Angeles County was 38% Latino in 1990, no one with a 
Spanish surname had been elected to the county’s governing body since 
1874.645  In Garza v. County of Los Angeles,646 MALDEF and the ACLU, 
joined by the Justice Department, showed that Anglo supervisors who were 
generally sympathetic to Latino interests, but who prized their own reelection 
even more, repeatedly redrew district lines to insure that no Latino could be 
elected.647  That their actions were not regarded as different in kind from 
those in covered jurisdictions is evidenced by the fact that after 1991, 
 
641. See, e.g., Hasen Statement, supra note 21, at 9 (suggesting that the Supreme Court might 
insist on evidence that discrimination was not only still present in covered jurisdictions but that it 
was greater there than in other jurisdictions); Issacharoff Statement, supra note 518, at 221, 220–21 
(warning that the Supreme Court may be skeptical of the need for certain jurisdictions to be covered 
and others not subject to preclearance because “[t]he clear record of geographic demarcation no 
longer exists”); Hasen, supra note 342, at 88–89 (arguing that the success of Section 5 in curtailing 
discrimination against voters may make it difficult for Congress to demonstrate the necessity of its 
continuance). 
642. Katz, supra note 241, at 215. 
643. Cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (finding a justification for 
Section 5 in the fact that an “inordinate amount of time and energy [was] required to overcome the 
obstructionist tactics invariably encountered” in litigation under the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights 
Acts). 
644. The lawsuit was decided more than three years later and cost taxpayers $12.8 million.  
Richard Simon, County to Pay $6.3 Million in Voting Rights Lawsuit Settlement, L.A. TIMES, May 
3, 1991, at B3. 
645. KOUSSER, supra note 16, at 72, 77. 
646. 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). 
647. As the expert witness for the plaintiffs on intent, I analyzed the evidence and developed 
the intent case.  A later version of my report in that case comprises Chapter 2 in KOUSSER, supra 
note 16. 
 Texas Law Review [Vol. 86:667 
 
 
standard Justice Department Section 5 objection letters cited the Garza 
purpose analysis as definitional.648  Another, more recent example comes 
from Osceola County, Florida, where an unexpected influx of predominantly 
Puerto Rican Latinos raised the Latino percentage in this uncovered jurisdic-
tion from 2% in 1980 to more than 30% by 2000, resulting in the election of 
a Puerto Rican county commissioner, followed by an intentionally discrimi-
natory shift from single-member districts to at-large elections.649  No amount 
of pressure from the Justice Department could convince the county to settle 
the lengthy and expensive lawsuit,650 which the county predictably lost.651 
To expand and contract the coverage of Section 5 under the close watch 
of the courts, it would help to articulate a new theory of discrimination.  
Section 5 has been based on the premise that the states and counties that are 
most likely to institute new discriminatory devices could be predicted from 
two factors—historical experience652 and the proportion of the population 
whose native language is not English.653  Although the rationale for using 
historical experience as a predictor has not been explicitly laid out, it could 
be characterized by two propositions—that electoral discrimination is a 
product of deep-seated cultural racism, or that it is a product of a struggle for 
power that is likely whenever a minority group reaches some demographic 
threshold, or both. 
For the first thirty years of the VRA, these two factors were so closely 
correlated as to make it fruitless to try to distinguish them.  Current condi-
tions and a consideration of nineteenth-century disfranchisement, however, 
allow us to choose between the cultural and power explanations of electoral 
discrimination.  Doing so will not only provide a more solid rationale for the 
Section 5 coverage scheme, but it will also dispel the view that normal poli-
tics can now be trusted to protect minority political rights everywhere.654  
 
648. E.g., Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to George Daly, Att’y 2 (Sept. 23, 1991) (on file with the Texas Law Review). 
649. United States v. Osceola County, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222–25 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
650. Osceola County spent nearly $2 million on this suit, which lasted for two years.  
Periwinkle, Editorial, A Win-Win for Osceola, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 6, 2006, at A14; Judge 
Orders Hearing on Voting Districts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 2006, at B3. 
651. Osceola County, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.  The facts of intentional discrimination in 
Osceola County are contained in Declaration of Dr. J. Morgan Kousser, United States v. Osceola 
County, No. 6:05-CV-0053-ORL-31DAB (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2006) (on file with the Texas Law 
Review). 
652. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997) (quoting South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).  Rodríguez, supra note 17, at 805–06, 805 & n.217, worries 
that expanding the coverage of Section 5 might seem to courts to divorce it from the historical 
experience stressed in Katzenbach and other cases. 
653. The two proxies that the 1965 Act used for historical experience—turnout in the 1964 
presidential general election and the employment of a literacy test in English—are of diminishing 
relevance to evolving conditions that are likely to produce electoral discrimination, especially the 
growth of Latino populations. 
654. See Issacharoff, supra note 23, at 1714 (suggesting that the VRA may no longer be needed 
because partisan politics can protect minority rights). 




The devices that most depress or threaten to depress minority political par-
ticipation today, criminal disfranchisement and voter-identification laws, 
deeply divide the two major political parties, one dependent on black and 
brown support, the other often scorning it.655  Wherever Republicans are in 
control, they will have an incentive to pass, strengthen, or at least preserve 
each type of measure.656  And the disfranchisement of African-Americans in 
the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the principal 
instance of disfranchisement of a large already-enfranchised group in 
American history and the target of the VRA, was driven by partisan as well 
as racial motives to establish white Democratic supremacy.657  History 
teaches us that partisanship is not a cure for racist practices, but a cause. 
Examination of coverage expansion before and during congressional 
hearings would provide more solid evidence for the necessity of continuing 
Section 5 by encouraging the investigation of areas where tendencies to pass 
discriminatory devices have not been inhibited for over forty years by the 
specter of preclearance.  It would uncover numerous examples of intentional 
discrimination, satisfying the Supreme Court precedents since Washington v. 
Davis that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are violated only by 
intentional discrimination.  It would lessen any opprobrium attached to cov-
erage by showing that the adoption and employment of discriminatory 
devices has taken place in areas and at times in which invidious expressions 
of discrimination are rare, that such discrimination is more a matter of power 
than of prejudice—that Bull Connor may be dead,658 but Tom DeLay is 
 
655. See Tracie Powell, Why Republican Presidential Candidates Skipped the Morgan State 
Debate, DIVERSE: ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 27, 2007, http://diverseeducation.com/artman/ 
publish/article_9612.shtml (discussing the failure of 2008 Republican presidential candidates to 
attend debates sponsored by historically black colleges and organizations focused on minority 
issues). 
656. For a sampling of the partisan/racial battles over voter identification, see Nancy 
Badertscher & Carlos Campos, Legislature 2005: ID Debate Gets Heated: Some Lawmakers Say 
Bill Could Be Disenfranchising, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 13, 2005, at E4; Reginald Fields, Voter 
ID Bill Gets Taft’s Signature: Legislative Approval Follows Party Lines, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland, Ohio), Feb. 1, 2006, at B3; Jo Mannies, Measure to Require Photo IDs Stirs Outcry, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 2006, at B1; R. Jonathan Tuleya, Democrats Not Happy About 
Voter ID Law, DAILY LOC. NEWS (Chester County, Pa.), Feb. 3, 2006, at A1; Tom Scheck, Voting 
Bill Stirs Strong Emotions at Capitol, MINN. PUB. RADIO, Mar. 15, 2006, http://minnesota.public 
radio.org/display/web/2006/03/15/voting. 
657. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE 
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 238 (1974) 
(“The system which insured the absolute control of predominantly black counties by upper-class 
whites, the elimination in most areas of parties as a means of organized competition between 
politicians, and, in general, the nonrepresentation of lower-class interests in political decision-
making was shaped by those who stood to benefit most from it—Democrats, usually from the black 
belt and always socioeconomically privileged.”). 
658. Richard Hasen’s picturesque expression captured a thought so well as to become an instant 
cliche.  See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 188 (2005); see also Voting Rights 
Act: The Continuing Need for Section 5: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
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not.659  It would shift more of the focus of federal antidiscrimination legisla-
tion from African-Americans to the growing, spreading minority, Latinos, 
making the Act more congruent with changing discriminatory practices.660  It 
might allow for the automatic bailout of many nearly all-white southern 
counties in which discrimination has always been a minor theme because 
there is so little real power at stake.  And it would anchor the coverage for-
mula in a coherent theory of discrimination, based on long historical 
experience from the disfranchisement of African-Americans at the turn of the 
twentieth century through the latest redistrictings and shifts from single-
member districts to at-large elections.  Thus, Supreme Court invalidation of 
Section 5 under Boerne might, ironically, make it politically feasible to pass 
an amended VRA that is truly congruent and proportional to the existing and 
developing threats to racial political equality. 
VIII. “History Can Move Backward” 
When C. Vann Woodward testified before a House judiciary 
subcommittee in favor of the renewal of the VRA in 1981, he brought his 
appreciation for irony as well as his deep knowledge of the importance of 
public policy in shaping the country’s racial past to his remarks.  Asked 
whether the “Progressive Era,” when many of the at-large-election structures 
at issue in VRA suits were erected, deserved its name, he answered: 
I think one of the great and pathetic ironies of our history is that the 
most reactionary period of racial legislation got tied with the name of 
“progressivism.”  That was the period when the great bulk of the 
discriminatory laws about voting and civil rights were put on the 
books, when the northern opinion was most lax and permissive about 
those laws.661 
Asked “What is the lesson about the first [R]econstruction and why should 
we be concerned about that in 1981?” Woodward replied: 
 I think for one thing that it makes evident and clear that revolutions 
and advances in popular rights and democratic rights can be reversed; 
that history can move backward; that enormous gains can be lost and 
jeopardized, eroded, or diluted, and abridged in spite of the enormous 
cost that those advances have made. 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of Laughlin McDonald, Director, ACLU 
Voting Rights Project) (“I have been struck with the fact that invariably someone will say we don’t 
need section 5 anymore because Bull Connor is dead.”). 
659. For DeLay’s role in designing the 2003 Texas re-redistricting struck down for 
discrimination against Latinos in LULAC , see Stuart Taylor Jr., The Trouble with Texas, NAT’L J., 
Mar. 6, 2006, at 13. 
660. Rodríguez, supra note 17, at 809–10. 
661. Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2024 (1982) (statement of C. 
Vann Woodward, Professor Emeritus of History, Yale University). 




 The first [R]econstruction cost us our greatest bloodshed and 
tragedy.  It would seem that if anything has been paid for at a higher 
price, it was these advances.  And yet, they were eroded and lost, and 
only a century later they were restored. 
 My history teaches me that if it can happen once, it can happen 
again.662 
Ironies warn us to beware of dimly foreseen or vehemently denied 
consequences, to reject trades of uncertain, but adverse long-term results for 
assured short-term advantages, and to be as skeptical of triumphs as we are 
alert to opportunities to turn defeats into victories.  They counsel us to let 
thoroughly analyzed experience, rather than ideology or simplistic principles, 
be our final guide to action.  The jerky, often-reversed course of modern 
voting rights history reminds us never to count on present trends, rely on the 
inevitable success of truth or right principles, or forget that justice is a self-
conscious political construction.  The future cannot be shaped all at once, 
once and for all, but needs constant reanalysis and readjustment.  Perfection 
in the institutions of voting rights—indeed, in any institutions—is a danger-
ous myth; there is only the repeated correction of imperfections.  As long as 
there is discrimination, there will always be more work to do. 
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